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A TALE OF TWO CLINICS: SIMILARITIES AND
DIFFERENCES IN EVIDENCE OF THE "CLINIC
EFFECT" ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW
STUDENTS' ETHICAL AND ALTRUISTIC
PROFESSIONAL IDENTITIES
JONEL NEWMAN* AND DONALD NICOLSON*
"It has been through discussion of the cases that the
ethical issues have been brought to life, and that I
have reached a deeper understanding of what some
of these in fact are. However, it does take a degree of
introspection, and putting yourself in the other's
shoes to try to get to grips with the pressures of con-
flicting needs and competing values. I think it is only
through experience that this level of understanding
will develop to the point of being a 'second-nature'
response to a legal issue that I am working on."'
"The clinic has really taught me a lot about myself
and made me think about what it is I want to do with
my degree. Representing people who would other-
wise not have access to an attorney or 'the system'
has been eye-opening. I would like to continue to
work with poor communities and do whatever I can
* Clinical Professor and Director, Health Rights Clinic, University of Miami
School of Law.
* Professor of Law and Director, University of Strathclyde Law Clinic. The
authors are indebted to the able research assistance of Nicole Halmoukos.
1 Jill, Strathclyde, Fall 2013, Week 2. Excerpts from the diaries of students from
the University of Strathclyde Law Clinic are identified by a pseudonym, Fall or
Spring term, and the week.
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to remedy some of the inadequacies that currently
exi st.,, 2
For many law clinicians, the above quotations from two
clinic students, reflecting on the value of their clinic experiences in
learning about ethics and inspiring an ongoing commitment to
enhancing access to justice, represent the holy grail. Based on educ-
ational theory,3 and anecdotal evidence,4 law clinicians and those
interested in the ethical development of law students have long
maintained that live-client law clinics are an extremely effective-if
not the most effective-means of developing (a) an awareness and
understanding of and commitment to legal ethics (what can be called
an "ethical effect" and/or (b) developing or at least sustaining an
altruistic commitment to use their legal skills to serve those most in
need of legal services (an "altruism effect").
Unfortunately, however, the results of the very few empirical
studies exploring the effect of clinical involvement on students'
ethics and/or altruism have been mixed. In a study of 120 students in
two U.S. law schools, Maresh found that 32 of 46 students who had
no intention of engaging in public interest careers changed their
mind after law clinic participation. Hartwell found that a clinical
2 Maria, Miami, Spring 2014. Excerpts from the self-reflection memoranda of
students from the University of Miami Health Rights Clinic are also identified by
a pseudonym and by Fall or Spring term.
3 See infra Section I.
' See e.g. Quintin Johnstone, Law School Legal Aid Clinics, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC.
535, 537 (1950); William M. Rees, Clinical Legal Education: An Analysis of the
University of Kent Model, 9 LAW TEACH 125, 136 (1975); Martin Guggenheim,
Fee-Generating Clinics: Can We Bear the Costs? 1 CLINICAL L. REv. 677, 683
(1995); Minna J. Kotkin, The Law School Clinic: A Training Ground for Public
Interest Lawyers and Sally Maresh, The Impact of Clinical Legal Education on
Decisions of Law Students to Practice Public Interest Law, in EDUCATING FOR
JUSTICE: SOCIAL VALUES AND LEGAL EDUCATION (Jeremy Cooper & Louise G.
Trubek eds., 1997); Irene Styles & Archie Zariska, Law Clinics and the Promotion
of Public Interest Lawyering, 19 LAw IN CONTEXT 65 (2001); Kieran Tranter,
Pro-Bono Ethos: Teaching Legal Ethics, 29 BRIEF 12, 12-14 (2002).
5 Maresh, ibid.
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class improved U.S. law students' moral judgment,6 but this was
through simulated, rather than live-client, experience, and, as we
shall see, improved moral judgment does not necessarily translate
into improved moral behavior. Palermo and Evans did explore the
impact of live clinical experience when combined with ethical
teaching on the professed values of Australian students as they
progressed through law school and entered the legal profession, and
found some evidence of a positive relation between clinic experi-
ence, on the one hand, and students' ethical reasoning and level of
commitment to engaging in pro bono legal representation, on the
other.8 Unfortunately, as they had not evaluated students' attitudes
before they entered the clinic, it was impossible to determine
whether this clinical experience initiated new, rather than merely
sustained prior, altruistic commitments and ethical values.
There have been other, far more wide-ranging, studies on the
possible impact clinics and wider pro bono programs have on the
development of altruism in students. Sandefur and Selbin in an
extensive survey study did control for (recollected) attitudes of stu-
dents upon entering law schools in the U.S., but found that when
this was taken into consideration, there was no evidence that clinics
generally develop, as opposed to sustain, students' altruism. 9 While
such a sustaining effect is valuable in itself, given, as we shall see,10
the apparently negative impact of U.S. legal education on students'
ethical and altruistic values and the challenge to their values they
will face once in practice, it is important to note that Sandefur and
Selbin failed to control for whether the clinics involved were
focused predominantly on serving the community or, as is far more
common in the U.S., on teaching students. Nor did they control for
6 See Steven Hartwell, Promoting Moral Development through Experiential
Teaching, 1 CLINICAL L. REv. 505, 536 (1994).
7 See infra note 43.
8 See Josephine Palenno & Adrian Evans, Almost There: Empirical Insights into
Clinical Method and Ethics Courses in Climbing the Hill Towards Lawyers'
Professionalism, 17 GRIFFITH L. REv. 252 (2008).
9 See Rebecca Sandefur & Jeffrey Selbin, The Clinic Effect, 16 CLINICAL L. REv.
57, 92 (2009).
10 See infra section 1(a)(iii).
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whether instruction went beyond teaching law and skills to include
reflection on access to justice and the lawyer's ethical responsibili-
ties in this regard. Thus, Nicolson has previously argued that a focus
on a student's education and the linking of student involvement to
earning academic credit risks undermining the message given to stu-
dents about the importance of serving the community, and, by con-
trast, clinics which have a social justice orientation and do not give
academic credit for participation may better preserve that message."
Rhode1 2 and Granfieldl3 also conducted extensive U.S. sur-
veys and found that merely requiring or giving students the
opportunity to engage in pro bono services while at law school will
not necessarily ensure their willingness to engage in pro bono work
after graduation, though the latter did find that 34% of those
surveyed were influenced in their choice of career by their pro bono
experience and that engaging in pro bono work in law school had at
least a marginal impact on their motivation to continue once in
practice. Both argued that, in order to maximize the potential for
clinical and other pro bono experiences to inculcate a commitment
to redress unmet legal need once in practice, law schools need to
give pro bono programs a high profile and integrated them into the
general curriculum. 15 In support, Schmedemann found a more posi-
tive impact on the commitment to engage in pro bono service after
graduation in both students who had undertaken clinical classes or
engaged in pro bono work on a voluntary basis where there were
" Donald Nicolson, Legal Education or Community Service? The Extra-Curricu-
lar Student Law Clinic, WEB J. OF CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES (2006), available at
http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2006.
12 Deborah L. Rhode, PRO BoNo IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE: PUBLIC SERVICE
AND THE PROFESSIONS ch. 7 (2005).
13 Robert Granfield, Institutionalizing Public Service in Law School: Results on
the Impact ofMandatory Pro Bono Programs, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1355 (2007).
" Id. at 1379, 1399-41; Rhode, supra note 12, at 156 (describing that 22% of
students were encouraged by their law school experience to engage in pro bono
after graduation, but that 19% were discouraged from doing so).
15 See Granfield, supra note 13, at 1412; Rhode, supra note 12, at 159-60 and
Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 665, 732-35
(1994).
4
2016-2017 A Tale of Two Clinics 5
opportunities for reflection on clinical and pro bono experiences and
- * * *16
a discussion of issues of social justice.
Finally, through a detailed qualitative study of the learning
diaries of law clinic students at a Scottish university-the University
of Strathclyde (henceforth, USLC)-Nicolson explored the impact
on both ethics and altruism of combining a course devoted entirely
to exploring issues of legal ethics and access to justice with what is
otherwise an entirely extra-curricular clinic.17 Like Schmedemann,
he found evidence of a commitment to engage in pro bono work
after graduation and, like Granfield, that clinical experience caused
some students to change career plans in favor of careers focused
more on assisting those most in need (an altruism effect). Moreover,
he also found that teaching ethics in the context of past and current
clinical experiences created the conditions for encouraging students
to see a commitment to legal ethics as an integral part of their
professional identity.
The study reported in this article replicates that of Nicolson's
in terms of methodology and, to a large extent, its findings. How-
ever, the fact that diaries from a new cohort of students at the USLC
are analyzed alongside self-evaluation reports of students from the
University of Miami Health Rights Clinic (henceforth, MHRC) is
significant, not only in that it provides additional evidence for both
the "ethics effect" and the "altruism effect," but also because, as we
shall see in more detail, the two clinics differ in a number of signi-
ficant ways. Both clinics prioritize the provision of legal services to
those most in need over student education. However at the USLC,
academic credit for clinic work is optional, and the exception rather
than the norm, and the teaching that does occur is focused far more
16 Deborah A. Schmedemann, Priming for Pro Bono Publico: The Impact of the
Law School on Pro Bono Participation in Practice, in PRIVATE LAWYERS AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE EVOLVING ROLE OF PRO BONO IN THE LEGAL PROFES-
SION 73 (Robert Granfield & Lynn Mather eds. 2009). See also Cynthia Adcock,
Beyond Externships and Clinics: Integrating Access to Justice Education into the
Curriculum, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 566 (2013).
17 Donald Nicolson, Learning In Justice: Ethical Education in an Extra-Curricu-
lar Law Clinic, in THE ETHICS PROJECT IN LEGAL EDUCATION 171 (Michael
Robertson et al., 2010).
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on issues of ethics and access to justice than on skills development
and substantive law. By contrast, all MRC students obtain credit
for their clinical involvement, and legal ethics forms only one part
of a wide range of topics taught. Moreover, there are also important
differences between the two clinics in terms of the form and depth
of teaching and student reflection on issues of ethics and access to
justice. Consequently, a comparison of the reflective diaries of the
USLC students and the self-evaluative reports of the MHRC stu-
dents allows us to draw inferences on how to maximize the potential
for law clinics to engender a commitment to ethical and altruistic
service as part of the professional identities of law graduates.
First, however, we will provide an outline of the theoretical
claims for the value of ethical and altruistic development through
clinical experience. We then explain our particular goals for incul-
cating ethical professional identity in our students before turning to
a description of our two clinics, the self-reflection materials
prepared by students in each clinic, and the methodology used to
analyze the diaries. This leads to the presentation of evidence from
our analysis for the conclusion that our clinics are having an impact
on students' attitudes which may well lead to the development of
ethical and altruistic professional identity, and finally to our own
reflections on the lessons we have learned from comparing the
reflections of our students on their clinical experience.
I. ETHICS, CLINICS, AND EDUCATIONAL THEORY
A. Aims and Assumptions: Teaching Against
Legal Education's Hidden Curriculum
(i) The Goal: Altru-Ethical Professionalism
Both authors see clinics as an important means to repay the privi-
leges that students and academic staff alike derive from a university
education by serving those most in need of legal services.18 As
18 See e.g. Donald Nicolson, Calling, Character, and Clinical Legal Education: A
Cradle to Grave Approach to Inculcating a Love for Justice, 16 LEGAL ETHICs 1
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important as this goal is, we also view clinics as an important vehi-
cle for developing in students a professional identity that includes a
commitment to upholding high ethical standards and a recognition
that service to those most in need is a moral obligation which con-
tinues after entry into legal practice. Such a notion of professional-
ism-what Nicolson has dubbed "altru-ethical professionalism"1 9
differs from more traditional notions, in which little more is required
of professionals than that they have the necessary skills to provide
services to their clients, and that they do so competently, zealously
and in accordance with promulgated professional norms. By con-
trast, along with many others,2 0 we regard a lawyer's personal
responsibility to maintain high ethical standards as an integral
element of professionalism, 2 1 and the responsibility to attempt to
enhance access to justice as part of these ethical standards.2 2
The reduction of professional ethics to mere adherence to
professional norms largely but not entirely23 found in codes of con-
duct can be criticized on two counts.24 One is substantive, namely
(2013); JoNel Newman & Melissa Swain, Helping Haiti in the Wake of Disaster:
Law Students as First Responders, 6 INTER. HuM. RIGHTS L. REv. 133 (2011).
19 Nicolson, id.
20 See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 213 (2000); William
M. Sullivan, Anne Colby, Judith Welch Wegner, Lloyd Bond & Lee S. Shulman,
EDUCATING LAWYERS 126-29 (2007); ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR
LEGAL EDUCATION 24 (2007).
21 Hamilton and Monson maintain that most legal scholars recognize that "a
lawyer's moral core is the foundation of professionalism." Neil Hamilton & Verna
Monson, Legal Education's Ethical Challenge: Empirical Research on How Most
Effectively to Foster Each Student's Professional Formation (Professionalism), 9
ST. THOMAS L.J. 325, 331 (2011).
22 See Hamilton & Monson, id. at 331-32 (discussing the formation of professional
identity as "an ongoing self-reflective process involving habits of thinking, feel-
ing, and acting," and defining as an educational objective "professional formation
toward a moral core of service to and responsibility for others").
23 See Donald Nicolson, Making Lawyers Moral: Ethical Codes and Moral
Character, LEGAL STUDIES 601, 603-04 (2005); Richard K. Greenstein, Against
Professionalism, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 327, 351-63 (2009).
24 In this article, we use the terms codes and rules interchangeably to refer to the
body of law regulating lawyers, and-unless specifically noted-are not referring
2016-2017 7
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that these norms fall short of what many would regard as high
ethical standards, and the other is regulatory, namely that formal
norms and codes are not the most effective means of ensuring that
lawyers do in fact act ethically (whatever the content of such ethics
might be).
As regards the substantive criticism, there is well-known and
widespread criticism that formal professional norms are premised on
a "standard conception" involving the notion that lawyers are
entitled, if not obliged, to act as 'hired guns' or, less pejoratively,
"neutral partisans."2 5 Untroubled by ethical considerations, lawyers
are left free to harm the administration of justice and the law itself, as
well as to third parties, the general public and even the environment.
The cocooning of lawyers from their ethical conscience may, in fact,
also harm their clients in that lawyers with anesthetized moral
consciences may impose solutions paternalistically on clients who
would not have wanted their interest pursued at all costs had they
been engaged in a "moral dialogue."2 6 At the very least, the shutting
down of a lawyer's moral faculties is argued to lead to a consequent
shutting down of the emotional faculty of empathy, which is
regarded as crucial for an effective, respectful and caring service to
the client.2 7 Yet the codes can also be criticized for paying little or no
to any particular set of regulations such as the Law Society of Scotland's Code of
Conduct or ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
25 See Donald Nicolson & Julian Webb, PROFESSIONAL LEGAL ETHICS: CRITICAL
INTERROGATIONS ch. 6 (1999); Deborah L. Rhode & David Luban, LEGAL ETHICS
132-33 (1992); David Luban, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988);
William H. Simon, The Ideology ofAdvocacy: Procedural Justice and Profession-
al Ethics, WIs. L. REv. 29 (1978).
26 See Luban, ibid. at 160ff; Nicolson & Webb, supra note 25, ch. 8, sec. 2.1;
Simon, id, 132ff; Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A
Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 613, 630-32
(1986); Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits ofthe Law: An Exercise in the
Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1600 (1995); Ted
Schneyer, Some Sympathy for the Hired Gun, 41 J. LEGAL EDuC. 11, 27 (1991).
27 See, e.g., Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 GEO.
L.J. 2665, 2694-95, 2699-700 (1993); Theresa Glannon, Lawyers and Caring:
Building an Ethic of Care into Professional Responsibility, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1175
(1992); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal
Profession Making New Voices in the Law, 42 MIAMI L. REv. 29, 45 (1987);
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attention to the need to respect client autonomy and to provide empa-
thetic, but at the same time effective, legal services. More generally,
they are often criticized for merely protecting the profession's own
self-interest and providing only just enough protection of clients and
the public to fend off outside regulatory control.2 8
Equally important is the fact that most professional codes
pay no attention to issues of access to justice. For example, the
American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct
state only that lawyers should "aspire to render at least (50) hours of
pro bono public legal services per year." 2 9 Yet none of the rules or
codes promulgated by U.S. jurisdictions require bar members actu-
ally to serve a minimum number of hours of pro bono service or
otherwise assist those who cannot afford their fees. 3 0 And, in the
U.K., the various professional codes do not even mention an aspira-
tional duty to enhance access to justice.
There are many sources suggestive of a moral duty to redress
unmet legal need, but we are most attracted to the idea that this
flows from an obligation of reciprocity lawyers owe to society. 3 1
Through their taxes or their contribution to the profits of other
taxpayers, all in society pay for the legal education of many lawyers
and the college education of some (especially in Scotland). Such
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Reflections on a Women's
Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 57 (1985). See also Bruce J.
Winick, Dealing with Client Denial in the Advance Directive Context: A Chal-
lenge for the Therapeutically-Oriented Preventive Lawyer, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. (1999); Marjorie A. Silver, Love, Hate, and Other Emotional Inter-
ference in the Lawyer/client Relationship, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 259, 270-71 (1999).
28 See Luban, supra note 25, at 148-74; Rhode, supra note 20, at 143-47, 211;
Robert Granfield & Thomas Koenig, It's Hard to Be a Human Being and a
Lawyer: Young Attorneys and the Confrontation with Ethical Ambiguity in Legal
Practice, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 495, 501-14 (2003).
29 ABA Model Rule Prof. Conduct 6.1 (2013).
30 See Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 LOy. L.A.
L. REV. 869, 888 (2009) (New York now requires bar applicants to demonstrate
that they have provided 50 hours of pro bono services prior to admission, 22
NYCRR 520.16 (2014), and a similar requirement is under consideration in
California).
31 See Nicolson, supra note 18, at 37-39.
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direct and indirect investment in law students enables the latter to
eventually enjoy substantial financial rewards. However, only those
who are fortunate enough to afford lawyers or qualify for legal aid
benefit from this investment. Moreover, a major reason why so
many people lack access to legal services is because lawyers seek to
maximize their financial rewards through charging high fees. Conse-
quently, it can be argued that these lawyers have a moral duty to
take some remedial action to repay those who helped put them in
their privileged position, but do not benefit from their investment in
the education of lawyers. Three arguments further support a moral
obligation on lawyers to enhance access to justice. One is that their
earnings are partly-albeit decreasingly-protected by state limita-
tions on who can practice law and access legal processes. Secondly,
many access to justice problems stem from often unnecessary and
difficult-to-understand legal complexities created by lawyers serving
their clients (and thereby themselves by making legal assistance
more necessary). Finally, the whole apparatus of law and the legal
system, by which lawyers make their money, is subsidized by the
public.
It therefore seems incumbent on law schools to impress upon
students the need both to commit to ethics beyond formal codes and
to take some responsibility for problems of access to justice. In fact,
the message about altruistic service is arguably even more important
than that regarding personal ethical standards (even if one leaves
aside the fact that personal ethical standards might turn out not to be
so ethical !).32 If, like Rawls, we think that '[j]ustice is the first virtue
of social institutions," 33 then we should think of access to justice as
the first virtue of the ethical lawyer. Put crudely, there seems to be a
limited value in producing lawyers who are aware of ethical prob-
lems, yet who ultimately serve the more powerful in society-for
example, by working for firms where morality is viewed as an unaf-
fordable luxury, and the scope of the lawyer's practice is highly
constrained. This is not to say that lawyers should not be made
32 See Donald Nicolson, Legal Education, Ethics and Access to Justice: Forging
Warriors for Justice in a Neo-Liberal World, 22 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 5-6
(2015)
33 John Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (rev. ed. 1989).
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ethically aware. Instead, it is to argue that we do a lot more to serve
justice-which is, after all, the legitimating goal of law-if we
produce lawyers who are not just ethically aware but who are
motivated to assist in some way to ensure that everyone has access
to legal services. It seems obvious to us that ethically aware lawyers
devoting their careers to serving those most in need or doing pro
bono work is an improvement over only providing ethically in-
34formed services to those who can afford to pay.
(ii) The Limited Imagination of Formal Ethical Norms
Leaving aside the exact extent of the lawyer's professional
responsibility, the current approach to inculcating a sense of moral
obligation is grossly deficient from both a philosophical and psycho-
logical point of view. Seeing morality in terms of obedience to
codes or other formal written rules flows from a philosophical tradi-
tion that has dominated ethics since the Enlightenment. It is often
called the deontic tradition because it sees morality in terms of
duties.3 5 Deontic ethics is most obviously associated with deontolo-
gists like Kant, but is also found in many religions, as exemplified
by the Bible's ten commandments, and even in utilitarianism. The
duties may be specific and categorical, such as duties not to lie,
break confidences, etc., or general and require tailoring to the parti-
cularities of each situation, such as the duty to always do whatever
maximizes utility in any given situation. However, whatever the
content and form of the duties, moral behavior is treated as primarily
an intellectual activity. It is assumed either that our rationality
enables us to know what our duties are and what they require, and
3 Cf Rhode, supra note 20, at 26 (arguing that legal education should strive to
"encourage a sense of professional responsibility for the public interest"); Stuckey,
supra note 20, at 62 ("All professional values deserve attention by law schools, but
teaching students to strive to seek justice may be the most important goal of all").
35 Nicholas J. Dent, THE MORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE VIRTUES 32-33 (1984)
(explaining that "deon " is the Greek word for duty, and contrasting this tradition
with aretaic or virtue ethics (see infra section B) and also Michael Slote, FROM
MORALITY TO VIRTUE (1992); Phillip Montague, Virtue Ethics: A Qualified
Success Story 29 AM. PHIL. Q. 53 (1992)).
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that somehow this will motivate obedience or, more commonly, that
duties need to be laid down in ethical, legal and religious codes, and
reinforced by threats of punishment.36
For many, however, reducing ethics to simply obeying
duties and codes is an inferior form of morality. For example, fol-
lowing a pure form of Kantianism, the developmental psychologist,
Kohlberg regards the highest stage of moral development as one
wherein individuals formulate their own moral principles (though he
nevertheless believes that these apply universally).37 More radically,
postmodernists like Bauman argue that codes are the antithesis of
morality and that morality ends where ethical codes begin.38 Moral-
ity involves recognition of the Other's unspoken and unconditional
demand, which, because it is unlimited in scope and ambiguous as
to content, cannot be reduced to formula and rules. Indeed, Bauman
argues that the "greater the moral responsibility, the dimmer is the
hope of its normative regulation."39 Morality is thus marked by
personal choice and anxiety, both of which are extinguished by
codes. As Rhode observes, when morality is reduced to codes, "[t]he
result is legal ethics without the ethics." 40 While there is much that
36 See Zygmunt Bauman, POSTMODERN ETHICS (1993), at chapters 1-3; Angus J.
Dawson, Professional Codes of Practice and Ethical Conduct, 11 J. APPLIED
PHIL. 146 (1996).
37 See e.g., Lawrence Kohlberg, Moral Stages and Moralization: The Cognitive-
Developmental Approach, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOUR (1976);
ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT, VOL 1: THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL
DEVELOPMENT (1981); ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT, VOL 2: THE PSYCHOL-
OGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1984); Lawrence Kohlberg, Charles Levine &
Alexandra Hewer, MORAL STAGES: A CURRENT FORMULATION AND A RESPONSE
TO CRITICS (1983).
3 8 See Bauman, supra note 36; Zygmunt Bauman, LIFE IN FRAGMENTS: ESSAYS IN
POSTMODERN MORALITY (1995), at ch. 1; Zygmunt Bauman, What Prospects of
Morality in Times of Uncertainty?, 15 THEORY CULTURE AND SOCIETY 11 (1998).
See also Dawson, supra note 35, at 153; Steven R. Salbu, Law and Conformity,
Ethics and Conflict: The Trouble with Law-Based Conceptions of Ethics, 68
INDIANAL.J. 101 (1992).
39 See Bauman, What Prospects of Morality in Times of Uncertainty?, id. at 20
(emphasis removed).
0 Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Education: Rethinking the Problem, 40 PEPPERDINE
L. REV. 437, 450 (2013). See also, e.g., Granfield & Koenig, supra note 28, at
12
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is inspirational in these accounts of ethics, one need not go that far
to realize-as some practicing lawyers themselves don-that rely-
ing solely on codes and duties to ensure that lawyers act ethically is
inadequate.
Instead, one can begin with the psychology of moral beha-
vior. Following Rest, it has come to be accepted that moral behavior
(whatever its content) involves at least 42 four components: sensitiv-
ity, judgment, motivation and courage. 4 3 First, moral sensitivity
enables individuals to recognize moral problems when they arise.
This requires both cognitive and affective psychological capacities,
in that awareness that a situation raises moral issues may stem from
empathy or guilt, rather than intellectual categorization. Second,
moral judgment enables individuals to identify the salient features of
issues, and to select and justify appropriate responses. These two
psychological components, however, only take individuals so far
towards acting morally. Empirical research repeatedly confirms that
knowing what is morally right is only weakly linked to doing what is
morally right. Acting morally requires two additional components.
499-500; William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1083, 1143 (1988).
41 See Granfield & Koenig, supra note 28, at 508-12.
42 See Laura J. Duckett & Muriel B. Ryden, Education for Ethical Nursing
Practice, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE PROFESSIONS: PSYCHOLOGY AND
APPLIED ETHICS 61 (James Rest & Darcia Narvaez eds., 1994) (arguing that
"implementation" involves a fifth, albeit interpersonal rather than purely psycholo-
gical, component).
43 See James Rest, The Major Components of Morality, in MORALITY, MORAL
BEHAVIOUR AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT (W. Kurtines & J. Gewirtz eds., 1984);
Darcia Narvaez & James Rest, The Four Components of Acting Morally, in
MORALITY, MORAL BEHAVIOUR AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT (W. Kurtines & J.
Gewirtz eds., 1995), at chapter 1. See also Joel J. Kupperman, CHARACTER
(1991), at ch. 4. Note that Rest et al. refer to "moral character" instead of moral
courage, but we have not followed that convention here, because we will argue
that developed moral character involves all four components, and not just moral
courage.
" See Rest, id., at 21-22; James R. Rest, Can Ethics Be Taught in Professional
Schools? The Psychological Research, 1 ETHICS EASIER SAID THAN DONE 22
(1988).
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Moral motivation ensures that individuals want to put into effect the
moral solution selected and elevate it over competing considera-
tions, such as self-interest or organizational and institutional values.
Without this component, individuals might know what morality
requires but not in fact care. Here it is moral feelings and character
dispositions which are more important than cognition. But even if
individuals do care, they must have the moral courage to convert
ethical thought and concern into ethical action. Doing so may
involve resisting temptations to compromise moral standards. Cru-
cial in this regard are the personal virtues of moral fiber, steadfast-
ness, perseverance, and backbone, or what psychologists call ego-
strength.
The psychology of moral behavior reveals a serious problem
with relying on codes as the means to lawyer's morality. Thus codes
and moral duties are highly unlikely on their own to equip lawyers
to identify and resolve all potential ethical problems arising in legal
practice. Attempts by codes to deal conclusively with all possible
moral problems are likely to be frustrated by the limits of human
imagination and the rapidly changing nature of the legal profession
and its social context. Moreover, codes often contain conflicting
duties,46 yet no means to resolve those conflicts. In fact, given the
inherent ambiguity and vagueness of language, even codes written
in the form of specific rules rather than aspirational ideals are open
to varying interpretations. This suggests that codes always require
1 See e.g., Dawson, supra note 36; Heidi L. Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can
Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 885, 932
(1996); Allan C. Hutchinson, Legal Ethics for a Fragmented Society: Between
Professional and Personal, 5 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 176, 183 (1998).
46 See e.g., Nicolson & Webb, supra note 25, ch. 8 (discussing the conflict
between the lawyer's duties to the client and to the court).
1 This is illustrated by confusion over often-conflicting rules governing the prac-
tice of lawyers in multiple U.S. jurisdictions, lack of clarity as to the weight to be
accorded the ABA's comments on the Model Rules, and conflict between the
standards set forth in the rules and the accepted standard of care in any particular
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Jane Y. Kim, Refusing to Settle: A Look at the Attorney's
Ethical Dilemma in Client Settlement Decisions, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 383,
407-413 (2012); Susan E. Thrower, Neither Reasonable Nor Remedial: The
Hopeless Contradictions of the Legal Ethics Measures to Prevent Perjury, 58
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those who they govern to exercise judgment. For two reasons, teach-
ing codes alone is insufficient to inculcate effective ethical judgment
in lawyers.
First, it does little to assist students in developing their own
sense of ethical professionalism. Without exposure to the extensive
legal ethics literature, they are unlikely to grapple with issues such
as the meaning of professionalism, the justification for neutral
partisanship, and the limits to lawyer's zeal, confidentiality and
paternalism. Without exposure to the ethical theories that underlie
and inform professional legal ethics, students lack the intellectual
tools to help resolve ethical dilemmas that are not covered by the
rules or professional conventions. Secondly, current education does
little to engage students' affective capacities. Moral judgment is not
confined to rationally working out which duty best fits a moral
dilemma and how it should be applied. As feminists, postmodernists
and a host of earlier ethical theorists recognize, the response to
moral issues might equally be an emotional one.4 It may involve
what the virtue ethicist McDowell calls a "perceptual capacity" 4 9
which enables individuals to respond to the unique circumstances of
each situation by drawing upon empathy, compassion and imagina-
tion, as well as their past experiences and entire world-view.o In
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 781, passim (2010); Lucian T. Pera, Grading ABA Leadership
on Legal Ethics Leadership: State Adoption of the Revised ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 637, 644-46 (2005); American
Law Institute, Excerpts from Special Study Conference of Federal Rules Gov-
erning Attorney Conduct, Daniel R. Coquillette, Rptr., Q247 ALI-ABA 311, 337,
340-44, 347 (1996).
4 See, e.g., Nicolson & Webb, supra note 25, at 34-38, 46-49 (regarding femin-
ism and postmodernism); Joan C. Tronto, MORAL BOUNDARIES: A POLITICAL
ARGUMENT FOR AN ETHIC OF CARE (1993) (regarding Scottish Enlightenment
philosophers). See also Stanley G. Clarke & Evan Simpson, Introduction: The
Primacy ofMoral Practice, in ANTI-THEORY IN ETHICS AND MORAL CONSERVA-
TISM (Stanley G. Clarke & Evan Simpson eds. 1989).
' John McDowell, Virtue and Reason, 62 THE MONIST 331, 333 (1979).
so See David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Teaching Ethics in
Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31 (1995); Mark N. Aaronson, We Ask You
to Consider: Learning about Practical Judgment in Lawyering, 4 CLINICAL L.
REV. 247 (1998).
2016-2017 15
Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal Vol. XXXV
addition, affective faculties may sensitize lawyers to moral issues,
and motivate them to act morally51 as well as to implement moral
decisions with "warmth, empathy, compassion, and connectedness,"
rather than in a "cool, distant or autocratic manner."52
The final and most significant problem with codified, duty-
based ethics is that, even if lawyers can identify and resolve moral
problems, they still need to care about doing the right thing and have
the backbone to resist competing pressures. But codes have little to
say about moral motivation and courage. Instead, lawyers are
assumed to have these faculties, or otherwise it is hoped that the
threat of sanctions will ensure that codes are obeyed. The effective-
ness of this threat is, however, crucially dependent on the ability to
detect wrongdoing, often in situations where lawyer behavior is
hidden from view.5 3 It is also dependent on professional bodies
having the resources and will to pursue and punish wrongdoers, yet
the record to date54 indicates that neither commodity is in great
supply. Moreover, empirical research suggests that lawyers who pay
attention to ethical rules solely because of fear of punishment are
51 Feldman, supra note 45, at 904-908.
52 Duckett & Ryden, supra note 42, at 61.
53 Richard O'Dair, LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT AND MATERIALS 5 (2001). This problem
is exacerbated by the likely reluctance of lawyers to risk being ostracized if they
report their colleagues. Rhode, supra note 12, at 709.
5 Richard L. Abel, THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN ENGLAND & WALES 134-35, 252-
53 (1988); Michael Zander, Only the TalkIs Tough, 95 GAZETTE 46, Dec. 2, 1998;
The Times, May 1998, 9; Michael Burrage, From a Gentlemen's to a Public Pro-
fession: Status and Politics in the History of English Solicitors, 3 INT'L J. LEGAL
PROF. 45, 56-57 (1996), and in relation to the U.S., Judith A. McMorrow, Jackie
A. Gardina & Salvatore Ricciardone, Judicial Attitudes Toward Confronting
Attorney Misconduct: A View from the Reported Decisions, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv.
1425 (2004); Andrew L. Kaufman, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
453-60 (3d ed. 1989) (Judges fail to enforce lawyers' ethical duties; and lawyers
fail to enforce the ethical duties of their peers); Eric Schnapper, The Myth of Legal
Ethics, 64 A.B.A. J. 202, 202-03 (1978). For similar trends in other jurisdictions,
see e.g., Harry W. Arthurs, The Dead Parrot: Ethics for Postmodern Profession-
als, 6 WESTMINSTER AFFAIRS 3 (1993); Julian Disney, Paul Redmond, John
Basten & Stan Ross, LAWYERS 83 (2nd ed. 1986).
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less likely to be committed to the mandated ethical behavior." This
is particularly problematic in the context of the legal profession,
given that the competent lawyer's skills include the ability to find
ways around inconvenient rules. Consequently, some lawyers might
not regard code rules as greatly limiting their freedom to act
unethically.
(iii) Ethics Teaching and the Hidden Curriculum
Duty-based codes of ethics thus fail to address much of what
is psychologically required for moral behavior. Matters are even
further exacerbated by the current state of legal education, both
generally and in relation to legal ethics. As regards the latter, U.S.
and U.K. law schools largely confine ethical education to teaching
the codes. While this occurs in compulsory stand-alone ethics
classes in the US, 56 such classes "are not highly regarded and are
seldom inspiring-as the focus tends to be on learning a code of
professionalism, rather than engaging in reflective thinking."
Moreover, in U.S. law schools ethics courses are often taught by "a
reluctant cadre of junior faculty and outside lecturers" and come to
be seen as the "dog of the law-hard to teach, disappointing to take,
and often presented to vacant seats or vacant minds."58 In the U.K.,
notwithstanding sporadic calls for professional ethics to be taught at
the academic stage of legal education,59 only roughly a quarter of
5 Margaret M. Coady, The Moral Domain ofProfessionals, in CODES OF ETHICS
AND THE PROFESSIONS 28 (Margaret M. Coady & Sidney Block eds., 1996), at 49.
56 See Andrew M. Perlman et al., A Survey ofProfessional Responsibility Courses
at American Law Schools in 2009 (2009), available at http://wwwlegalethics
forum.com/files/pr-survey-resultsfinal.pdf.
5 Muriel J. Bebeau, The Defining Issues Test and the Four Component Model:
Contributions to Professional Education, 31 J. MORAL EDUC. 271, 274 (2002).
58 See Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Questions: Feminist Perspectives on Legal Edu-
cation, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1547, 1561 (1993) (quoting Dale C. Moss, Out of Bal-
ance: Why Can'tLaw Schools Teach Ethics?, STUDENT LAw., Oct. 1991, at 19).
59 See e.g. Julian Webb, Jane Ching, Paul Maharg & Avrom Sherr, Setting Stan-
dards: The Future of Legal Services Education and Training Regulation in
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law schools do so on a compulsory basis.60 Instead, the teaching of
legal ethics is usually left to the "vocational stage," where it is
almost invariably confined to teaching professional rules. Admit-
tedly, legal ethics teaching in the U.K. has not received the sort of
criticisms it has in the U.S. However, even if it were inspiring and
went beyond the teaching of the codes, a single class in ethics is
likely to be too limited and come too late to reverse what is regarded
by many as the implicit message of most legal teaching.
While most students are not explicitly taught ethics (as
opposed to the norms of professional responsibility contained in the
codes), it is argued that they all learn about ethics, legal practice and
professional roles from what has been called the hidden curricu-
lum. 6 1 These unarticulated value assumptions, which supplement
and may be as powerful as those contained in formal curriculum, are
communicated to students by example, teaching methods, curricu-
lum choices as to what courses are or are not taught, at what level
they are taught and for what number of credits, and whether they are
compulsory, and by student culture and contacts with the legal
-62profession.
Thus, notwithstanding the shrinking dominance of black-
letter scholarship and the growth of "law and..." courses, it is prob-
ably true to say that legal education remains primarily focused on
England and Wales (London, Legal Education and Training Review 2013),
available at http://letr.org.uk/the-report/index.htm.
60 Phil Harris & Sarah Beinart, A Survey of Law Schools in the United Kingdom,
2004, 39 L. TCHR. 299 (2005).
61 See Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29
J. LEGAL EDUC. 247 (1978); AALS Curriculum Study Project Committee, Train-
ing for the Public Professions of the Law: 1971, reprinted in Herbert L. Packer &
Thomas Ehrlich. NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION 93, 129 (1972) (This
concept has also been varyingly referred to as law school's latent, implicit or
informal curriculum); See, e.g., Ronald M. Pipkin, Law School Instruction in
Professional Responsibility: A Curricular Paradox, 1979 AM. BAR FOUND. RES.
J. 247 (1979); Howard Lesnick, The Integration of Responsibility and Values:
Legal Education in an Alternative Consciousness of Lawyering and Law, 10
NOVA L.J. 633, 634 (1986); Kim Economides, Legal Ethics Three Challenges
for the Next Millennium, in ETHICAL CHALLENGES TO LEGAL EDUCATION AND
CONDUCT (Economides ed. 1998).
62 See Sullivan et al., supra note 20, at 140-42.
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teaching "the law" and "how to think like a lawyer." Yet, whether
consciously or not, academics constantly convey messages about
justice and ethics.63 Unfortunately, the lesson tends to be that such
issues are unimportant and should yield to more "lawyerly"
questions, thus undercutting students' understanding that the role of
a lawyer includes acting as a normative agent.6 4 The low visibility of
moral values and justice in the formal curriculum is especially
apparent whenever questions about lawyers' ethics, justice and the
impact of law on people's lives cry out for discussion, but are
ignored, or when students are told not to confuse their emotional or
moral responses to law with the central question of what it is. This
combination of the separation of law and justice, and the relegation
of the latter to "soft," and often optional, subjects like jurisprudence
is likely to lead to an uncritical, formalistic acceptance of law's
underlying values as neutral and objective, and acceptance of the
idea that law is justice, and moral behavior merely that which is
legal. As an alternative to this legalistic morality, an educational
focus on developing technical and argumentative skills in relation to
malleable law and facts might lead students to abandon ideas of
right and wrong in favor of an instrumental morality, in which their
only goal is success and the only constraints pragmatic. Either way,
there is little to challenge the standard conception of lawyers whose
function is confined to manipulating law and facts in the interests of
65---paying clients, particularly if these concepts remain unexamined
63 See e.g., Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Can a Law Teacher Avoid Teaching Legal
Ethics?, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1991); Jane H. Aiken, Striving To Teach "Justice,
Fairness, and Morality, " 4 CLINICAL L. REv. 1, 3 (1997); Susan P. Koniak and
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Paying Attention to the Signs, 58 L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS
117, 118-19 (1997); Allan C. Hutchinson, Beyond Black-Letterism: Ethics in Law
andLegal Education, 33 L. TCHR. 302, 309 (1999).
64 Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social
Values and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503,
537-38 (1985).
65 See e.g., Nicolson & Webb, supra note 25, ch. 6; See generally Donald
Nicolson & Julian Webb, Lawyers' Duties, Adversarialism and Partisanship in
UK Legal Ethics, 7 LEGAL ETHICS (SPECIAL ISSuE) 133 (2004); Robert Granfield,
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throughout the course of a legal education. Equally, the concentra-
tion on legal reasoning as an exercise in dispassionate and abstract
logic distracts attention away from law's human and emotional side,
while the emphasis on case law portrays law as primarily a means of
dispute resolution through adversarial combat66 and prioritizes the
authority of existing values over critical evaluation.
Inculcating in students a sense of altruism is hampered by
the increasingly competitive nature of legal education in terms of
admissions, results and obtaining employment, and the fact that the
increasing expense of a university education encourages students to
see it as a short-term investment for long-term financial gain. The
channeling of students into lucrative law careers, rather than those
devoted to helping the vulnerable, is reinforced by the preponder-
ance of law subjects involving the interests of the rich and powerful,
large law firms' dominance of the recruitment process, and by
informal messages about legal careers provided by staff and fellow
students. However, while many academics may portray a career in
large law firms, or in the U.K. at the Bar, as the height of ambition,
others may engender student cynicism by openly disparaging law-
yers as mindless form-fillers and grubby money-seekers. This leaves
little space for the conception of lawyers as heroes, bent on seeking
justice and helping those in need.67 Even more unfortunately,
because most law schools fail to engage students in any searching
scrutiny of what they want to do in the world, "[i]ndividuals who
enter talking about justice often leave talking about jobs." 6 8
Given this hidden curriculum, it is hardly surprising that
numerous studies show that U.S. legal education tends to undermine
MAKING ELITE LAWYERS: VISIONS OF LAW AT HARVARD AND BEYOND 55-61
(1992).
66 Acknowledging that litigation is only a last resort, to be used where other forms
of dispute resolution fail, is unlikely to make much difference absent a substantial
focus on such other means in teaching law.
67 Cf Andrew Goldsmith, Heroes or Technicians? The Moral Capacities of
Tomorrow 's Lawyers, 14 J. PROF. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1996); Avrom Sherr & Julian
Webb, Of Super Heroes and Slaves: Images and Work of the Legal Profession, 48
CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 327 (1989); Burke Marshall, A Triumph of Law, 86
YALE L.J. 356 (1976) (reviewing Richard Kluger, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976)).
68 Rhode, supra note 20, at 206.
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student idealism about using law to promote justice, and to engender
moral and political cynicism, and a propensity towards ethically
dubious behavior. 69 For example, in their in-depth study of the
69 Usefully summarized in June Chapman, Why Teach Legal Ethics to Under-
graduates? 5 LEGAL ETHICS 68, 73-79 (2002); Robert Granfield & Phillip Veliz,
Good Lawyering and Lawyering for the Good: Lawyers' Reflections on Manda-
tory Pro Bono in Law School, in PRIVATE LAWYERS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST:
THE EVOLVING ROLE OF PRO BONO IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 53, 53-72 (Robert
Granfield & Lynn Mather eds. 2009). See Richard L. Abel, Choosing, Nurturing,
Training, and Placing Public Interest Law Students, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563
(2002); Ronit Dinovitzer et al., After the JD: First Results of a National Study of
Legal Careers, American Bar Foundation and NALP, Chicago (2004); Robert
Granfield, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS: VISIONS OF LAW AT HARVARD AND BEYOND
(1992); Robert Granfield, The Pedagogy of Public Service: Assessing the Impact
of Mandatory Law School Pro Bono on Young Lawyers, report prepared for the
Law School Admission Council, Newton, P.A. (2006); Robert Granfield, The
Meaning ofPro Bono: Institutional Variations in Professional Obligations Among
Lawyers, 41 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 113 (2007); Robert Granfield, Institutionalizing
Public Service in Law School: Results on the Impact ofMandatory Pro Bono, 54
BUFF. L. REV. 1355 (2007); John P. Heinz et al., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW
SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (2005); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of
Cause Lawyering: Toward an Understanding of the Commitment ofSocial Justice
Lawyers, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998); Deborah L.
Rhode, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004); Deborah L. Rhode, PRO BoNo IN PRINCIPLE
AND IN PRACTICE: PUBLIC SERVICE AND THE PROFESSIONS (2005); Debra Schleef,
Empty Ethics and Reasonable Responsibility: Vocabularies of Motive among Law
and Business Students, 22 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 619 (1997); Debra J. Schleef,
MANAGING ELITES: PROFESSIONAL SOCIALIZATION IN LAW AND BUSINESS
SCHOOLS (2006); Robert Stover, Making It and Breaking It: The Fate of Public
Interest Commitment During Law School (1989); David B. Wilkins, Doing Well
by Doing Good? The Role of Public Service in the Careers of Black Corporate
Lawyers, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2004); Thomas E. Willging & Thomas G. Dunn,
The Moral Development of the Law Student: Theory and Data on Legal Educa-
tion, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 306, 320, 339 (1982); Gregory J. Rathjen, The Impact of
Legal Education on the Beliefs Attitudes and Values of Law Students, 44 TENN. L.
REV. 85, 87-88, 91-96 (1976); Robert V. Stover, Making It and Breaking It: The
Fate of Public Interest Commitment During Law School (1989), reviewed by
David W. Raack, Law School and the Erosion of Student Idealism, 41 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 121 (1991). For a contrary view, see E. Gordon Gee & Donald W. Jackson,
Current Studies ofLegal Education: Findings and Recommendations, 32 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 471 (1982).
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informal Harvard Law curriculum, Granfield and Koenig found that
even among students entering law school with a desire to pursue a
career in public interest law and/or a resistance to pursuing a career
in large urban prestigious firms, their assimilation of the values
implicitly conveyed during their law school career "makes it ex-
tremely likely that they will serve the interests of the corporate elite,
rather than other individuals and groups in need of talented law-
yers."7 o Similarly, in a study of law students at two different public
law schools conducted a decade later, Sheldon and Kreiger found
"students declined in their endorsement of intrinsic values over the
first year, specifically moving away from community service values
and moving towards appearance and image values."7
Absent similar empirical research, it is difficult to gauge
whether U.K. legal education has the same effect. In the only rele-
vant studies, Sherr and Webb7 2 found that Warwick Law School left
untouched the overwhelmingly conservative political orientation of
incoming law students, but, by contrast, Nicolson and Zoumidou 7 3
failed to detect any obvious negative effect of legal education on
attitudes after three terms of study at the University of Strathclyde,
whereas similar finding emerged from a recent study of four U.K.
teaching institutions.74 However, even if legal education does not
have a negative impact on ethical values in the U.K. similar to that
in the US, studies of students' motivations for studying law reveal
that law schools have much work to do if they want to persuade
students that practicing law should involve a calling to promote
70 Robert Granfield & Thomas Koenig, Learning Collective Eminence: Harvard
Law School and the Social Production ofElite Lawyers, 33 Soc. Q. 503, 516 (1992).
71 Kennon M. Sheldon & Lawrence S. Krieger, Does Legal Education Have Under-
mining Effects on Law Students? Evaluating Changes in Motivation, Values, and
Well-Being, 22 BEHAV. Sci. L. 261, 281 (2004). The authors posit that "law school
may bring about some negative changes in student motivations and values." Id.
72 Avrom Sherr & Julian Webb, Law Students, the Market and Socialisation: Do
We Make Them Turn to the City?, 16 J. L. & Soc'Y 225 (1989).
73 Reported in Nicolson, supra note 18, at 41-44.
' Richard Moorhead, Catrina Denvir, Rachel Cahill-O'Callaghan, Marva
Kouchaki & Stephen Galoob, The Ethical Identity of Law Students, 23(3) I.J.L.P.
235-75 (2016).
75 See id.; Sherr & Webb, supra note 72.
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justice and serve those most in need of legal services, rather than
just a means to status, material reward, and an interesting and chal-
lenging occupation.
We are not aware that the ethical (as opposed to altruistic
and political) predispositions of incoming law students have ever
been investigated. But even those with an inclination to do the right
thing in general life will not have given much thought to what doing
the right thing might mean in the very specific context of legal
practice. Here, the prima facie justifications for the hired gun or
neutral partisan role are likely to be persuasive, particularly if they
are not subjected to careful scrutiny during law school. And then,
once in practice those committed to high personal ethical standards
will come under pressure from various aspects of professional life.
For instance, the increasing commercialization of practice places a
premium on prioritizing financial over moral considerations, compe-
tition for promotion and organizational hierarchies make it difficult
to challenge the moral judgment of superiors, while the increasing
specialization and bureaucratization of law firms encourage lawyers
to see moral responsibility as that of everyone but themselves. These
problems may be exacerbated by the deference that legal neophytes
are likely to show towards experienced colleagues, especially those
with authority over them, and by intense socialization processes that
encourage lawyers to regularly flout the rules. Even those who go
76 See e.g., in relation to the U.K., Nicolson, supra note 18, at 60-61; Andrew M.
Francis, Legal Ethics, the Marketplace and the Fragmentation of Legal Profes-
sionalism, 12 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 173 (2005); and in relation to the U.S.,
Granfield & Koenig, supra note 28, at 512-19; Bruce A. Green, Professional
Challenges in Large Firm Practices, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 7, 23-24, 40 (2005);
Nancy B. Rapoport, Enron, Titanic and the Perfect Storm, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
1373, 1384-91 (2003); Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical
Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV.
871, 911-20 (1999); Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate
Lawyers and Their Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 507, 511, 526, 544-45 (1994).
7 For evidence of unethical behavior in the U.K., see John Baldwin & Mike
McConville, NEGOTIATED JUSTICE: PRESSURES TO PLEAD GUILTY (1977); Gwynn
Davis, PARTISANS AND MEDIATORS (1994); Gwynn Davis, PARTISANS AND
MEDIATORS: THE RESOLUTION OF DIVORCE DISPUTES (1988); Mike McConville,
Jacqueline Hodgson, Lee Bridges & Anita Pavlovic, STANDING ACCUSED: THE
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into practice with the intention to engage in pro bono work are likely
to face obstacles in the form of long work hours, family responsi-
bilities and an unsupportive-if not hostile-work culture. More-
over, those who seek careers which serve the underprivileged are,
especially in the U.S., likely to be put off by the practical need to
pay off student loans.7 9
(iv) Ethics Education: The Ideal
If law schools wish to inculcate in their students a sense of
professional identity that includes maintaining high ethical stan-
dards and altruistic service to those most in need of legal assistance,
they clearly have a mountain to climb. Based on the preceding
discussion, it would seem that to make the ascent, ethical education
ORGANISATION AND PRACTICES OF CRIMINAL DEFENCE LAWYERS IN BRITAIN
(1994); Andy Boon, Ethics and Strategy in Personal Injury Litigation, 22 J.L. AND
Soc'Y 353 (1995); Hazel Genn, HARD BARGAINING: OUT OF COURT SETTLEMENT
IN PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1987); Bren Neale &
Carol Smart, "Good" and "Bad" Lawyers? Struggling in the Shadow of the New
Law, 19 J. SOC. WELFARE & FAM. L. 377 (1997); Mike McConville, Plea Bar-
gaining: Ethics and Politics, 25 J. L. & Soc. 562 (1998); Janine Griffiths-Baker,
SERVING Two MASTERS: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE MODERN LAW FIRM
(2002); for the U.S., see Schlitz, id., and, inter alia, Catherine Gage O'Grady,
Wrongful Obedience and the Professional Practice ofLaw, 19 J. L. BUS. & ETH. 9,
10-12 (2013); Harry T. Edwards, Renewing Our Commitment to the Highest
Ideals of the Legal Profession, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1427-28 (2006); Susan P.
Koniak, Testimony, Where Were the Lawyers? Behind the Curtain Wearing Their
Magic Caps, in Accountability Issues: Lessons Learned from Enron's Fall-
Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing (Feb. 6, 2002); Lisa G. Lerman, Scenes from
a Law Firm, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2153, 2175-83 (1998); Margaret Kline Kirk-
patrick, Partners Dumping Partners: Business Before Ethics in Bohatch v. Butler
& Binion, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1767, 1784-86 (1999); William H. Simon, The Kaye
Scholer Affair: The Lawyer's Duty of Candor and the Bar's Temptations of Eva-
sion andApology, 23 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 243 (1998).
8 See Green, supra note 75, at 9, 33-36; O'Grady, supra note 76, at 23-26.
* See Rhode, supra note 12, at 6; Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Stricture and Structure:
The Social and Cultural Context of Pro Bono Work in Wall Street Firms, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 1689 (2002); David B. Wilkins, Doing Well by Doing Good?
The Role ofPublic Service in the Careers ofBlack Corporate Lawyers, Address at
the Eighth Annual Frankel Lecture, in 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 73-80 (2005).
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will need to pursue four goals. First, given the implicit message that
ethics are not important, or, at best, merely require keeping one's
nose clean, law schools need to inspire in students a conception of
ethics as going beyond mere adherence to codes. Second, given that
the current rules can never resolve all possible ethical dilemmas that
might arise in practice, and given that these rules and overarching
professional roles are highly contested, ethical education needs to
illuminate the tools which ethical theory and applied ethical dis-
course provide for the resolution of ethical dilemmas, as well as the
realities of legal practice which affect such resolution in real-life.
Third, given that these tools and ethical codes themselves always
require the exercise of choice and judgment, ethical education needs
to illustrate the ethical dimensions of legal practice by giving
students practice in resolving dilemmas. Finally, because recog-
nizing ethical dilemmas and working out how to resolve them is
insufficient by itself to ensure moral behavior, ethical education
needs to begin to inculcate in students the habit of identifying,
evaluating and caring about ethical issues so that this becomes a
more or less spontaneous response once they are in practice,
especially when faced with the many countervailing pressures to
compromise ethical values.
If these goals are achieved, legal education will have
succeeded in making legal ethics part of a student's professional
moral identity, or, in the language of moral psychology, their
professional moral character. Moral character involves relatively
stable character traits, dispositions, habits of perception, feelings,
and behavior relevant to issues of morality. If properly developed,
moral character can be said to equip individuals not just with moral
sensitivity and judgment, but also with moral motivation and
courage.80 Thus, moral "saints," such as Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson
Mandela and Oskar Schindler, seem to act out of deep-seated and
spontaneous feelings of compassion, empathy, etc.-by "habits of
the heart"-rather than conscious deliberation. This is confirmed by
" See generally CHARACTER PSYCHOLOGY AND CHARACTER EDUCATION (Daniel
K. Lapsley & F. Clark Power eds., 2005).
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studies of moral exemplars who acted more or less automatically.s"
And, on the basis of the insight that "what we see depends on who
we are,"82 and on empirical studies, it is argued that moral behavior
is more likely for those for whom moral considerations are central to
their personal identity and sense of self.8 3 Indeed, following
Aristotle, Blasi argues that where moral motivations are central to
the individual's self-identity, "moral action flows from a kind of
spontaneous necessity" without the need for willpower or moral
courage to overcome temptations or pressures to act unethically.84
Admittedly, law students are likely to begin their studies
with their moral character already relatively fixed. At the same time,
recent psychological research suggests that early adulthood is a
particularly key time for moral and self-identity development.85
Moreover, while students might have relatively well-developed
personal moral character traits in relation to issues of morality
which arise in the family, friendships, school, sports, etc., without
exposure to the realities of legal practice, the type of ethical issues it
raises, and the moral considerations relevant to resolution of those
ethical issues, students will not have begun to develop a professional
moral character. And, as law teachers generally are the first to
introduce students to the legal world, they have a unique opportunity
81 See Samuel P. Oliner & Pearl M. Oliner, THE ALTRUISTIC PERSONALITY:
RESCUERS OF JEWS IN NAzI EUROPE (1988); Anne Colby & William Damon,
SOME Do CARE: CONTEMPORARY LIVES OF MORAL COMMITMENT (1992).
82 See Daniel K. Lapsley & Darcia Narvaez, Moral Psychology at the Crossroads,
in Lapsley & Power, supra note 79, at 61 (citing Gilbert Meilaender, THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF VIRTUE (1984)).
83 See Lapsley & Power, supra note 79, chs. 1, 2-4, 9, and 13; F. Clark Power,
Understanding the Character in Character Education, presented to the American
Educational Research Association, Chicago, March, 1997, available at http://
tigger.uic.edu/~1nucci/MoralEd/articles/powerunder.html.
Augusto Blasi, Moral Character: A Psychological Approach, in Lapsley &
Power, supra note 79, at 84-85.
85 Daniel K. Lapsley & Gustavo Carlo, Moral Development at the Crossroads:
New Trends and Possible Futures, 50 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1, 1-7 (2014);
Anne Colby & William Damon, SOME Do CARE: CONTEMPORARY LIVES OF
MORAL COMMITMENT (1992).
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to influence this process.86 As the Carnegie report on legal education
observed, powerfully engaging law school experiences can poten-
tially "influence the place of moral values such as integrity and
social contribution in students' sense of self"8 7
Nevertheless, while the positive impact reported by law
clinicians and partly reflected in the research described above
suggests that law clinics may have an impact, such impact is limited
by the fact that many incoming students will have moral characters
which predispose them towards a formalistic or instrumentalist
approach to professional norms and/or a lack of concern about those
who cannot access legal services. By contrast, others will enter with
a predisposition to do the right thing in their personal life, and can
be guided to adapt what is virtuous in everyday life to professional
life. It is even possible that those with morally ambivalent characters
can-if the conditions are right-be encouraged to embark on a
journey towards the development of altru-ethical professional moral
character. This raises the question of what constitutes the most fav-
orable conditions for achieving the four goals of ethical education,
particularly that of professional character formation.
B. The Means to the Ends:
Clinics, Character, and Educational Theory
Unsurprisingly for two law clinic directors, we think that the
answer lies in the in-depth and repeated involvement of students
with actual clients who would not otherwise gain legal assistance,
coupled with exposure to relevant theories of what it means to be
ethical and altruistic, the literature on access to justice and opportu-
86 Norman Redlich, Professional Responsibility ofLaw Teachers, 29 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 623, 624 (1980). Regarding the potential impact of universities, cf Matthew
L. Davidson, Harness the Sun, Channel the Wind, The Art and Science ofEffective
Character Education, in Lapsley & Power, supra note 78; Rosamond Rhodes &
Lawrence G. Smith Molding Professional Character, in LOST VIRTUE: PROFES-
SIONAL CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT IN MEDICAL EDUCATION (Nuala P. Kenny &
Wayne N. Shelton eds., 2006).
87 Sullivan et al., supra note 20, at 135.
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nities for reflection on what is learned from these experiences. This
view finds support in a long tradition of moral psychology that dates
back to Aristotle and the philosophical tradition of virtue ethics.
Virtue ethics recognizes that individuals are not born with
developed virtues, nor with the "practical wisdom" that enables them
to decide how to act in specific situations. Instead, virtue, practical
wisdom, and a person's overall moral character are gradually dev-
eloped through actual engagement with moral issues. Whereas moral
development usually starts with an application of rules before
reaching the point where it involves instinctive and spontaneous
moral responses, character formation results not so much from
direct teaching but from experiences in behaving morally, or what
might be called a "moral apprenticeship." 89 In other words, "only
someone who has had the experience of acting in a certain way is
capable of knowing the principle embodied in that way of acting." 90
More specifically, by emulating others, by trial and error, by instruc-
tion from authoritative others, and by experiencing and reflecting on
the appropriate pride or regret over the outcome of one's actions,
moral habits or dispositions are said to gradually develop to the point
that appropriate moral behavior and feelings become embedded in
the individual's character.91
Admittedly, traditional forms of teaching in lectures, semi-
nars, and tutorials, if they are conducted enthusiastically 92 and inno-
8 Aristotle, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (1987), book X, ch. 10. See also Richard
S. Peters, MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND MORAL EDUCATION (1981), ch. 2; Kupper-
man, supra note 43, at 203; Hubert L. Dreyfus & Stuart E. Dreyfus, What Is
Morality? A Phenomenological Account of the Development of Ethical Expertise,
in UNIVERSALISM AND COMMUNITARIANISM (D. Rasmussen ed., 1990).
89 Peters, ibid, at 37; David Carr, EDUCATING THE VIRTUES: AN ESSAY ON THE
PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION 43, 242
(1991).
90 Robert Condlin, The Moral Failure of Clinical Legal Education, in THE GOOD
LAWYER 323 (David Luban ed., 1983).
91 See Aristotle, supra note 87, book II, chapter I and book VI, chapter XIII; Carr,
supra note 88; David Luban, Epistemology and Moral Education, 33 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 636 (1983).
92 Cfnotes 56 and 57, supra.
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vatively,93 may inspire students' interest in ethics, illuminate relevant
tools for handling legal ethics issues and the context in which they
are handled, and provide opportunities for students to develop moral
judgment through debating illustrative ethical dilemmas. However,
such formal teaching is unlikely to be as effective in this regard as
law clinic experience, 9 4 and certainly cannot involve the sort of
moral apprenticeship envisaged by Aristotle and, more recently, the
latest Carnegie report on legal education in the U.S. 9 5 Much of the
benefit of live-client clinics is thought to stem from the fact that
93 Eg, academic debates can be brought to life by exposure to legal biographies,
fictional accounts of legal practice in literature, films and television (see e.g. Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, The Sense and Sensibilities ofLawyers: Lawyering in Literature,
Narratives, Film and Television, and Ethical Choices Regarding Career and Craft,
31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 61, 64-6 (1999); Telling Stories in School: Using Case
Studies and Stories to Teach Legal Ethics, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 787 (2000)), or
even vignettes scripted and filmed by academics (Stephen Gillers, Getting Per-
sonal, 58 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 61 (1995); Edmund B. Spaeth,
Janet G. Perry & Peggy B. Wachs, Teaching Legal Ethics: Exploring the Continu-
um 58 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 153, 159-60 (1996)), and the personal
accounts of local lawyers, clients and those affected by lawyer behavior (Walter H.
Bennett, The University of North Carolina Intergenerational Legal Ethics Project:
Expanding the Contexts for Teaching Professional Ethics and Values, 58 LAw AND
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 173 1995)).
94 For other supporters of ethical education via live client clinics, see, e.g., Rhode,
supra note 12, at 457-58; Aiken, supra note 63, at 47; Julian Webb, Conduct,
Ethics and Experience in Vocational Legal Education: Opportunities Missed, in
Economides, supra note 61, at 296; Andrew Boon, Ethics in Legal Education and
Training: Four Reports, Three Jurisdictions and a Prospectus, 5 LEGAL ETHICS
34, 60 (2002); Deborah L. Rhode, Into the Valley ofEthics: Professional Respon-
sibility and Educational Reform, 58 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 141 (1995).
See generally Condlin, supra note 89, at 320-24; Luban, supra note 25; Luban,
supra note 50; Nigel, Duncan, Responsibility and Ethics in Professional Legal
Education, in EFFECTIVE LEARNING AND TEACHING IN LAW (Roger Burridge &
Karen Hinett eds. 2002); Mary Jewell, Teaching Law Ethically: Is It Possible?, 8
DALHOUSIE L.J. 474, 507-10 (1984); Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring:
Building an Ethic of Care into Professional Responsibility, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1175
(1992).
95 See Sullivan et al., supra note 20, at 191-92. Indeed, the Report suggests that
clinical experience with clients is "an essential catalyst for the full development of
ethical engagement." Id. at 160.
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handling real-life dilemmas and flesh and blood clients imparts
immediacy and provokes an engagement with ethics that is lacking
from didactic and even interactive forms of teaching, like tutorials,
seminars, role plays and simulations. Students are more likely to be
inspired to take ethics seriously by feelings of satisfaction that result
from doing the right thing, and feelings of regret that result from
moral mistakes. In general, students are likely to be motivated to act
altruistically by seeing the impact of their actions on clients. More-
over, the "disorienting moments" 96 or "moral crises" that occur when
prior assumptions and settled values are confronted by experienced
reality may also stimulate an "engaged moral faculty." 97 According
to adult learning theory, learning experiences that are realistic and
relate to the fulfillment of future social roles lead to more profound
learning and greater self-knowledge than exposure to abstract knowl-
edge. 98
Engagement with real-life clients and actual ethical issues
has other distinct advantages over traditional teaching, and even
attempts to replicate real-life conditions through role-play and simu-
lations. One advantage is that even the most realistic simulation is
unlikely to engage student emotions to the same extent as being
faced with actual clients and their legal problems. As we have
seen,99 this is important for the development of all four psycholo-
gical components necessary for moral behavior, as well as the way
in which moral decisions are implemented. Even the best ethics
textbooks and simulations are not likely to produce the ability to
notice "moral issues when they are embedded in complex and
ambiguous situations, as they usually are in actual legal practice."100
A second advantage of engaging with actual clients is that
this always gives rise to a wide variety of issues flowing from the
96 Fran Quigley, Seizing the Disorienting Moment: Adult Learning and the
Teaching of Social Justice in Law School Clinics, 2 CLINICAL L. REv. 37, 37-72
(1996).
97 Webb, supra note 61, at 290.
98 See Frank S. Block The Andragogical Basis of Clinical Legal Education, 35
VAND. L. REV. 321, 321-54 (1982).
99 See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
100 Sullivan et al., supra note 20, at 149.
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fact that all relationships with other human beings involve subtle
ethical issues. Students can be encouraged to act towards others with
care, consideration, and respect, and will (almost of necessity) have
to navigate problems of how to act in the best interest of clients
without impinging on their autonomy. Additionally, students who
develop empathy for their clients must learn to balance this with the
need for effective professional judgment. To some extent, these
issues can be built into realistic role plays and simulations, but they
are likely to be raised in richer and subtler forms by actual clients,
especially those from disadvantaged backgrounds and/or those who
suffer from mental health, personality, or learning difficulties or
who are otherwise vulnerable.
However, the fact that law clinic clients tend to come from
disadvantaged backgrounds and cannot otherwise access legal ser-
vices reflects a third advantage over all other forms of engagement
with the ethics of legal practice. These types of clients present
unparalleled exposure to the realities of problems of access to justice
and social justice in general. Such clients are also most likely to
evoke students' empathy, and to catalyze feelings of satisfaction
where students are able to make a difference with regard to the
clients' plights, or regret when they cannot. As asserted above,o0 it
is these personal responses-pride in one's work and regret over the
outcome of one's efforts-that are crucial in inculcating in students
a continuing commitment to enhance access to justice, and even
social justice in general. Clinics reveal that the extent of unmet legal
need is great, that social and legal injustice is pervasive, that legal
practice can involve helping others, and that this can be rewarding
as well as intellectually challenging. Indeed, community work is
said to enhance general moral development and not just a desire to
promote social justice.10 2
Finally, if we recall the conditions regarded as conducive to
the development of moral character, we can see why law clinics
101 See discussion supra and accompanying note 90.
102 Judith A. Boss, The Effect of Community Service Work on the Moral Develop-
ment of College Ethics Students, 23 MORAL EDUC. 2, 183 (1994); Narvaez & Rest,
supra note 43, passim.
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have distinct advantages over other forms of ethics teaching in
ensuring that students start on a journey of character development
that encourages ethical and altruistic behavior as a more or less
spontaneous response to legal practice. Thus, depending on the aims
and design of the clinic, 103 students may engage in repeated exercise
of their moral muscles through dealing with a series of clients. This
may lead to a concern for moral decision-making and moral beha-
vior becoming second nature. Moreover, the fact that they take
responsibility for actions with actual consequences for flesh and
blood clients deepens reflections on appropriate behavior, sharpens
lessons learned, and heightens the emotions felt after acting well or
badly, which may in turn contribute to the development of moral
104courage.
But, clinics do not just provide opportunities for the develop-
ment of virtue through repeated ethical encounters. They also con-
tain environmental conditions that enhance character development
and involve students in the sort of "moral apprenticeship" that virtue
ethics stresses is so important for character development,10 5 and
which reports on legal education have stressed is lacking in law
schools. 10 6 Experienced students may act as role models for others
and, through mentoring, both influence others and strengthen their
own ethical and altruistic ethos. However, because of their perceived
expertise, clinic supervisors are likely to be even more influential as
mentors and moral exemplars, modeling good client relations, civil-
ity, the understanding that a client's needs come before a lawyer's
interests, concern for how their actions affect others, and, if they are
seen as exceeding their salaried role, an altruistic commitment to the
community. Supervisors also help transmit the values of the profes-
103 See discussion infra Section II.
104 Bany Schwartz and Kenneth Sharpe, PRACTICAL WISDOM: THE RIGHT WAY
TO Do THE RIGHT THING 241-47 (2010) (citing William M. Sullivan, EDUCATING
LAWYERS 121 (Ist ed. 2007)).
15 Carr, supra note 88, at 242; Peters, supra note 87, at 37.
106 Sullivan, supra note 20, at 145-54. This report involved U.S. legal education,
but arguably its conclusions are equally applicable to the U.K.
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sion, especially when there is more than one supervisor.io7 Finally,
they can guide students' reflection and place their experiences in
context by introducing them to the academic literature on ethics and
access to justice.
This latter function is extremely important because provid-
ing students with repeated opportunities to make ethical judgments
and respond to real-life situations in role and in the moment is not,
by itself, sufficient to ensure that all four moral components, espe-
cially moral sensitivity and judgment, develop appropriately. The
potential for fostering ethical professionalism will be seriously
under-utilized unless students are exposed to a theoretical basis that
helps them make sense of their experiences.108 As Schwartz and
Sharpe assert: "[e]xperience must be structured in ways that cause
wisdom to be learned."1 09 Thus, without being alerted to the sort of
ethical dilemmas that arise in practice, students might overlook
those issues even when staring them in the face.110 Without expo-
sure to a wide variety of ethical theories or positions on issues of
legal ethics, students will not have the opportunity to explore alter-
native approaches to resolving dilemmas, or to develop their own
sense of professional values that are arguably necessary to supple-
ment, and sometimes even supplant, existing professional roles and
rules."
Moreover, learning from experience "occurs not in the doing
but in the reflection and conceptualization that takes place during
107 Cf Lori L. Keating & Michael P. Maslanka, Finding and Getting the Most out
of a Mentor, in ESSENTIAL QUALITIES OF THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 163 (Paul
A. Haskins ed., 2013).
108 Hamilton & Monson, supra note 21, at 352.
109 Schwartz, supra note 103, at 272.
110 See Sullivan et al., supra note 20, at 149 (discussing how moral and ethical
dilemmas are frequently embedded in complex and ambiguous situations in actual
legal practice, and that the ethics curriculum in most law schools, with its narrow
focus on rules, may undermine law students' ability to recognize many such
dilemmas as ethical issues). See also discussion infra and accompanying notes
217-25 and accompanying text (discussing this phenomenon among MHRC
students).
... See discussion supra Section I(a)(ii).
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and after the event." 112 Through critical self-reflection, students in
law school clinics "try on," and begin to adopt and internalize a
professional identity. They have the opportunity to observe and
"consider systemic power dynamics, political and social realities,
and economic forces," as they develop greater self-awareness and
moral sensitivity.113 Such reflection, aided by the critical evaluation
of others, may help students arrive at guiding moral principles "that
have been experienced pre-reflectively and internalized as disposi-
tions."1 More generally, they may develop the life-long learning
skills of the reflective practitioner.1 15 Thus, according to Kolb's
well-known learning circle, 116 reflection may lead to the adoption of
new, or the adaptation of existing, theories about how to handle
issues (including moral issues), which can then be put into practice
when similar situations arise. This new experience provides the
material for further reflection, theory adaption, and theory testing,
and so on. Moreover, it seems obvious that the more opportunities
for experience and reflection students confront, the more sophisti-
cated their theories will become, and the more habitual the resultant
behavior will be.1 17
112 See Hugh Brayne, Nigel Duncan & Richard Grimes, CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCA-
TION: ACTIVE LEARNING IN YOUR LAw SCHOOL (1998).
113 Timothy Casey, Reflective Practice in Legal Education: The Stages ofReflec-
tion, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 317, 344 (2014) (arguing for structuring reflection to
reflect stages of cognitive, self-awareness and moral development). See generally
Schwartz, supra note 103, at 247.
11' Robert J. Condlin, "Practice Ready Graduates:" A Millennialist Fantasy, 31
TOuROL. REV. 75, 93 (2014).
115 Donald A. Schon, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: How PROFESSIONALS
THINK IN ACTION (1983). See also Aiken, supra note 63, at 26; Webb et al., supra
note 59, at 289-90; Howard Lesnick, Infinity in a Grain of Sand: The World of
Law and Lawyering as Portrayed in the Clinical Teaching Implicit in the Law
School Curriculum, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1157, 1184-85 (1990); Paul J. Spiegelman,
Integrating Doctrine, Theory and Practice in the Law School Curriculum: The
Logic ofJake's Ladder in the Context ofAmy's Web, 38 J. LEGALEDUC. 243, 243-
70 (1988).
116 See e.g., David A. Kolb, EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING: EXPERIENCE AS THE
SOURCE OF LEARNING AND DEVELOPMENT 33 (1984).
"' See Schwartz, supra note 103, at 81-106 (describing the development of moral
habits).
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H. CREATING CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE
TO A CLINICAL EFFECT
Thus, we see law clinics as providing an ideal opportunity
for students to achieve ethical praxis-the synthesis of ethical theory
and behavior. We believe that students' real-life experiences in their
clinical work, and guided reflection with teachers on those clinical
experiences, grounds ethical development that will inform students'
professional lives, help them develop the Aristotelian virtue of
phronesis, or practical wisdom,118 and start them on a journey
towards the development of a professional identity or professional
moral character that is based on altru-ethical professionalism. But,
while law clinics are ideally placed to foster moral development, in
reality this is not their only, or usually their primary, goal. Nor
should it be. A large portion of law clinics (what Nicolson has called
educationally-oriented clinics) 119 are aimed primarily at developing
legal skills and providing a realistic understanding of substantive
areas of law. However, given that it is usually the most vulnerable
members of society who seek law clinic assistance, this involves
students "practicing on the poor," 12 0 rather than for the poor. More-
over, if such clinics were also aimed at inculcating ethical values,
they would ironically run the risk of undermining the notion of altru-
ethical professionalism, or even more traditional ideas of profession-
alism, by conveying the implicit message to students that their
interests-now educational, later commercial-take precedence
over those of clients. By contrast, clinics like the MHRC and USLC
whose primary goal is to provide legal services to those most in
118 See Aristotle, supra note 87, bk. X, ch. 10; Martha C. Nussbaum, Non-Relative
Virtues: AnAristotelianApproach, 13 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 32, 51 (1998).
119 See Nicolson, supra note 11, at 3.
120 Margaret Thornton, PRIVATISING THE PUBLIC UNIVERSITY: THE CASE OF LAW
(2010) 83. See also Nicolson, supra note 11, at 5; Richard Lewis, Clinical Educa-
tion Revisited 14 (2000); Stephen Wizner & Jane Aiken, Teaching and Doing: The
Role ofLaw School Clinics in Enhancing Access to Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
997, 1007 (2004).
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need (social justice-oriented clinics) avoid this problem by modeling
an ideal of altruistic service.
Prioritizing the enhancement of access to justice over student
education has both advantages and disadvantages in terms of foster-
ing ethical development. The first advantage is that students in both
clinics undertake relatively high caseloads. Over the course of their
year-long involvement, MIRC students (typically 14 second-year
or third-year students) handle on average twelve cases, usually six to
eight at a time. Although the MRC is a generalist clinic that does
not specialize in one area of law, because it is a population-based
clinic-serving the general legal needs of individuals referred by
healthcare provider partners-the majority of its cases involve
access to subsistence benefits, Social Security, disability, healthcare
and immigration. The USLC is also a generalist clinic, but around
80% of cases involve employment, consumer, and housing issues.
Although its students take on fewer cases over the course of the aca-
demic year (usually between 2 and 4), because their clinic involve-
ment is largely extra-curricular it can be much longer-up to five
years, depending on the student's stage of entry and degree program.
Students' activities often extend beyond the civil cases which form
the bulk of casework to include investigating miscarriages of justice
and/or engaging in various forms of public legal education and/or
law reform work. Furthermore, students can remain involved during
vacation, when caseloads are typically much higher. Consequently,
average caseload levels are similar to those in the MRC-though
for each student, more varied. Some students take on only a handful
of cases, whereas one (admittedly part-time) student has racked up
more than 70 cases! 121 Moreover, in both clinics, a small number of
121 Of the 23 students whose journal diaries were analyzed by Nicolson, the
average number of cases they had taken on was 4.75, but some had taken on as
many as 12, and all had at least one-but in some cases, three-more years of
clinic involvement to come; in the study set out below, the average number was
much higher, at just over 9.5 cases each (though this was skewed upwards by two
students who had undertaken 31 between them) notwithstanding that most were
earlier in their stage of clinical involvement (seven were graduate entrants with
two years' worth of clinic experience and one or two more years to follow; two
were undergraduates with three years of experience and two years to follow).
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students (annually, around four at the MRC and six at the USLC)
are provided with more indirect exposure to ethical issues in that
they formally mentor less experienced clinic members. In addition,
the USLC is run by a committee of academic staff and around 24
students who occasionally are required to deal with ethical issues in
cases, while all USLC students are required to attend at least one
Initial Advice Clinic, where they triage and sit in on interviews
conducted by qualified lawyers on a pro bono basis, and thus may
observe these volunteer lawyers responding to ethical issues.
More importantly, for those USLC students who choose to
engage in some form of clinical education, exposure to ethical issues
arising in actual cases is significantly expanded through class dis-
cussion in weekly "surgeries" where they present ethical issues
raised by their cases for discussion. Similarly, MRC students all
attend weekly classes that include structured "case rounds" during
which students present ethical and other dilemmas that are raised by
their cases for class discussion, and reach some consensus on sug-
gested resolutions. Each MHRC student also meets weekly on an
individual basis with his or her student mentor and faculty super-
visor to discuss in detail each case-including ethical problems
presented. In particularly difficult cases, a student may be asked to
present the case and particular ethical problems to the weekly "firm
meeting," of staff and faculty.
High caseloads also bring home the message that there is a
dire need for legal service by many community members. This is
particularly true for MHRC students, whose clients come from some
of the most vulnerable and underserved sectors of the Miami
community. For example, during the 2013-2014 academic year,
approximately two-thirds of the Clinic's 144 clients did not speak or
read English, with 44% speaking Spanish primarily or exclusively,
and 19% speaking Haitian or Creole, while 95% belonged to racial
or ethnic minorities. 122 In addition, more than 55% of the Clinic's
122 47% were African American or Black (including Haitian and other Caribbean),
and 48% were Latino or Hispanic.
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clients were affected by IV/AIDS, and at least one third were
homeless.
By contrast, while theoretically the USLC will take on any
matter except child custody cases (which are too important and
potentially harrowing to be entrusted to students as young as 17),
relatively generous legal aid provisions in Scotland effectively mean
that it only deals with very low income groups who have cases for
which there is no legal aid (such as representation in small claims
courts), or for which no legal aid lawyer will act. The upshot is that
a large proportion of clinic work involves clients facing the
problems associated with the "middle-income gap" rather than those
challenging the allocation of state-funded subsistence benefits.
Recently, though, USLC has begun to deal with destitute asylum
seekers, those with I-HV/AIDS, and survivors of sexual violence.
It is true that students in both clinics face anxiety about
student debt (though to a lesser extent in Scotland, where fees are
low and covered by the state for undergraduate as opposed to
postgraduate students). 12 3 Nevertheless, compared to their clients,
most students in both clinics come from relatively privileged back-
grounds and thus will not be prepared for the levels of legal need
and the impact of deprivation in their clients' lives. Being newly
exposed to "the realit[ies] of people they perceived as different,"
there is a high likelihood that students will experience the "disorien-
ting moments" that are said to involve profound learning experien-
ces,124 and develop empathy through learning about the lives of
others as they work closely with clients whose life experiences are
so different from their own. 125 This is especially true of the Miami
students, whose clients are often from a different race, ethnicity,
123 Nevertheless, virtually all Strathclyde students have part-time jobs to pay for
living costs and if they are graduate entrants for fees. In the U.S. legal education
islargely financed through student loans and many students graduate $200,000 or
more in debt.
124 Aiken, supra note 63, at 38; Quigley, supra note 95, at 52.
125 See Sullivan et al., supra note 20, at 146.
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country or culture, and whose cases are often of crucial importance
to them. 126
The final advantage of both clinics' social justice orientation
is that the desire to maximize the number of clients served means
that students work largely independently of their supervisors to
interview clients and to pursue their interests, and are thus exposed
to and have to take responsibility for ethical decision-making in all
stages of representation, from interviewing, through letter-writing
and negotiation, to representing clients in court. 1 2 7 Given that the
USLC has more than 280 student advisors, but only the resources to
employ three part-time supervisors (at a staff-student ratio of around
1:150!), supervision is relatively hands-off, and based largely on
checking the final product of student work, such as letters or
pleadings. 12 8 The Miami Health Rights Clinic students are at once
both more and less closely supervised than their Scottish counter-
parts. Fewer students, and a lower staff-student ratio (1: 9),129 result
in more time spent supervising individual students formally and
informally. Supervision occurs not only in the weekly one-on-one
meetings with students but also in countless informal exchanges
between faculty member and student, on campus, on the phone, and
via email and text. However, the very high and demanding caseloads
carried by the MHRC students, and the fact that many of the
students' interactions with clients, and governmental agencies take
place off campus, frequently result in a similar, though slightly less
hands-off approach as that in the USLC. 13 0
126 Scottish society is far more homogenously white, and there is no noticeable
overrepresentation of ethnic minorities amongst USLC clients.
127 Usually, at USLC, the small claims court or employment tribunals, though
students can now represent clients in all courts other than the highest.
128 Despite this, the clinic's rate of obtaining some form of positive result for the
client in cases going beyond advice only is over 90%.
129 During the year that this study was conducted there were two supervising
attorneys in the MHRC, with eighteen students, though the supervising attorneys
had other faculty duties.
130 Cf Carolyn Grose, Flies on the Wall or in the Ointment? Some Thoughts on the
Role of Clinic Supervisors at the Initial Client Interviews, 14 CLINICAL L. REv.
415, 435 (2008) (discussing Newman's supervision style).
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At the same time, however, even if students are exposed
directly and indirectly to a sufficient number of cases, it is undoubt-
edly the case that, as with clinical legal education generallyl31 the
demands of serving clients impinge on time for guided reflection
and ethics education. While both clinics experience this tension, the
balance between service and education is drawn differently in each.
The USLC was established with the primary aim of provid-
ing legal services to those who cannot afford a lawyer or who
qualify for legal aid, but also in the hope that playing this role would
inspire a new generation of lawyers to see enhancing access to jus-
tice as part of their professional moral obligations. Initially, student
participation was entirely extra-curricular, and formal education was
limited to induction training necessary to give the students the skills
to assist their clients. Later, educational programs were grafted onto
this social justice-oriented clinic. First, an optional Ethics and
Justice class was designed to explore issues of legal ethics and
access to justice in the context of students' clinical experience. More
recently, the success of this class led to the establishment of a
Clinical LLB (henceforth CLLB) that integrates all aspects of clini-
cal experience into the standard LLB curriculum (which for gradu-
ate entrants can be limited to two years of study, but for undergradu-
ate honors students may last for four years).132 Because Ethics and
Justice is a compulsory class for CLLB students, more USLC stu-
dents now gain an in-depth exposure to issues of legal ethics and
access to justice than before, though such exposure remains limited
to a third of USLC students. The remaining students are, however,
provided with two-hour "crash course" in their induction training
designed to sensitize them to the sort of ethical issues that might
arise in their cases and provide them with strategies for their
131 Cf Aaronson, supra note 50, at 286.
132 Students must take a minimum of one-third of their credits via a class that is
wholly or partly of a clinical nature. Four of these are compulsory (including
Ethics and Justice) and the rest involve students replacing part of the assessment in
one of their standard classes with an assignment involving reflection on the law,
justice and/or ethics of a clinic class relevant to the class in question. For further
detail, see Nicolson, supra note 18, at 51-55.
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appropriate resolution, 13 3 This session also provide a basis for
reflection by CLLB students on ethical issues which arise in their
cases when they commence writing fortnightly diary entries in the
semesters before they take the Ethics and Justice class in their final
year.
By contrast, the MRC is committed to both serving the
interests of justice and educating law students. The latter goal explic-
itly encompasses instilling high standards of ethics and professional
responsibility, assisting students in the formation of an ethical
professional identity,1 34 and encouraging students to take on work
that assists underserved and impoverished clients, whether through
pro bono work or a public interest career. The MHRC's educational
component also provides training in fundamental lawyering skills,
making students more confident in their decision-making role as
clients' advocates, and enhancing students' understanding of how
legal doctrine and institutions operate in individual cases. Like the
USLC, the MHRC also focuses on developing law students' ability
to engage in self-reflection and introspective professional develop-
ment. Inevitably, given the wide range of goals addressed in the
year-long class, less time can be devoted to issues of ethics and
justice. Thus, compared to the Strathclyde Ethics and Justice class,
which devotes eight seminars to legal ethics and professionalism,
and four to issues of access to justice, 135 along with 10 case
133 For further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 200 and 325-26 (showing
that this aim is not always successful).
134 Cf Sullivan et al., supra note 20, at F.
135 Typically, seminars cover: an introduction to clinical teaching methods, legal
professionalism with special reference to access to justice obligations; methods for
ensuring ethical behavior-education, codes and other regulatory strategies; the
lawyer/client relationship-autonomy, paternalism, and empathy; immoral client
ends; immoral tactics; confidentiality; conflicts of interests; access to justice and
unmet legal need; public interest litigation; the structure of the legal profession and
access to justice; access to justice and law centers; franchising legal aid services;
conditional fee arrangements; and multi-party claims (class actions). However,
there is the flexibility to replace certain topics with those identified by students as
raising particular problems, such as dealing with clients with mental health
problems.
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surgeries in which students discuss ethical issues arising in their
cases, the focus in the MIHRC is more broad.
There are two other differences between the clinics that
affect their potential to develop or at least sustain an existing
commitment to altruistic service to the community. One is the fact
that the USLC assesses each of the roughly 120 students who apply
to join the clinic each year on their commitment to further social
justice goals rather than their own educational and vocational needs,
and whether they show the attributes required to treat clients with
sensitivity, care and consideration. This results in roughly 50% of
applicants being denied a place, though some gain entry in subse-
quent years, particularly if they undertake internships in advice
agencies, or join as associate members and take on non-client facing
work such as online advice, street law or investigating miscarriages
of justice. By contrast, the MRC does not screen or qualify stu-
dents based on pro bono or altruistic inclinations, and initially
enrolls a majority of students whose primary interest in the clinic is
skills training, even though the students are made aware of the
clinic's explicit social justice goals when enrolling. Theoretically,
this means that a greater percentage than at the USLC can be
influenced to develop a commitment to assist those most in need. In
practice, however, the fact that it is so difficult to develop in a short
space of time a commitment to altruism which is likely to withstand
the pressures of professional and personal life suggests that the
USLC has the greater potential to affect student behavior because of
their much longer clinic participation.
This conclusion is strengthened by the second difference
between the two clinics, namely the way that they are organized and
run. Organizationally, the MRC is a fairly typical US clinic in the
sense that it is run by law school staff, and students are involved for
a finite period in a discrete clinic. The USLC model is radically
different in that the students play a central role in not just running
the clinic, but also more crucially in deciding the clinic's direction,
and safeguarding the clinic's values and ethos. This has two relevant
consequences.
One is that according to research, this should create in the
students a sense of "psychological ownership" of the clinic, which
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will incentivize them to go the extra mile in fulfilling their
responsibilities. 13 6 Such behavior is obviously beneficial to clients
and the community in that it expands services in a cost-effective
way and models altruism, responsibility and commitment to other
students. Secondly, students' long-term involvement in a distinct
organization, with a constitution, elections and formal appointment
process for committee positions, creates conditions conducive to a
strong and cohesive ethos. Moreover, this can be transmitted
through committee meetings, meetings of the eight "firms" into
which all students are organized, and an Annual General Meeting at
which prizes for outstanding service are awarded. Students also
participate in formal and informal social events, and other forms of
socialization that arise when people work closely and form friend-
ships with like-minded colleagues. 13 7 Arguably, informal socializa-
tion within the peer group may be as, if not more, effective than any
message transmitted by paid law school staff, though, here, students
are aware that all law clinic staff work far longer hours than they are
paid for, and that the Clinic's Director is a full-time academic with
the same teaching and research duties as his non-clinic colleagues.
Although the MRC students similarly participate in numerous
informal social events and have developed a distinct camaraderie
and ethos, also influenced by similar dedication of time by staff and
professor, the "ownership" of the MRC very much remains with
136 See, e.g., Mary A. Konovsk & S. Douglas Pugh, CITIZENSHIP BEHAVIOUR AND
SOCIAL EXCHANGE, 37 ACAD. MGMT J. 656, 666-68 (1994); Jon L. Pierce, Tatiana
Kostova & Kurt T. Dirks, Towards a Theory of Psychological Ownership in
Organisations, 26 ACAD. MGMT REV. 289, 299 (2001); Michael P. 0' Driscoll,
Jon L. Pierce & Ann-Marie Coghlan, The Psychology of Ownership: Work Envi-
ronment Structure, Organizational Commitment, and Citizenship Behaviours, 31
GROUP MGMT 388, 390 (2006); Steven H. Wagner, Christopher P. Parker & Neil
D. Christiansen, Employees That Think and Act Like Owners: Effect of Ownership
Beliefs and Behaviours on Organisational Effectiveness, 56 PERS. PSYCHOL. 847,
868 (2003).
137 Elton F. Jackson, Mark D. Bachmeier, James R. Wood & Elizabeth A. Craft,
Volunteering and Charitable Giving: Do Religious and Associational Ties
Promote Helping Behavior?, 24 NON-PROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 59, 62-64
(1995).
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the faculty and thus USLC's students have a longer-term investment
and role to play in the Clinic, which may lead to higher levels of
commitment. 138
III. EVIDENCING THE CLINIC EFFECT
A. Reflections Captured-The Source of the Evidence
Having explored the somewhat different potential of the two
clinics to influence the ethical development of their students, we
now turn to examine the evidence for any such effect. Such evidence
in both cases derives from the words of the students themselves that
they are required to write as part of their clinical learning experi-
ence. Again, there are important similarities and differences between
the two clinics. Having analyzed the reflections of our students, we
observed significant typological differences in at least six areas,
though many of these differences can be situated along a continuum
and in some case both axes of a typological modality are combined.
First, there is a difference as to how much theory and instruction on
theory precedes clinical students' experience and then reflection on
the experience. Newman spent less time up front on theory (though
she did touch on it in initial orientation as well as early clinic semi-
nars), while we have seen that Nicolson provides all clinic students
with a two-hour crash course in legal ethics designed to sensitize
them to commonly arising issues and to encourage reflection on
them in their diaries. Second, reflection can be oral or written, with
Newman relying more on oral reflection than Nicolson, thus par-
tially accounting for the brevity of NMRC student writings. Third,
reflection can focus on summative elements or be episodic and
ongoing, with, again, Newman requiring short summative reflection
written pieces from her students and Nicolson requiring longer
(sometimes weekly) reflections from the USLC students, leading to
the fourth typological distinction-brief or extensive reflection.
Fifth, the written reflection exercises Newman gave her students
were very directive, while Nicolson's were far more broad and
138 See discussion infra Section IV.
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open-ended. Lastly, we noted the educational value of dialogue
(whether oral or written), with the student's instructor (and others,
where possible). In this regard, we also observed differences
between our instructional roles. Newman is both the professor
teaching clinic and ethics and the practicing attorney directly
supervising her students and thus has greater opportunity for oral
dialogue, while Nicolson does not directly supervise the legal work
of the students at USLC and thus conducts his dialogue with the
students in writing. However, both authors open up reflection to a
wider group thus transforming the reflective dialogue into a more
wide-ranging conversation.
Turning to the details of the reflection process in each clinic,
the MIIRC captures student reflection in a formal "self-evaluation"
at the mid-point of each semester (meaning that it covers less than a
full academic year). These self-evaluations are referred to in the
analysis that follow as "Miami, Fall 2013" or "Miami Spring 2014"
to denote the two different semesters in which they were recorded.
Students are asked a series of specific questions on 15 separate
topics designed to uncover their progress toward meeting the
Clinic's learning goals. 139 The majority of these topics relate to
specific practical skills and competencies (such as client interview-
ing, legal research, maintaining case files), while some relate to
professional attributes (such as being a team player). Others involve
more general topics such as those entitled "Reflective Practitioner"
and "Professionalism," and one is titled "Ethical Issues."140 On each
topic, a specific set of prompts is given. For instance, on the
"Reflective Practitioner" topic, students are asked: "What successes
do you feel you have had? What challenges have you experienced?
139 MHRC's Learning Goals consist of a variety of professional skills and values.
On the values side, the Learning Goals include client empathy, a practice of self-
reflection, sensitivity to race and cultural issues, integrity, honesty and teamwork.
Available at: http://www.teachinglegalethics.org/sites/default/files/LEARNING
%02OGOALS%/`2O(3).pdf
140 As a result of focusing on ethical development in this study, MHRC seminar
lectures, discussions and case rounds now articulate more explicitly a definition of
"ethical issues" that is not merely code or rule-based. See discussion infra Section
IV.
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What do you wish to improve? Are you having a good time? Do you
enjoy being a lawyer? What in particular do you enjoy or dislike?"
More pertinently, on Professionalism, they are asked: "Have you
conducted yourself in a professional manner with integrity and
honesty? Have you been honest with yourself, your clients and your
supervisors? How do you think others perceive you as a profes-
sional?" On "Ethical Issues" they are prompted to "describe any
ethical issues that have arisen during your client representation.
How were you able to spot the issue? How did you address the
issue? What if any, ethical issues are you concerned about?" In a
specific effort to capture professional growth, most prompts differ
between the first and second semesters. For example, in the
second semester, in relation to "professionalism," they are asked:
"What impact has your clinical experience had on your professional
identity as a lawyer?" and on being a reflective practitioner, they are
asked: "How do you think you have changed as an advocate and a
lawyer?" While most of the prompts do not explicitly mention
ethics, many of them elicit reflection on developing professional
values-from individualized assessments of personal character and
integrity, and habits of reflection, to broader issues of the role of
lawyers in providing access to justice. Indeed, many of the directive
NMRC prompts ask students to reflect on how they treat clients and
others, as well as what kind of lawyer they want to be.
The MRC students are encouraged to limit their self-evalu-
ations to three pages. After reviewing the self-evaluations carefully,
and after considering independently each students' progress toward
the goals, the two supervisors meet individually with each student at
the mid-semester point to review and reflect on the student's work.
Faculty and senior student mentors also meet individually with each
student on a weekly basis to orally review the student's cases and
provide further feedback and opportunity for reflection though these
reflections are not captured in writing, nor are the frequent class case
rounds sessions which involve a conversation amongst the entire
class on particular ethics issues raised by students.
141 Notably, however, the prompts associated with "Ethical Issues" remained the
same.
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Compared to the summative nature of MIHRC student reflec-
tions, written reflection at Strathclyde is an ongoing process-what
can be called episodic reflection in that students concentrate on
writing about experiences as they arise. When they take the Ethics
and Justice class, CLLB students are required to reflect weekly
(though they only submit ten entries), but in their other semesters
only fortnightly (six entries in total). Graduate entrants taking the
accelerated CLLB write diaries in three out of four semesters,
whereas undergraduates write diaries in four out of six semesters.
Each entry is a maximum of 500 words, and students are given the
opportunity to submit their entries at two stages during the semester
for comments by the class co-coordinator. They then have a maxi-
mum of 200 words with which to respond to these comments. In
addition, they are encouraged but not required to submit an "intro-
duction (maximum length 500 words) providing a narrative to the
diary and calling attention to any noteworthy aspects of the reflec-
tion process." Unlike the directed nature of MRC reflection, for
the Ethics and Justice class students are simply instructed to reflect
on their "activities in handling cases and participation in case sur-
geries, as well as ... performance, what they are learning from the
class and from their clinical experience, and how they might
improve their performance," though this is fleshed out at a first
seminar meeting which contains a discussion on the theory and
techniques of good diary reflection, by the provision of examples of
good diaries from previous years. The topics for reflection for the
general CLLB diaries are even more open-ended, as the following
instruction shows: "Relevant experiences on which you can reflect
will include, most obviously, any case work, but also Clinic training,
attendance at an IAC [Initial Advice Clinic], and attendance at
surgeries. As long as it somehow illuminates one of your various
clinic activities, you may even reflect on what you have learnt in the
standard LLB from, for example, classes in Legal Process on access
to justice, classes in Legal Theory on substantive justice or ethics,
and any class in which you learn law relevant and helpful to the
conducting of one of your cases." USLC students were thus given
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much greater autonomy than MRC students on what to focus on in
their reflective journals.
To ensure consistency between the dairies of graduate entry
Strathclyde CLLB students' and their undergraduate counterparts
(who because their course is longer, wrote more diaries) in analy-
zing the diaries, we ignored the latter's first set of diaries. In order to
assess the effect of the Ethics and Justice class on students' ethical
awareness, we analyzed diaries of the students enrolled in the Ethics
and Justice seminar before, throughout, and after concluding the
course. In the analysis the Ethics and Justice diaries are designated
as "Strathclyde Fall 2013 with the dairies preceding them as "Strath-
clyde Spring 2013" and those following the Ethics and Justice
diaries as "Strathclyde Fall 2014" with the reference to the particular
week indicating when in the relevant semester the entry was made.
Had all Strathclyde students utilized the maximum word limit, this
would have resulted in 21,000 words of reflection to analyze, but
not all students took advantage of the full word limit and the
opportunity to submit their diaries for comments and only about a
third took the opportunity to provide an introduction to their diaries.
Nevertheless, data from the USLC students was far more extensive
than that of Miami students, with the longest combined self-
evaluation just over 5,000 words (including some repetition of the
topic prompts), and the shortest one just over 3,000 words.
The quality of student reflection in the MRC was also
rather different to that of USLC students. Being required to com-
ment on fifteen topics with space constraints meant that students did
not provide extensive and expansive reflection on one or two issues
but rather a modest amount on each required topic. As a result,
reflection was sometimes confined to perfunctory or bland com-
ments on topics where students appeared only to comment because
they were required to do so, meaning that there was less space to
develop more noteworthy issues. The fact that reflection topics were
set by teaching staff also means that we can read far less into their
choice of subject-matter than that of USLC students, who chose
what to discuss within only very general parameters.
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B. Reflections Analyzed-Methodology
Turning now to our analysis of the students' reflections
itself, we utilized two forms of qualitative research methodology
that are often used-and increasingly in combination 42-in evalu-
ating effective teaching and educational outcomes: grounded
theory1 4 3 and narrative inquiry analysis. 14 4 Grounded theory
involves breaking down data from large samples into component
parts; these components are then grouped and named based on
themes that are identified, and the researcher engages in constant
comparison and contrast of the concepts that emerge.145 Thus in our
initial review of the students' reflections we used a grounded theory
approach. While we had already read our own student's reflections
when they were submitted for assessment, when we came to
analyzing them for research purposes, we first closely read both sets
of data in their entirety closely for the purpose of identifying what
ethical issues were discussed, whether there was evidence of moral
development and professional identity formation, and what influ-
enced these processes. While we began with the themes Nicolson
had identified in his previous study, 14 6 as is common with this
methodology, new themes and subthemes emerged and earlier ones
were modified with repeated re-readings of the data. Moreover,
comparison of the two data sets revealed various patterns of similar-
ities and differences between the two student cohorts. Lastly, we
extracted and reproduced representative quotations to represent the
142 This is especially the case as regards the constructionist camp of grounded
theory, in which the researcher constructs meaning from the extracted themes
throughout the data.
143 See Alan Bryman, SOCIAL RESEARCH METHODS, 541-45, 694 (2008).
144 See generally Shalini Lal, Melinda Suto & Michael Ungar, Examining the
Potential of Combining the Methods of Grounded Theory and Narrative Inquiry:
A Comparative Analysis, 17 QuAL. REPORT 1, 2-3 (2012).
145 See Bryman, supra note 142, at 567-68.
146 Supra note 17.
147 See Bryman, supra note 142, at 568.
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themes and patterns identified, 14 and organized them to produce a
coherent narrative,
While we primarily utilized a grounded theory methodology,
because we were analyzing students' narratives that reflected what
meaning they derived from their individual experiences in the law
clinics, we also utilized elements of narrative inquiry. This method-
ology involves a thematic analysis of the personal accounts of
individuals of their lived experiences in order to understand how the
individual has derived meaning from experience and constructed
self-identity. 149 Narrative inquiry typically analyzes both the story
that an individual tells and the manner in which that story is told,
and usually focuses on a relatively small sample. To that extent, our
methodology differs from narrative inquiry in that we concentrated
only on the content of what was written and analyzed 22 diary
entries from seven graduate entrants and 28 entries from two under-
graduate Strathclyde students, and 24 three page self-evaluations
from the Miami students. But like narrative inquiry, we drew on
information out with the written data to help explain or draw conclu-
sions from the narratives.1 50 Thus, we "filled in" our students'
stories with our own personal knowledge of their performance and
development. In other words, we added our stories about our
students to their own stories.
Narrative inquiry is typically further characterized by a
meaningful relationship between the researcher and subject, which
must be acknowledged as potentially having an impact on the
individual and his or her narration. 151 And here our relationship with
the students undoubtedly influenced their narratives. Thus, elements
148 See generally Douglas Ezzy, QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS: PRACTICE AND
INNOVATION 80-85 (2002).
149 See Donald E. Polkinghome, NARRATIVE KNOWING AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES
149-50 (1988); Dan P. McAdams, Personal Narratives and the Life Story, in
HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY: THEORY AND RESEARCH 655 (Oliver P. John et al.
eds., 2008). See Margarete Sandelowski, Telling Stories: Narrative Approaches in
Qualitative Research, 23 J. NuRSING SCHOLARSHIP 161, 161-65 (1991).
150 See Susan E. Chase, Narrative Inquiry: Multiple Lenses, Approaches, Voices,
in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 660-65 (Norman K.
Denzin & Yvonna S. Lincoln eds., 3rd ed., 2005).
151 See Sandelowski, supra note 148, at 162.
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of the narratives were possibly co-constructed between teacher and
student, especially because we used the narratives of our students to
both measure their progress and grade their performance in terms of
whether they have met our teaching aims. Even more problem-
atically, in a variant of what has been termed a "reactive effect,"
common in research where there is a close relationship between the
researcher and the subject, 152 some students may well have "played
to the gallery" by expressing views that they assumed would find
favor with us. While we cannot state with certainty to what extent
this may have occurred, at least in some cases the sincerity of stu-
dent statements could be confirmed or undermined by their actual
actions, especially in the MRC where the faculty observes and
reviews on a weekly, if not daily, basis actual student behaviors.
Moreover, as demonstrated in Nicolson's earlier study, 153 some
USLC students are prepared to express views that they know will
challenge those of their tutors.
In addition to these specific risks, all qualitative research has
weaknesses flowing from the inevitability of subjective interpreta-
tion based on biases or pre-conceptualizations of the researcher.
However, in an effort to reduce some of these risks that we might
have overlooked or re-interpreted data which conflicts with what we
expected or wanted to find, each author undertook a "blind" reading
of the student reflections produced by the other's clinic students
with the purpose of determining whether they identified other
themes or indeed were unconvinced by the other's reading. Never-
theless, given that both of us were interested in finding evidence of
clinical impact on ethical professional development, this cross-
reading only reduced rather than eliminated problems inherent in all
qualitative research methods, though it did lead to comparative
insights which would have been unlikely without it.
152 See Bryian, supra note 146, at 266.
153 Supra note 18, at 49.
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C. Evidence of the Clinic Effect(s)
(i) Introduction
Having described the methodology of our analysis of the
student reflection, we now turn to our story of their stories. The
headline for that story would read that both the self-evaluations of
the Miami students and the diaries of the Strathclyde students show
them displaying ethical awareness and judgment through reflection
on a wide spectrum of ethical issues. At one end, these involved
everyday issues of how to interact with other human beings and
particularly their clients in a way that reflects common decency,
respect, care, consideration, empathy, and that respect for their
autonomy as a human being-what we call called micro-ethics or
interpersonal ethics. At the opposite end of the spectrum, students
addressed macro-ethical issues involving law and social justice and,
most importantly for the argument about altru-ethical profession-
alism, concerns about access to justice. Falling between these two
ends are a number of issues which we will describe as meso-ethical
for want of a better word, 15 4 and which involve more standard issues
found in codes of ethics and discussed in the legal ethics literature
revolving around the clash between personal morality and profes-
sional role morality: should lawyers represent and do all they can
within code and legal rules to further their clients' interest irrespec-
tive of the morality of such actions; should they breach confiden-
tiality to prevent harm to others, etc. even without breaching the
codes or law. While there is considerable fluidity between these
three broad categories of ethical issue,15 5 and one could categorize
154 Cf Derek Morgan, Doctoring Legal Ethics: Studies in Irony, in LEGAL ETHICS
AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 203, 212 (Ross Cranston ed., 1995); see also
Abraham Edel, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice: on the Terms of Their
Relation, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN ETHics: THE CHALLENGE OF APPLIED ETHics
317, 322-23 (Joseph P. DeMarco, Richard M. Fox & Michael D. Bayles eds.,
1986) (explaining other, although slightly different use of the terms, "micro" and
"macro" ethics); D.R.F. O'Dair, Ethics by the Pervasive Method The Case of
Contract, 17 LEGAL STUDIES 305, 312 (1997).
155 For example, lawyers who humiliate or intimidate other human beings can be
said to contravene micro-ethical values, but when this is done in order to promote
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micro- and meso-ethical issues under a single category of "ethics" to
distinguish them from questions of altruism, we think that they
provides a useful means of categorizing our analysis of student
reflection which reflects our view1 5 6 that altruistic service to those
most in need is a professional ethical obligation as much as zeal-
ously representing clients or upholding confidentiality. The other
headline of our story about the students' reflection is that, while, as
we shall see, there were differences between the two cohorts as to
the type of micro-ethical issues discussed, both cohorts seemed to
encounter far fewer meso-ethical issues than micro-ethical issues
relating to interpersonal relations or the macro-ethics of the law's
content or access to justice.
(ii) Micro-ethics
While traditional ethics have focused on abstract and only
rarely arising issues of justice, life, death, and formal obligations
such as promise-keeping, feminists, postmodernists and others have
drawn attention to the ever-present ethical dimension of interper-
sonal relations; in other words, the issue of how to deal with another
human being as a human being. Similarly, if we lift our gaze above
the sort of issues that occupy most professional codes and legal
ethicists to focus on the way that lawyers interrelate with their
clients and with others, we can see that every instance of client
representation is replete with ethical significance,15 7 not least
because clients often entrust important and often emotionally
their client's interests it falls into the area of meso-ethics as raising issues of role
morality. Similarly, the issue of whether lawyers should undermine the integrity of
legal proceedings by zealously pursuing their client's interests can be said to be
both an issue of role morality and macro-ethics.
156 See supra Section I(a)(i), p. 4, especially text accompanying note 23.
157 James E. Moliterno, An Analysis ofEthics Teaching in Law Schools: Replacing
Lost Benefits of the Apprentice System in the Academic Atmosphere 60 U. CIN.
LAW REV. 83, 107-08 (1991); S. J. Burnham, Teaching Legal Ethics in Contracts,
41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 105, 105, 108 (1991); Mary Ann Noone & Judith Dickson,
Teaching Towards a New Professionalism: Challenging Law Students to Become
Ethical Lawyers, 4 LEGAL ETHICS 131, 135 (2001).
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charged issues to the lawyer, making the relationship a highly
personal one, which involves-or should involve-trust, commit-
ment, care, and consideration.1 58 Given the relatively high number
of cases handled by students in both clinics, it is hardly surprising
that virtually every student reported encountering issues of micro or
interpersonal issues involving how to deal with clients in a profes-
sional, yet empathetic and non-paternalistic manner, and that many
also reflected on how to maintain respect for others they dealt with
in the course of representing clients. 159
A problem commonly encountered was how to deal with
clients who did not turn up to meetings or who were otherwise
difficult in, for instance, being rude, impatient or not taking advice.
Students reflected on how they were challenged to be patient and
show an understanding of circumstances that might explain their
client's behavior.
[W]orking in the clinic has taught me how to be
more patient with people who ask for help but do not
want to help himself or herself I have a few clients
who are unresponsive or straight up rude; but I keep
telling myself that there are societal and health
pressures that have made them the way they are and
that I must continue to persevere in trying to get
them help. Regardless of their attitude it is my job to
help them become healthier in any way that I can.160
When I first met Mr. E., he was very respectful and
kind. However, some of my conversations over the
phone have been less pleasant. Though I am some-
times frustrated with him, I always maintain my
composure .... I try to be clear, calm, and patient
158 See e.g. Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 GEO.
L.J. 2665, 2665 (1993); Francesca Bartlett & Lyn Aitken, Competence in Caring
in Legal Practice, 16 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 241, 249 (2009).
159 Cf Schwartz & Sharpe, supra note 103, at 241.
160 Jennifer, Self Reflection Memoranda, Miami (Spring 2014) (on file with the
University of Miami Health Rights Clinic).
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with him, but also provide some delicately placed
firmness when necessary. ... Even though he can be
difficult to work and communicate with, he has seri-
ous health problems, and I really want to help him
get benefits and make his life even a little easier. 16 1
Karen twice faced clients who did not turn up to meetings.
On both occasions, she noted how in her personal life she would
have responded negatively and intolerantly, but the "Law Clinic
constantly challenges your natural reaction to situations" and
"because we often work with those on the fringes of society, we
need to be more aware of considering situations from the perspec-
tive of our clients." 16 2 On the second occasion, she admonished
herself "to be more understanding as there are often many factors
which affect our client's ability to attend meetings or arrive on time.
It would be entirely unprofessional to allow this to have an effect on
how I interact or treat the client, and I would like to think this is not
something I would ever do." 16 3 At the same time, while reflecting
the sort of empathetic understanding Law Clinic staff encourage,
Karen stated that this "raises the question of at what point we stop
being understanding and let the client go."164
Hannah also had mixed emotions about a client interview
being cancelled:
I understand that these things are very unpredictable
and that is similar of what to expect in a law firm,
however I was concerned that the Law Clinic may
not be taken seriously by clients as the LC offers a
161 See Anne, Self Reflection Memoranda, Miami (Fall 2013) (on file with the
University of Miami Health Rights Clinic); see also Tim, Self Reflection
Memoranda, Miami (Fall 2013) (on file with the University of Miami Health
Rights Clinic).
162 Diary Entry, Strathclyde (Spring 2013, Weeks 3-4) (on file with the University
of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
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free service and is run majorly by students, hence we
may not have the same appeal or command the same
respect as a firm would. 16 5
The same concern about a possible lack of respect from non-
fee paying clients was expressed by Hannah in relation to a client
who did not respond to attempts to contact her and by Andrew, who
felt that "while me and my co-advisor are putting in as much effort
as possible in relation to dealing with the case however we are not
receiving the same amount of effort back." 16 6 But whereas Andrew
only seemed concerned about the impact on himself, Hannah
referred to the "waste of clinic resources including the time of
volunteers, like myself." 1 6 7
Chris even admitted that his client's attitude had negatively
affected the level of service he provided:
Unlike the majority of my clients, I never had a fond
relationship with [I]. In our first conversation he was
discourteous and impatient. From then on, our rela-
tionship mainly consisted of him calling me and
yelling on the phone for 20-30 minutes. It made me
hesitant to contact him in the same way that I did
with my other clients. I didn't see the need to give
him a courtesy update on his case when it would
result in receiving a painful array of barbs. ... Now,
as we are closing his case, his vitriol has increased
tenfold and the simplest act of just double-checking
his address before sending him a file is met with
hours of agony. Nevertheless, I think dealing with
165 Diary Entry, Strathclyde (Spring 2013, Weeks 7-8) (on file with the University
of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
166 Hannah, Diary Entry, Strathclyde (Fall 2013, Week 3) (on file with the
University of Strathclyde Law Clinic); Andrew, Diary Entry, Strathclyde (Spring
2013, Weeks 9-10) (on file with the University of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
167 Diary Entry Strathclyde (Fall 2013, Week 3) (on file with the University of
Strathclyde Law Clinic).
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such a troublesome client has at least given me the
experience of dealing with a challenging client. 168
However, such attitudes were rare, and in some cases, stu-
dents were encouraged to show greater understanding. For instance,
when Hakeem reported that he had not gone "the extra mile" for an
impatient and quarrelsome client, it was suggested in the response to
his diary entry that he see himself as something like Luban's "law-
yer for the damned" 169 in order to encourage him to display his usual
zeal.1 70
Far more common were attitudes of respect for clients and
empathy for their plight, though references were far more prevalent
in the MRC self-evaluations than the Strathclyde diaries.17 1 This is
no doubt at least partly due to the fact that one of the specific
learning goals was to "[t]reat clients, lawyers, judges and staff with
respect," and that the importance of understanding and respecting
the client's often very different circumstances, and of developing a
trusting relationship with the client was repeatedly emphasized in
class discussion and supervision meetings. Thus, many mentioned in
passing how they displayed empathy toward their clients,172 or
168 Self Reflection Memoranda, Miami (Spring 2014) (on file with the University
of Miami Health Rights Clinic). See also Sean, Diary Entry Strathclyde (Spring
2014, Week 2) (on file with the University of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
169 Luban, supra note 25, at 160-66.
170 Diary Entry, Strathclyde (Spring 2014, Week 5) (on file with the University of
Strathclyde Law Clinic).
17 E.g., In working with a homeless young woman who is HIV+, Anne observed
that "C. has had a very difficult life and I was very empathetic to her story and
expressed my desire to do my best to help." Anne, Diary Entry, Miami (Fall 2013)
(on file with the University of Miami Health Rights Clinic).
172 See infra, e.g., text accompanying notes 175-78 and 183-89. See also Anne,
Self Reflection Memoranda, Miami (Spring 2014) (on file with the University of
Miami Health Rights Clinic); Sarah, Self Reflection Memoranda, Miami (Fall
2013) (on file with the University of Miami Health Rights Clinic); Jane, Self
Reflection Memoranda, Miami (Fall 2013) (on file with the University of Miami
Health Rights Clinic).
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described actions that revealed their caring and sensitivity. 173 In
addition, in the first semester students were specifically asked to
discuss a situation where they "interacted with a client, lawyer, gov-
ernment worker, judge, or staff member" and whether they thought
they treated such persons with respect. In response to this prompt
Roda described how she felt and expressed concern and empathy for
a client's frustrations over scheduling conflicts between appoint-
ments to advance the legal case and her employment:
When I explain to her that these time slots are out of
my control, she calms down and accepts it. I think
she appreciates that I do not demand her to take off
work and calmly explain the situation to her.174
Similarly, Tim noted, "[n]o matter what, I have tried to build
a rapport with each person and find some common ground/interest
with them to make them feel comfortable." 17 5 Possibly because of
being asked specific questions about client interviewing and other
aspects of the lawyer-clients relations, as well as the emphasis
placed in class and in supervision meetings on the interpersonal
aspects of the attorney-client relationship, Miami students frequently
linked the need for empathy to developing the necessary rapport for
a trusting and collaborative attorney-client relationship.
I met with G. ... to better prepare for his hearing and
to build rapport.... [T]he meeting ... enabled G. to
get to know me and trust me better, and gave him a
chance to tell me his story. ... At the end of the
meeting, G. seemed very comfortable with me. ... I
173 E.g., infra, Maria, note 177; Lynn, Self Reflection Memoranda, Miami (Fall
2013) (on file with the University of Miami Health Rights Clinic) (discussing
sensitivity to a client's mental health needs).
174 Self Reflection Memoranda, Miami (Fall 2013) (on file with the University of
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was empathetic to his situation and showed him that
I understood his inability to work. 176
... I have also found that my clients ... are looking
for an individual that they can trust that will express
real concern for them as individuals. Checking up
with clients to see how they are feeling or if they
need something goes a long way. Asking them about
their life and interests, not only about the specific
events that led up to their case, generate [sic] the
rapport crucial to creating a long-lasting and trusting
relationship with the client. ... Additionally, showing
empathy to my clients definitely helped with the
interaction both in person and over the telephone.17 7
My goal was to not only to develop a case theory, but
also to get to know the needs of my client as much as
possible. I knew that he suffered from anxiety so I
tried to make our time at the Social Security office as
stress free as possible. I asked him question[s], but
mostly listened to his story and got to know him
better. I have built a very good relationship with this
client and he trusts me.
Sarah extrapolated the use empathy and sensitivity to a general
methodology for communicating with her clients:
176 Sarah, Self Reflection Memoranda Miami (Fall 2013) (on file with the
University of Miami Health Rights Clinic).
177 Jennifer, Self Reflection Memoranda Miami (Fall 2013) (on file with the
University of Miami Health Rights Clinic). See also Jane, Self Reflection
Memoranda Miami (Fall 2013) (on file with the University of Miami Health
Rights Clinic).
178 Maria, Self Reflection Memoranda Miami (Fall 2013) (on file with the
University of Miami Health Rights Clinic).
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Whenever I call clients, I first ask them if there is
anything in particular I can help them with so that I
understand their most immediate concerns. I ask
them to tell their stories so that I can understand their
challenges from their perspectives. Additionally, I
am sensitive to language differences, and want to
make sure that clients understand I am there for
them, even if I cannot speak with them directly. 179
The only Strathclyde student to acknowledge the value of
empathy to an effective client relationship also saw this as having an
independent intrinsic value. Thus, the positive response of a client to
being told that the students would work hard to deal with her case as
quickly as possible made Shruti realize that "clients really want to
feel that someone actually cares about their issue and want to help
them." She then referred to her desire to improve on the issues she
has learned during the Ethics and Justice class: "I have learned that
one of the most important ways to help and work with clients is to
make them feel that they have someone who is attentive and eager to
help them.180 To some extent, this echoes Jane's recognition, which
is amply supported by empirical research 81 that to many clients the
process of being listened to and cared for is just as important as the
outcome. Thus, citing the gratitude of one client and the more
resilient attitudes of another, she comments: "I have learned that it is
not about me 'winning.' The clinic has taught me that some clients
just need to feel like someone is advocating on their behalf." 182 Her
views are echoed by Catriona:
179 Sarah, Self Reflection Memoranda Miami (Fall 2013) (on file with the
University of Miami Health Rights Clinic).
180 Diary Entry, Strathclyde (Fall 2013, Week 4) (on file with the University of
Strathclyde Law Clinic).
181 Discussed in Clark D. Cunningham, What Do Clients Want from Their
Lawyers?, 2013 J. DiSP. RESOL. 143, 146-51 (2013). See also Hilary Sommerlad
& David Wall, Legally Aided Clients and Their Solicitors: Qualitative Perspec-
tives on Quality and Legal Aid, The Law Society, Research Study No. 34, at 2-6
(1999).
182 Jane, Diary Entry, Miami (Spring 2014) (on file with the University of Miami
Health Rights Clinic).
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I have come to realize that often the mere idea of fair-
ness can be very comforting to many people. Know-
ing that they weren't "railroaded" by the system and
the knowledge that they at least had a genuine chance
in fighting their case gives a sense of justice, even if
the end result is less than had been hoped for.183
Whereas most students simply discussed how they exercised
empathy and its value in enhancing client service without referring
to how they came to these views, others also echo Jane's implicit
recognition of the clinic effect by attributing their growing apprecia-
tion of the need for empathy to their clinic experiences.
Through case work I am now more prepared to deal
with lawyer-client relations, empathy, listening to the
client, maintaining communication to build rapport
and also ensure that the client feels confident in my
ability and the way their case will be handled.18 4
... I have found it easier to empathize with clients by
intimately learning about the challenges they face,
and therefore I have learned how to be more tactful
when approaching difficult topics.... This experience
has evolved what I previously viewed to be a homo-
genized group of indigent people into individual
people who are relatable and deserving of help. I
have found myself developing close relationships
with clients and enjoy learning about their lives and
helping them find success."s
183 Introduction, Strathclyde (Spring 2014) (on file with the University of
Strathclyde Law Clinic).
184 Hannah, Introduction, Strathclyde (Spring 2013) (on file with the University of
Strathclyde Law Clinic).
185 Kerry, Self Reflection Memoranda, Miami (Spring 2014) (on file with the
University of Miami Health Rights Clinic). See also Cecelia, Self Reflection
Memoranda Miami (2014) (on file with the University of Miami Health Rights
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One aspect of legal practice that requires particular sensitivity,
empathy, and patience is dealing with clients with mental health
problems. Given that mental illness is far more prevalent among
116those living in poverty, and that there is a correlation between
mental health and the stress of, for example, having HIV or being
homeless, 18 7 it is not surprising that MIIIRC students appeared to
learn more about to treat such clients appropriately, as is illustrated
by the following reflections:
E. continues to be my most challenging client rela-
tionship as he goes back and forth between being
completely withdrawn and avoiding me, to being
responsive and charismatic. As a function of his bi-
polar [condition] he is rarely at a stable point so it is
often hard to keep him involved in his case and get
him to go to appointments and provide needed infor-
mation. I think my clinical experience has taught me
how to approach problems from a number of direc-
tions in hopes of finding a solution that works. 188
Clinic) ("[E]xperience has taught me valuable skills such as how to approach
sensitive subjects with tact and how to cater to different cultural backgrounds.").
186 Carla J. Groh, Poverty, Mental Health, and Women: Implications for Psychia-
tric Nurses in Primary Care Settings, 13 J. AM. PSYCH. NURSES Assoc. 267
(2007); Christopher G. Hudson, Socioeconomic Status and Mental Illness: Tests of
the Social Causation and Selection Hypotheses, 75 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 3
(2005); Jane D. McLeod & Michael J. Shanahan, Trajectories of Poverty and
Children 's Mental Health, 37 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAVIOR 207 (1996).
17 Hudson, ibid; see also Ezra Susser, Eliecer Valencia & Sarah Conover,
Prevalence of HIV Infection among Psychiatric Patients in New York City Men's
Shelter, 83 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 568 (1993). For an example of how this corre-
lation is internalized by MfHRC students, see, e.g., Jennifer, Self Reflection
Memoranda, Miami (Spring 2014) (on file with the University of Miami Health
Rights Clinic) ("I interviewed a homeless veteran.... It ... became clear rather
quickly that this man suffered from extreme mental illness and his homelessness
was a consequence of his failing mental health.").
188 Anne, Self Reflection Memoranda, Miami (Spring 2014) (on file with the
University of Miami Health Rights Clinic).
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Through my interaction with Ms. B, I noticed that
she displayed a strong fagade, but is in dire need of
help. I noticed that she needs the medical care for her
HIV, but also requires some sort of mental coun-
seling as she is unwilling and reluctant to share her
diagnosis with her family and friends. In order to
maintain a relationship with Ms. B., I continue to call
her and ensure [sic] her that we are working the best
we can in order to get her the care she needs. 189
Daniela described an initial interview with a prospective client in
which her sensitivity to the client's mental status enabled her to
recognize, and possibly prioritize, additional legal needs:
Mrs. G. suffers from extreme depression and anxiety,
and she has overwhelming guilt over her inability to
assist her ill husband in supporting the family. She
identified naturalization as her biggest goal. How-
ever, it seems that getting her financial assistance
through SSI would ease some of the tension in her
household and reduce some of her guilt, both of
which are factors aggravating her psychiatric condi-
tions. Mrs. G. cried throughout the entire interview,
so it was especially important to be empathetic to her
situation. Explaining how the clinic works and what
we might be able to do to help her did help her stop
crying.19 0
A number of Strathclyde students also reflected on the issue of
dealing with clients with mental health problems and in fact
189 Lynn, Self Reflection Memoranda, Miami (Fall 2013) (on file with the
University of Miami Health Rights Clinic). See also Maria, supra note 177.
190 Daniela, Self Reflection Memoranda, Miami (Fall 2013) (on file with the
University of Miami Health Rights Clinic).
2016-2017 63
Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal Vol. XXXV
specifically requested a seminar to be devoted to this issue, from
which many reported learning practical lessons. 191
Given that the client may be suffering from depres-
sion is also on my mind when dealing with the case,
as I would not want to pester the client too much for
a reply and end up stressing him out too much or
putting too much pressure so that he is sort of turned
off from our service. Lawyers will regularly deal
with aggrieved individuals and I would imagine there
is some sort of balance of counseling being provided
and also legal expertise being given due to the client
reliance on the lawyer to sort out their problems. 192
Shruti mentioned in passing that issues of paternalism were
exacerbated by her client's mental illness, but was prompted by
comments on her diary entry to reflect on whether she had a moral
duty to ensure that the client received help for his illness and
concluded that "[w]hilst I am not sure if this is our legal duty I can
not help but feel a moral obligation to ensure he gets the protection
he needs. 193A more noticeable difference between the two cohorts of
students in relation to issues of empathy related to its impact on
other aspects of the lawyer-client relationship. In positive terms,
Shruti responded to a comment on her diary entry querying whether
her reference to being a zealous advocate was the same as neutral
partisanship:
I empathize with the client too much to really be
"neutral" in that sense. Caring and empathizing with
191 E.g. Shruti, Diary Entry, Strathclyde (Fall 2013, Week 12) (on file with the
University of Strathclyde Law Clinic) ("[O]ne of the easiest (and politest) ways to
establish if a client is mentally challenged or lacks capacity is to ask a series of
leading questions.")
192 Andrew, Diary Entry, Strathclyde (Spring 2013, Weeks 9-10) (on file with the
University of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
193 Diary Entries, Strathclyde (Fall 2013, 2014, Week 6) (on file with the
University of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
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the client really helps to motivate me when working
on her case.... Obviously, I have wondered what I
would do if I found myself working with a client
who I did not empathize with. In a situation like this
I believe I would still be able to fulfill the partisan
aspect of the role but would need to make a con-
scious effort to keep myself focused and moti-
vated. 19 4
Far more common amongst Strathclyde, but not Miami, 1 95
students was reflection on the impact empathizing, or perhaps more
accurately, over-empathizing may have on other aspects of the
lawyer-client relationship. One is that this may lead to lawyers
losing the necessary "professional" detachment required to give
clients the best possible service-an issue which many students
discussed, Jill and John on two separate occasions. Jill first worried
that while "as laudable as it is to have empathy with your client's
situation, it is crucial to keep some distance in order to maintain a
professional relationship and remain focused on the issues at hand,"
but two weeks later she was rather more certain that "perhaps a little
more analysis and a less empathy would have served me well." 1 96
By contrast, John commented in relation to a client whose plight
aroused his sympathy, that "although I know it is important to
remain detached, ultimately it is empathy that is needed" and that
while "[e]mpathy and detachment are difficult to reconcile, ... an
answer for how they can ... will only come with greater experience
than I have amassed to date." 19 7 Such experience arrived a fortnight
194 Diary Entry, Strathclyde (Fall 2013, Week 4) (on file with the University of
Strathclyde Law Clinic).
195 Though Lynn commented that she was starting to understand the fine line
between acting as a professional advocate for the clients and also being the person
they talk to when they have nowhere else to go. See Lynn, Self Reflection Memor-
anda, Miami (Spring 2014).
196 Jill, Diary Entries, Strathclyde (Spring 2013, Entries 4 & 6) (on file with the
University of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
197 John, Diary Entries, Strathclyde (Spring 2013, Weeks 1-2) (on file with the
University of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
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later, when he encountered another client who became upset, lead-
ing him to comment that "again sympathy was trying to come
through despite it being empathy that was required." Then,
prompted by written comments on his diary entry, he researched the
difference between sympathy and empathy and concluded that
"empathy is more needed in what we do, as, in my opinion, you
can't remain detached enough to help someone if you feel sorry for
them." 198
By contrast, while Hakeem was motivated to do some
research on the two concepts, he found it of little use in deciding
whether he was feeling empathy or sympathy for a client whose situ-
ation he felt sorry for and who he "deeply" wanted to help. However,
he astutely commented that: "[a]lthough at first it appears that
empathy is a desirable quality to have I think with this comes the risk
of being overly paternalistic and assuming that the way the client
should be dealt with mirrors the way I myself would like to be
treated if roles were reversed." 199
Here, Hakeem perceptively refers to the second problem
posed by empathy in client relations-namely its potential to prompt
paternalism. The general issue of lawyer paternalism was a common
theme amongst Strathclyde students, two thirds of whom raised it in
relation to their cases. But while Hakeem's comments followed fre-
quent surgery discussions and an in-depth seminar involving reading
specifically addressing the issue, some students raised it after only a
brief introduction to the issue in induction training.
Thus, within weeks of starting to take on cases, Jill asserted
that while "our clients rely on us and we may offer the only oppor-
tunity of legal representation to them ... we cannot and should not
make decisions for clients about how far to take a dispute." 2 0 0 And
in the Introduction to all her diary entries, she confirmed that "at the
beginning of my Law Clinic experience I was concerned about
198 John, Diary Entries, Strathclyde (Spring 2013, Weeks 3-4) (on file with the
University of Strathclyde Law Clinic). See infra note 234.
199 Hakeem, Journal Entry, Strathclyde (Spring 2014, Week 2) (on file with the
University of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
200 Jill, Journal Entry, Strathclyde (Spring 2013, Week 2) (on file with the Univer-
sity of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
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client interactions and making sure that I was representing the
client's best interests, and not acting in a paternalistic manner."
The fact that this reflection-and that of John on balancing
empathy and attachment-occurred before their in-depth discussion
in the Ethics and Justice class shows the value of a brief introduction
to the topic during training in engendering at least sensitivity to the
issue. This can then be built upon to develop ethical judgment by
more in-depth exploration and application of the various relevant
theories relating to the issue in class. However, most students only
raised this issue following a two-hour seminar or tutor comments on
diary entries. The need for more than a brief introduction to legal
ethics was explicitly recognized by Shruti, who remembered the dis-
cussion of paternalism in induction training, but felt that it was over-
shadowed by other aspects of training. By contrast, she stated that
... after studying paternalism this week I am left
wondering why I never felt there might have been a
concern with just how much autonomy the client
exercised.... My reading this week has made me
question if I should have worked more to assure my
client was autonomous, or if by trying to dissuade
my client from relying on her husband more heavily
would be impinging on her autonomy in a way-as
how much of it is my business who she relies upon to
make decisions and take advice from? Understanding
client autonomy and how I can work to support it is
something which I feel I need to be vigilant about in
any future case I take in the law clinic. ... I am going
to try and read up on issues about paternalism and
how it works in a lawyer/client relationship.20 1
The value of learning ethics in the context of repeated immersion in
casework, and equally of exposing those involved with casework to
201 Shruti, Journal Entry, Strathclyde (Fall 2013, Week 2) (on file with the
University of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
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ethical theory, emerges clearly from Shruti's comments the next
week when she started a new case:
I am quite excited about taking on a new case as it
allows me to start working on the skills that my time
in ethics and justice classes have shown I need to
work on, namely getting a better grasp of the correct
balance of lawyer client autonomy. Before the initial
interview I spent the night before reading over my
seminar notes and looking at some of the extra
d*202reading....
In fact, the issue of paternalism did arise in the interview, along with
questions about the contractual nature of the lawyer-client relation-
ship.
There is obviously a much bigger concern in this case
that our client could have been "swindled" somehow
out of his house and lost control of his finances.
Whilst ... this ... is not the reason the client contacted
the clinic and so is no concern of ours I feel that it
would fly in the face of the hard work the law clinic
has done to improve justice to those most vulnerable
if we were to just close the case. Obviously this
brings us into a tricky area where my co-advisor and I
are investigating this matter where we have not been
instructed to but I feel it is our ethical duty to try and
ensure that an elderly, frail person has not been taken
advantage of I am going to research into whether or
not doing this could still be regarded as "acting within
the best interests of our client" and work hard to try
and protect our client in case he has been somehow
cheated into giving up his home and access to his
f203
own finances.
202 Id. at Week 4.
203 Id. at Week 6.
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We see evidence of the USLC's service in Shruti's grappling with
this dilemma. But we also see in her later references to client
privilege and the concept of informed consent, quoted below, clear
evidence of the benefit of drawing on the legal ethics literature to
provide more nuanced tools for the exercise of ethical judgment than
those provided by the codes and mere common sense-though, as
she realized, these nuanced tools do not necessarily enable the
simple resolution of difficult dilemmas. Thus, in relation to the
suspected swindler, she agonized that
one part of me wants to phone up the third party and
essentially tell them to butt out of it-I know that
this would be a ridiculous and immature response
that would not solve anything so I would never do it.
... Another part of me wants to phone the client and
ask them why they are sharing this [privileged] infor-
mation with the 3rd party when we have outlined that
it is not in their best interest to do so. I suppose this
ties into issues of paternalism, if you phoned up the
client to ask this I would be afraid of acting like a
nagging parent telling their child off, essentially
patronising the client and their autonomy. It is a very
difficult issue to reconcile in my head but I feel that
we must regard it on the face of it as the client
making an informed choice and respect that-how-
ever in this case there are concerns with the mental
capacity of our client and the possible risk of 3rd
party exploitation that make this line of thinking
uneasy for me. Unfortunately if I began talking about
these issues I could possibly write a small novella on
them! So I am hoping that the next few weeks of
seminars and surgeries may somehow help me work
204out my concerns.
204 Id. at Week 8.
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However, some help was more readily at hand via her tutor's sug-
gestion in the response to her entry that she revisit relevant seminar
reading, particularly on the concept of soft paternalism. 2 0 5 Shruti
responded by saying that the reading "certainly did help" and that:
At the moment I do see a strong argument for using
soft paternalism as it seems that our client cannot
really make decisions fully autonomously-either
due to his disability or due to possibly being exploited
by a third party. However until we know the severity
and nature of his disability I feel reluctant to pursue
soft paternalism-it may be the client is mentally
aware and happy with his situation, but suffers from
communication problems, or the client could be very
mentally ill and not have any legal capacity. I do not
want to undermine the client's autonomy because I
have misunderstood the situation.2 06
These extended extracts from Shruti's diaries clearly show
both the important symbiosis between practice, reflection and theory
and the value of repeated exposure to casework experience in allow-
ing students to finesse their existing theory of how to act, develop
moral wisdom and make habitual their moral responses to ethical
issues. The value of linking theory with practice is also illustrated by
Hannah, who used her seminar reading to reflect on a client who
was given contradictory advice by a previous voluntary agency, and
now appears to value the advice being given by the Clinic:
as Ellmann describes it the client may not always be
aware of what is in their best interest or be inconsi-
derate to moral factors hence the lawyer may express
their opinion on the direction the client should take
.... This emphasizes Ellmann's argument of the risk
and ease by which one can possibly breach client
205 Cf Nicolson & Webb, supra note 25, at 126-27.
206 Shruti, supra note 205, at Week 8.
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autonomy thus careful consideration is needed to
ensure the client is not manipulated by the soli-
citor.20 7
While this perhaps only shows a consolidation of abstract lessons
learnt through reflection on an actual experience, Karen used her
case experience in a more transformative way to question orthodox
approaches to client autonomy flowing from agency laws which
stipulate that it is for clients to determine the ends of representation
208but lawyers to decide on the means.
To me this always seems like a bit of a grey distinc-
tion. In this case it could be argued that the "end"
that the client has instructed is "I want you to settle
this case for Lx." Therefore it is our responsibility to
decide the "means" by which this end is achieved;
this means that it can conceivably be argued that the
wording of the COT3 [formal settlement document]
and the final decision to sign is all for the representa-
tive to do without further instructions from the client.
However at the end of the day to actually accept the
wording of a COT3 and sign without final authoriza-
tion from the client would be an insane course of
action. Any potential risk ... are risks for the client
and so it makes sense that the final decision of whe-
ther or not to take them is for the client to make.209
Then, in responding to a comment on this entry, Karen drew on her
reading about the importance of having a moral dialogue with, and
207 Hannah, Journal Entry, Strathclyde (Fall 2013, Week 7) (on file with the Uni-
versity of Strathclyde Law Clinic) (citing Stephen Ellman, Empathy andApproval,
43 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 1002 (1992)).
208 Cf MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1983);
Nicolson & Webb, supra note 25, at ch. 5 passim.
209 Karen, Journal Entry, Strathclyde (Spring 2014, Week 5) (on file with the Uni-
versity of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
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gaining informed consent from clients to state that whether lawyers
should always follow client instructions "depends on a variety of
matters":
The first is theoretically if you do not wish to follow
the instructions you can always withdraw from
acting, however depending on how far proceedings
have gone this may not be possible. Otherwise I
suppose we are considering a matter of zealousness,
should you have to follow instructions you think are
"wrong" or indeed "crazy" ...? A moral dialogue is
important to try and suggest more appropriate cour-
ses of action There's always going to be a risk in
acting without informed consent but what you can do
to protect yourself is keep meticulous records of all
conversations where you have attempted to get in-
formed consent and perhaps put the information in
letters to clients.... I think it is a matter of putting
yourself in the clients [sic] shoes and being aware of
what you are actually doing, is it truly a day to day
task which can count as "means" or is it more? 210
In addition to illustrating the use of theoretical knowledge in reflec-
tion on experience (specifically about the concepts of moral dia-
logue and informal consent), the above extract also shows how
interventions by teaching staff can prompt deeper reflection. In
some cases, like that of Shruti's revisiting reading on paternalism,
this involves simply reminding students of ideas found in their
reading. But in Karen's case she was prompted to engage in more
nuanced thinking. This experience was repeated later in the semes-
ter, when she began by stating:
This kind of case really demonstrates the difficult
decisions that are left at the end of the day for our
client to make. This case and [another mentioned
2 10 id.
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previously] have really focused the place of a lawyer
for me. It is neither to decide what the client should
do nor how they should do it but instead to provide
them with all of the information available, allow
them to come to their own decision and then take the
action they request. It must sometimes be a hard to
do so however this is the role of a lawyer and I think
we must be careful, even if we believe that we have
the client's best interests at heart, not to overstep
these boundaries.2 1 1
But when asked whether one really "just" gives client options with-
out influencing them, she reflected the more sophisticated position
that "it is probably impossible for us, as human beings, to give
opinions without influencing[;] however we should be aiming for
our personal feelings to influence as little as possible."2 12
On the other hand, to the frequent and often sophisticated
reflection on paternalism by Strathclyde students, no Miami students
reflected in writing on the issue. Indeed, their evaluations seemed to
reflect that they had perhaps taken actions on behalf of their clients
without exploring the possibility that this might impinge on their
autonomy, despite the fact that this issue, along with over-sympathi-
zing with clients, was discussed both in individual supervision
meetings and in class in the context of the ABA's Model Rules 1.2
(allocation of authority) and 1.14 (diminished capacity).213 Thus,
Cecelia put "her foot down" to stop a client's "extremely assertive
and domineering" wife from making it difficult to develop a rela-
tionship with the client,214 without appearing to ask whether the
client was happy with this. While it is true that instructions must
211 Id. at Weeks 11-12.
212 id.
213 Compare with JoNel Newman, Miami's Medical Legal Partnership: Preparing
Lawyers and Physicians for Holistic Practice, 9 INDIANA HEALTH L. REv. 473,
481 (2012) (describing the sort of clinic discussion where these issues have been
explicitly raised in the MHRC).
214 Cecilia, supra note 184.
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come from the client and not others, she could have explored
whether the client's decision to voluntarily allow another to speak
on his behalf, even when he "is perfectly alert and capable of
articulating his thoughts,"215 is in itself an exercise of autonomy.
Similarly, in relation to a client with diminished capacity who
wanted to continue with an immigration application notwithstanding
that this potentially exposed her to losing her liberty, Daniela con-
cluded: "Even if she was aware of and willing to take the risk, I did
not feel that it was ethical to proceed with my limited knowledge of
immigration law." 2 16 Finally, Lynn asked that a client's partner wait
outside during an interview in order to preserve attorney-client privi-
lege and confidentiality apparently without exploring with the client
whether she might value the support and participation of his partner
217
over privilege and confidentiality.
It is thus clear that issues of autonomy and paternalism were
just as likely to arise in the MHRC as the USLC. Indeed, Miami
students were probably more likely to stray into paternal behavior
because their clients are generally less educated, more impoverished
and more likely to have diminished capacity than USLC clients, and
thus more likely to defer to the views of legal advisors, and to tempt
their advisors to consciously or subconsciously override their
choices by making choices that seem contrary to their best interests.
The striking difference between the discussion of the two
cohorts of students on issues of paternalism and autonomy, as well as
the difference in emphasis on empathy, respect and the relative
importance of establishing a caring attorney client relationship, may
be explained by the difference in emphasis in the teaching in the two
clinics. The MHRC students were not exposed to the same level of
discussion and debate on the issues of paternalism and autonomy as
their Strathclyde counterparts, while Strathclyde students had less
exposure to theoretical and practical instruction on the importance of
connecting across widely different socio-economic backgrounds and
cultures. What this clearly suggests is that teaching ethics in a clini-
215 Id.
216 Daniela, Self Reflection Memoranda, Miami (Spring 2014) (on file with the
University of Miami Health Rights Clinic).
2 17Lynn, supra note 194.
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cal setting enhances ethical sensitivity, and that the particular dimen-
sions emphasized by clinic and program design will be reflected in
students' ethical development.
(iii) Meso-Ethics
This is seen also in differences between the two student
cohorts in relation to meso-ethics-what we defined as ethical
issues arising out of the specific obligations of a lawyers, which are
either found in their professional codes or are associated with
professional role morality, such as the requirement that lawyers act
zealously for clients and protect their confidentiality, irrespective of
moral consideration. Such differences do not relate to the extent to
which the students encountered meso-ethical issues in their case-
work: 58% of all Miami218 and 67% of all Strathclyde reported that
they did so, though some students encountered more than one issue.
Strathclyde students also revealed that they learned from issues
raised by others in seminars, surgeries, or issues which became
apparent in training exercises.2 1 9 Prima facie, a similar range of
issues were raised either explicitly or implicitly. These included
218 Surprisingly, when asked the following questions that explicitly referenced
ethics: "Please describe an ethical issue that arose during your clinic experience.
How were you able to spot the issue? How did you address the issue?," one Miami
student claimed never to have encountered an ethical issue. Another five reported
one semester free of ethical problems, and for another seven the "ethical" issues
raised were either extremely trivial (whether to accept hospitality from clients and
how to respond to client attempts to get them to provide hospitality), or were not
in fact ethical issues. Of course, one cannot read too much into numbers alone
given the low base rates of the self-evaluations and the fact that Strathclyde
students were encouraged to focus on ethical issues especially when taking Ethics
and Justice. Nevertheless, it does seem unlikely that students with caseloads often
as high as ten clients would not confront any ethical issues, especially if we are
right (see infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text) that the highly personal
nature of the lawyer client relationship means that virtually all encounters with
client have an ethical dimension. Far more likely, the low rate of response to
"ethics" questions by IHRC students is a consequence of the U.S. inclination to
see ethical issues as limited to those defined and proscribed by a particular rule.
219 See infra Section III(C)(vi), p. 58.
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conflicts of interest, confidentiality, whether clients with immoral
ends or character deserved representation, whether the students
should pursue immoral action on behalf of their clients, and most
frequently how they should respond when they suspected or knew
that their clients had engaged in some form of dishonesty. Indeed,
seven out of nine of all meso-ethical issues raised by Miami students
involved suspected fraud by clients on various government agencies
(though in two cases further investigation of facts was said to
exonerate the client). Miami students might have encountered other
issues, as the self-evaluations only ask for one example, and space
constraints meant that some Miami students who discussed one
ethical issue in a semester might have had more. But, it is also likely
that the nature of the work undertaken and, even more so, the
clientele of the two clinics was the main reason for the uniformity of
the issues encountered by Miami students. Thus MHRC clients tend
to be those desperate for state assistance and gaining immigration
status and hence much more likely to be tempted to stray from the
truth. By comparison, the fact that the USLC handles all civil cases
except those involving child custody and serves those falling into
the "middle income gap" as well as more vulnerable members of
society seemed to result in a wider range of ethical issues.
Despite these differences, students from both clinics learned
similar lessons from representing clients suspected of not telling the
truth or not being legally entitled to relief, namely they had to be
vigilant in checking the facts of their cases-a "trust but verify"
approach.2 20
I have learned that even with clients who seem to be
forthcoming, you always need to ask certain ques-
tions, even if you think you know the answer. ... I
have also learned that as a lawyer, my responsibility
in acquiring facts is not only crucial and a funda-
220 See Hakeem, Journal Entry, Strathelyde (Fall 2013, Week 1) (on file with the
University of Strathclyde Law Clinic) (stating that one must avoid directly asking
the client whether she is lying to prevent sever[ing] the trust between us and client
resulting in him not to wishing to pursue the case with us, rendering him without
representation from anybody."
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mental part of being ethical, but often times a gate-
way to information that I never would have thought
was important until it came to light.2 21
[T]here is the possibility that the client did not feel
she could trust us to disclose the full amount of her
debt. Another option that clients can at times be in
denial, however upon questioning she admitted to
know of all debt yet still wished to pursue a reduc-
tion on other grounds, which frankly would not
succeed. Alternatively and more plausibly the client
attempted to manipulate [us] and underestimated our
competence. She may represent the "manipulative"
client that Ellmann refers to in his article. This is
clearly disappointing and has now made me alert to
situations where the client may attempt to mislead
the legal representative. However, it proves that one
should not merely accept that which you are told by
your client, you must always carry out extensive
research .22 2
223
These quotations -the first from a Miami student and the second
from a Strathclyde student-also illustrate a difference between the
discussion of meso-ethical issues by the two cohorts, namely
whether or not they drew on reading and class discussion. In the
case of the Miami students, the lack of in-depth analysis was
possibly a feature of space constraints in discussing each of the set
topics. Thus, in response to a client whose medical records did not
support his claim for benefits, Cecelia simply wrote that she
"addressed this issue by coming up with different approaches/
theories as to how we could proceed with his case if we did decide
221 Anne, supra note 171.
222 Hannah, supra note 165, at Week 12.
223 See also Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STANFORD L. REv. 589,
618-20 (1985) (discussing the concept of the epistemological demurrer as
presented by Rhodes and referenced by Hakeem).
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to, and then by presenting the facts and case theories at a firm
,,224
meeting. Anne reported that she essentially ceased her concern
about a client not reporting income when she learned that this was
not relevant to the client's legal case, though she "made sure to
include the income issue in his intake memo so that moving forward
everyone [would be] aware of the issue and [could] address it if
needed." She also told the client "that he should seriously consider
reporting his income to the IRS for tax purposes, as is required by
law." 2 2 5 Jennifer also leaves the reader with little idea of her moral
thought-processes when she discusses a client's admission of his
intention to pay someone to marry him to gain immigration status:
"Although I feel awful knowing this; this is his only option to stay in
the country. Thus, I told him I do not want to know about the money
and only want to see proof of him and his loving wife in the near
future."226
Given what was expected of Strathclyde students and the
space allowed for reflection, their student diaries unsurprisingly
revealed much deeper reflection and evidence of grappling with
ethical dilemmas. Thus, by contrast to many Miami students who
seemed relieved at the perceived absence of ethical issues,22 7 or who
dispensed a quick response to comply with obvious ethical rules,22 8
some Strathclyde students reflected on how they would have dealt
with ethical issues of their cases had the facts been different.
224 Anne, supra note 187. See also Jane, Self Reflection Memoranda Miami (Fall
2013) (on file with the University of Miami Health Rights Clinic) (describing
relief upon learning that her client's volunteer work was not inconsistent with her
disability claims).
225 Anne, supra note 187.
226 Jennifer, supra note 159.
227 See, e.g., Daniela, supra note 189 ("Thankfully, I have not encountered any
ethical issues thus far during my client representation"); Cecelia, Self Reflection
Memoranda, Miami (Fall 2013) (on file with the University of Miami Health
Rights Clinic) ("Fortunately, I have not had any ethical issues arise during my
client representation").
228 See e.g. Anne, supra note 171 (discussing the discharging of ethical duties by
instructing clients to comply with the law).
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[P]reviously I would have thought that I had never
had an ethical conflict on a case but when you really
start to think about ethics you start to notice things
that could have become ethical issues. For example,
a case I had where our client was going to an Em-
ployment Tribunal for unlawful deduction of wages.
It later transpired that for the first three months of
working with his employers the client was paid cash
in hand and also claimed unemployment benefits at
the same time. I didn't know this until we were on
the verge of settling a claim with the respondents and
I wonder how it would have affected the claim that I
put in for him. Would I have discounted these three
months in his Schedule of Loss, for example, or
would I have ignored the benefits he received and
hoped he wasn't asked about them at the Tribunal?
... I think I've realized that often situations might
arise in cases that you wouldn't recognize as an ethi-
cal problem or issue until you've started thinking
229
about ethics in a broader sense.
Similarly, a seminar discussion about a case involving lawyers
sending threatening letters to unrepresented opponents caused Karen
to experience surprise, exclaiming, "wow I didn't realize that this
was an ethical dilemma," when she remembered an abusive letter
sent to her client. This led her to think about the issue from a
different hypothetical perspective:
... obviously if your client, or someone you know
was at the receiving end of such a letter we would be
very quick to call how unfair and unethical such
writing is. However if you are at the other end and
are possibly the one tempted to write such a letter to
229 Catriona, Journal Entry, Strathclyde (Fall 2013, Week 1) (on file with the
University of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
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an unrepresented member of public is it possibly far
too easy to do so without thinking.23 0
Of more immediate value for the Strathclyde students were
seminars which alerted them to issues in their then-current cases
which they might not otherwise have noticed. For instance, in
reflecting on the case discussed above 2 3 1 in which she was worried
that her client was being manipulated by his friend, Shruti is
prompted by an "issue which [she] examined in [her] seminar" to
condemn a solicitor who had acted for both sides in relation to her
client's property transaction. She even asserted that "[i]t might be
necessary to make a complaint to the law society."2 32 However,
upon being asked if she would file a complaint, she replied that she
would not consider using the threat of a complaint as a form of
"extortion" to help her client.
The following extended reflection by Hannah in relation to a
nurse charged with abusing patients provides an excellent illustra-
tion of the value of exposing students to ethical dilemmas in a safe
environment and with the assistance of class reading, class discus-
sion and academic and supervisory faculty.
... I was left with the dilemma of having to provide
legal advice and possible representation to a person
that was willing to exploit vulnerable members of
society and clearly abuse his position of trust. It was
wrong for me to do so, yet I must admit that I judged
him and the impression my co-advisor and I had of
the client was one of disgust. As a human being I did
feel it immoral and unethical to take this case on. ...
If this was a case that I was appointed [to] in the
working world then I would have scarce opportunity
to object taking on the case. In honesty, I was disap-
230 Shruti, Journal Entry, Strathclyde (Fall 2013, Week 3) (on file with the
University of Strathclyde Law Clinic). See infra note 296 (exploring ethical issues
through hypothesizing).
231 See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
232 Shruti, supra note 200, at Week 6.
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pointed by my reaction, as a clinic advisor I am to be
impartial, yet I failed in this task. I began pondering
over the ethics and justice classes and was reminded
of the fact that I should adopt a more neutral parti-
sanship role. The client could be the victim of a
false-allegation.... However, at the moment, I am not
willing to act as ... a 'hired gun' to a client that I do
not feel comfortable around.... [A]t at no point dur-
ing the interview did the client try to refute the
claims against him.... He admitted he was previously
accused of being in a similar situation with another
patient.... In the scenario that he is not a victim of
false allegation, then he poses a danger to society....
Although this is only a possibility, the fear that he
may commit similar abuse in future, and that I may
be partly responsible for him to practice again, is a
great burden.... I will not be willing to place my own
ethical and moral code aside to act in the client's best
interests where the client poses a risk to society.23 3
Hannah then returned to the case the following week:
The file has disturbed me considerably.... I feel
reluctant to read of the abuse, his denial and defenses
seem weak.... I fear I may not be able to advise him
with the enthusiasm I have done so in previous cases.
However, it is conflicting with my duties of pro-
viding him with legal assistance. It may be that the
previous case in which a client abused our sympathy
for her in order to lead only her contorted version of
events has impacted on my empathy for this client. If
this is the case, I am unsure how to deal with it and
recently discovered the article of The Lawyer as
233 Hannah, Journal Entries, Strathclyde (Spring 2014, Weeks 1-2) (on file with
the University of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
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Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relationship by Fried23 4 which discusses client rela-
tions and empathy. Following the reading I discov-
ered my reluctance was due to my own opinion of
appearing bad in the eyes of our client's possible
victim. I hope to deal with it by becoming slightly
emotionally detached from the case. This is disheart-
ening as I thought I would have acquired the skills to
deal with this type of situation. I feel like I am failing
my client by having these doubts, thus I decided to
speak to my case supervisor who has greatly placed
my mind at ease, she stated it is an horrific case. To
have a person with great legal expertise find it
equally as traumatic as I did made me realize you
cannot become immune to a situation. According to
Empathy and Approval by Stephen Ellmann in such
a pendulum situation I must somehow manage my
personality trait of being empathetic to now becom-
ing empathetic enough in a professional capacity. I
hope to now adopt this approach in order to act
zealously for my client and maintain his best
interests.235
Nevertheless, as sophisticated as this reflection was, particularly in
its reliance on class reading, like many other Strathclyde students,
we see Hannah bouncing between the extremes of either just con-
tinuing as an amoral advocate for the distasteful client or regarding
their moral objections as precluding representation. Unlike in
Nicolson's previous analysis of student diaries,2 36 there was little
evidence of a more nuanced approach taught in class where argu-
ments for and against neutral partisanship and moral activism were
weighed up and applied in the specific context of cases.23 7 More-
234 Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-
Client Relationship, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).
235 Hannah, supra note 183, at Weeks 3-4.
236 Supra note 17, at 178.
237 Cf Nicolson & Webb, supra note 25, chs. 8, 9 and 10.
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over, when this contextual approach was used, it was always
prompted by comments on diary entries. When it was suggested to
Jill that taking into account the justice of her clients might be a
better way of justifying her decision to use the threat of reporting a
criminal offence as a "strong-arm tactic" against an opponent than
simply saying that as lawyers in the making she "has a job to do" so
cannot adopt the "moral high ground." 2 3 8
Nevertheless, it should be relatively obvious that reflections
of students like Hannah are likely to be much more informed than
those without any introduction to legal ethics, especially if the
former had as much as two seminars on neutral partisanship. This is
made clear by Andrew's discussion of a classic issue of role moral-
ity before being exposed to ethical tools that would have assisted
him in dealing with this "very tough case."
[B]asically the client wants to slow down the process
as much as possible to give him time to get rehoused
and to get in a better financial position. The ethical
alarm bells were going off in my head, what is ethic-
ally correct, to delay the process and block the legal
process of division of the estate somehow or not
block the process-allow things to proceed-the sale
of the house-leading to the client being homeless?
... Lawyers are supposed to follow client's instruc-
tions (within the law) but there is a clear margin
surrounding legality where lawyers or even clients
can push things through or delay things to suit their
-239
own wishes.
Unfortunately not only was the Ethics and Justice class months
away, but by not submitting his diaries for comments, Andrew could
not be referred to relevant reading that suggests that avoiding
238 Hannah, supra note 232, at Week 2 (on file with the University of Strathclyde
Law Clinic).
239 Andrew, Journal Entries, Strathclyde (Spring 2013, Weeks 1-2) (on file with
the University of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
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homelessness is the sort of issue which might justify otherwise
ethically dubious behavior.240 In stark contrast, faced with the
"always ... difficult decision" of whether to withdraw from repre-
senting a client, Jill echoed ideas encountered in Ethics and Justice
when exploring the dilemma posed by the fact that "[w]e have set
out our stall to fill the 'unmet legal need' service gap," yet have very
limited resources.
By implication, our clients do not have the means to
instruct their first choice solicitor, and, in that respect,
we are the last lawyer in town for them. One conse-
quence of this is that if and when we withdraw, this
generally heralds the end of legal representation for
the client. I am acutely aware of this, and the pressure
this brings weighs heavily on my shoulders.241
Then in response to a suggestion to read Bauman's Postmodern
Ethics, 24 2 Jill comments:
I found his proposition that humans are morally
ambivalent quite comforting. I have always struggled
with the concept that an ethical code can be set down
to codify moral behaviour. I found his writing on
"Self' and "Other" interesting, but difficult to follow.
The concept of moral responsibility as one of being
for the other before one can be with the other is
challenging. He goes on to express this as the first
reality of self, rather than a product of society. I take
that to mean that it in some way comes from within,
and is not a phenomenon that can be "managed"
through application of a set of rules. Returning to the
scenario, I take this to be about empathizing with the
240 Cf Nicolson & Webb, supra note 25, ch 8.
241 Jill, Journal Entry, Strathclyde (Spring 2014, Week 4) (on file with the Univer-
sity of Strathclyde Law Clinic); see also Murray L. Schwarz, The Zeal of the Civil
Advocate, 3 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 543, 563 (1983).
242 Bauman, supra note 36.
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client's position, standing in their shoes, before being
able to advocate on their behalf.243
(iv) Macro-ethics
When we turn from more traditional issues of meso-ethics
and the more subtle, but perhaps more important, issues of micro-
ethics to the macro-ethical issue of whether lawyers owe obligations
to enhance access to justice and to be concerned about law's justice,
we see the greatest similarity between the two student cohorts'
reflection, both as regards their experiences of injustice and sense of
responsibility to enhance law's justice.
But even here there were differences in the focus of com-
ments. Thus, unsurprisingly given the nature of their work, the
Miami cohort focused more on difficulties they face with unwieldy
bureaucracy, unsympathetic bureaucrats and lack of access to coun-
sel or a remedy-the administration of justice-rather than injustices
in the underlying substantive law.244 Thus, Maria observed that
although the social welfare and disability systems were "designed for
this population ... they have too many systematic walls." 2 4 5 Lynn
noted that:
243 Jill, Journal Entry, Strathclyde (Spring 2014, Week 4) (on file with the
University of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
24 By contrast, this issue only received one mention in the USLC diaries and only
then in a criminal matter in connection with the Innocence Project. See Hannah,
Journal Entry (Spring 2014, Weeks 11-12) (on file with the University of
Strathclyde Law Clinic) (criticizing the police's failure to take seriously a request
to release important evidence as "truly shocking ... our client may be serving time
due to a wrongful conviction yet the police and other authorities seem to be hiding
the fact that they have failed in their duties as they have lost evidence. A person's
liberty was removed, his daily life altered and his family relations broken." She
also turned her fire on the "pathetic" criminal justice system more generally for
allowing convictions on "feeble evidence" and disallowing her client's appeals
"despite the judge admitting the evidence is not faultless."
25 Maria, supra note 2.
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The agencies that we work with aren't always the
easiest to maneuver and I cannot imagine most of my
clients successfully meeting their goals. I feel that the
populations many of the policies and laws are set out
to help are not afforded the proper guidance and we
can help so much simply by listening to their
-246issues.
Tim echoed this observation:
In terms of the administrative process, it is amazing
to me that the law is written so that a person should
reasonably be able to represent themselves pro se in
the administrative process for disability, but now
after dealing with it first hand, my view is that over-
all premise is not reasonable.2 4 7
This difference in focus is likely to be explained at least in
part by the differences in access to legal counsel and social welfare
services between Scotland, which has far more generous legal aid
and public welfare systems, and the U.S.248 Similarly, for reasons
246 See Lynn, supra note 194; see also comments from Tim, infra note 261;
comments from Jennifer, infra note 263.
247 Tim, Self-Reflection Memoranda, Miami (Spring 2014) (on file with the
University of Miami Health Rights Clinic).
248 The various U.S. civil legal assistance programs were never intended to be
comprehensive, or to provide access to justice for most Americans in need. Joan
Grace Ritchey, Limits on Justice: The United States' Failure to Recognize a Right
to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 317, 317 (2001). The federally-
funded program has also undergone significant funding reductions and been
subject to restrictions on permitted advocacy from even its admittedly modest
beginnings. Alan Houseman, The Justice Gap: Civil Legal Assistance Today and
Tomorrow, Center for American Progress Report 6 (2011), available at: https://
www.ameicanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/06/pdf/justice.pdf.
Cf Tamara Goriely, Making the Welfare State Work: Changing Conceptions of
Legal Remedies Within the British Welfare State, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF
LEGAL AID: COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL STUDIES 89-112 (Don Flemming et
al. eds., 1999); Francis Regan, Why Do Legal Aid Services Vary Between Socie-
ties?: Re-examining the Impact of Welfare State and Legal Families, in THE
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relating to the nature of the populations it serves and the "brutal
need" 249 their clients face, the MRC's students' focus on the
general social problems faced by its clientele (as well as the impact
it had on the students), was also unsurprising. For example, in her
first semester, Anne made reference to the mental and emotional toll
"the heavy content of the class" was taking on her.2 5 0 Jennifer
recounted that one of her clients requested that she:
send all important documentation to her cousin's
home, not her own home, and requested that I do not
show up at her home to have papers signed even
though it would be much more convenient for her
because, according to her, it would not [be] good if
her landlord knew a "black woman" was going
through social security proceedings. I think she fears
that her landlord will kick her out knowing that she
251has limited to no money.
Cecelia, working on behalf of a client with rapidly progressing
- * 252
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, was outraged when an immigration
officer denied her client citizenship because he questioned whether
the client was "'competent to understand and attach meaning to the
oath of allegiance.' This experience made me frustrated with USCIS
TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL AID: COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL STUDIES 179-
204 (Don Fleming et al. eds., 1999). For a comparison between the U.S. and U.K.
in public assistance, see Alberto Alesina & Edward L. Glaeser, FIGHTING POv-
ERTY IN THE US AND EUROPE: A WORLD OF DIFFERENCE 17-54 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2004).
249 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970); See also Lynn, supra note 194
(noting "I understand that they do not always have the resources they need for the
most basic things.")
250 Anne, supra note 160.
251 Jennifer, supra note 176.
252 Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis is a rapidly progressive, invariably fatal neuro-
logical disease characterized by the gradual degeneration and death of motor
neurons.
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and its process. Mr. V is someone whose case should have been
expedited because of his medical conditions rather than delayed."253
By contrast, Strathclyde students were more exercised than
their Miami counterparts by problems with substantive law and
associated access to justice problems. For instance, an employment
case prompted Hannah to question the "capitalism of the law:"
[T]he deserving employee is treated unfairly by his
employer yet is expected to suffer due to making a
decision based on coercion. The law is not interested
in justice, only notice is required to be given by
employers. ... [D]ue to their wealth and social stand-
ing employers can afford to employ leading lawyers.
... An employee will not generally have such luxury.
Furthermore, the injustice and inequality is manifest
in legal aid cuts and the extortionate increase in
employment tribunal fees .... The entire employment
system is farcical and unreasonable.254
Jill was similarly prompted to reflect on law's capitalist foundations
by a comment on one of her diaries asking why she thought com-
panies like the one she was acting against were able to get away
with avoiding compensation claims by declaring bankruptcy only to
re-launch under a new name:
Whilst I do not object to the market economy in prin-
ciple, I do worry about the lack of controls and the
opportunities that presents to companies like this
have to exploit others.... I think that company law is
an area which is ripe for reform, and the focus must
be on consumer protection, and not as it is at present,
on protection of those trying to make a fast buck.255
253 Cecelia, Self-Reflection Memoranda, Miami (Spring 2014) (on file with the
University of Miami Health Rights Clinic).
254 Hannah, Diary Entry, Strathclyde (Spring 2014, Week 6) (on file with the
University of Strathclyde Law Clinic); see also Hannah, supra note 169.
255 Jill, supra note 199.
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Catriona also referred to a "hard economic climate [in which] people
seem more willing to walk over others to protect themselves" and
excoriated the company which had "ripped off' her client by "taking
advantage of his very limited resources and language difficulties" to
brush off his complaints, while also stating that she was "glad that
the Law Clinic gives me a chance to stick up for people who may
otherwise be trampled." 2 5 6
The time bar is a legal doctrine that causes many problems
for ULSC clients; though only Lachlan commented negatively,257
noting that "in some cases the only reason the claim is submitted
late is that the claimant has been seeking legal advice and trying in
vain to fully understand the situation they are in with their employ-
er." 258 This led him to conclude that, "the law does not always
adequately protect those that it sets out to do" and "that this has
galvanized my enthusiasm for the working in the Law Clinic as I
want to represent and fight for these people to the best of my ability
to give them the best chance of getting treated fairly by the system."
Weeks later, he expressed very similar sentiments about law's fair-
ness, and claimed to have "a better appreciation of the actual inner
working of the legal system and how they affect different sectors of
society." 259
There was a similar level of awareness in both cohorts in
regards to problems faced by many in gaining legal representation
and the essential role played by law clinics in their redress. This gap
caused many to empathize with and seek to do their utmost for their
clients.
The client came to [the] clinic really as a last chance
saloon after being through solicitors working pro-
256 Catriona, Diary Entry, Strathclyde (Spring 2014, Week 11) (on file with the
University Strathclyde Law Clinic).
257 But see John, Diary Entry, Strathclyde (Spring 2013, Weeks 5-6) (on file with
the University of Strathclyde Law Clinic) (connenting positively).
258 Lachlan, Diary Entry, Strathclyde (Fall 2013, Week 6) (on file with the Univer-
sity of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
2 59 Id. at Week 11.
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bono and also the [Citizens Advice Bureau]. When I
found out that the client had already been through so
much it did hit me personally and I felt sad for the
client knowing that she had been through so many
different loops trying to seek justice.260
If my client did not have representation she would
probably never have the opportunity to have her case
heard.... If it was not for the clinic they would not
have access to the legal system at all. Even I get frus-
trated at how hard it is to navigate the system. The
frustration has made me a better advocate because I
know how much this population needs our help.261
Moreover, without being prompted, a number of students
made clear that it was only by working in their law clinic that they
fully appreciated problems of justice and access to justice.
I never realized how tough it was to deal with the
[Social Security Administration] and how unbeliev-
able the premise is that clients should be able to
represent themselves pro se.... The clinic has had a
tremendous impact on my professional identity as a
lawyer. I have a much better understanding of the
underserved and how people's rights are ignored and
how they are denied benefits they should be entitled
to.2 6 2
When I started on the path to a law degree ... I
thought I believed in access to justice for all; that
judicial justice shouldn't just be the preserve of those
with the money to pay for it. Having ... become
involved in the work of the Law Clinic, I now know
260 Andrew, Diary Entry, Strathclyde (Spring 2014, Weeks 1-2) (on file with the
University of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
261 Maria, supra note 2.
262 Tim, supra note 246.
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that I believe in access to justice, not just as a theory,
-263but in practice.
I have changed in that I am more critical of the pub-
lic benefits system and realize how critical our role
as advocates is-that in many cases-without an
attorney this population is essentially barred from
access to care. It has further opened my eyes to how
many social issues this populations [sic] face and
how unfair our country's public benefit system is. It
264leaves out some of the most in-need populations.
I knew that there were inadequacies in the legal
system, but I did not realize how bad it was until I
started working with the population we serve. I am
glad to be part of a clinic that represents people who
would otherwise not have access to the legal
system.265
Some students expressly referred to their clinic involvement as
enhancing their commitment to help redress unmet legal need. As
Karen put it, "the more I have become involved in law clinic the
more passionate I have become about it." 2 6 6 Similarly, looking back
at his two years of clinic experience, Hakeem declared that, "[t]he
most remarkable thing that has struck me is that my drive for access
to justice has actually increased in my time in the clinic whereas I
thought there was a risk that this spark would disappear once I got
263 John, Diary Entry, Strathclyde (Fall 2013, Week 9) (on file with the University
of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
264 Jennifer, supra note 159.
265 Maria, supra note 2.
266 Karen, Diary Entry, Strathclyde (Fall 2013, Week 9) (on file with the Univer-
sity of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
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,,267into the swing of things. For Catriona, however, her experiences
led to a change in the way she intended to serve the community:
The Clinic has helped me develop a stronger and
clearer sense of injustice. Before I joined the Clinic I
had a strong, but quite vague, feeling that there was
injustice in the legal system, but now ... I feel that I
have a much more focused idea of what the problems
are and where the injustice comes from, especially
the availability (or lack thereof) of Legal Aid funding,
and the way the Tribunal system runs compared to
how it was supposedly designed to be.... When I first
joined the Clinic, I think I just wanted to help every-
one and solve all their problems for them. I now ...
understand that we can't always help people, or fix
everything for them: sometimes the best we can do is
help them to navigate the perils of the legal system,
but for some people, this can be just as important as
winning a big financial award.... I think the most fun-
damental thing I have learned over the last two years
is that there may not be much we can do change the
legal system itself, at least in the short term, but we
can do a great deal to lessen the impact of, say, Legal
Aid cuts, on individuals and help to ensure that there
are alternative paths to justice for people.26 8
Even more significant as regards our hope for an altruistic clinic
effect, some students declared that their appreciation of access to
justice problems had engendered a desire to continue with enhan-
cing access to justice once they graduate. Thus, John admitted that
when he returned to university to study law, "he had little knowl-
edge, or interest, in the field of social justice." However, he went on
to state:
267 Hakeem, Introduction, Strathclyde (Spring 2013) (on file with the University of
Strathclyde Law Clinic)
268 Catriona, Introduction, Strathclyde (Spring 2013) (on file with the University of
Strathclyde Law Clinic).
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The law clinic, and in particular the guidance and
direction of its director has changed this for me.
Social justice is an important field, and one that all
too often is overlooked, and regarded as not being
particularly "sexy." Do I see the legal profession as a
means to make lots of money? Not anymore, I see it
as a way to help others, and by doing so enrich their
lives for the better.26 9
Likewise, Tim stated that his clinic "experience has changed my
life:"
There are not many people that I know at my level
that have ever had an experience working with the
underserved like I now have, much less at a point of
time where they can affect a change soon after the
experience like I may be able to. It was a humbling
experience and I greatly appreciate it as these people
are now stakeholders in any policy and operational
decisions I make going forward.27 0
Maria was even more explicit about the impact on her career plans:
The clinic has really taught me a lot about myself
and made me think about what it is I want to do with
my degree. Representing people who would other-
wise not have access to an attorney or "the system"
has been eye-opening. I would like to continue to
work with poor communities and do whatever I can
269 John, Diary Entry, Strathclyde (Spring 2014, Entry 5) (on file with the Univer-
sity of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
270 Tim, supra note 246 (Tim anticipates a career in health policy and administra-
tion). See also John, supra note 262 (referencing the MHRC's "tremendous impact
on my professional identity" and suggesting a possible impact on his career).
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to remedy some of the inadequacies that currently
exi st.27 1
Similarly, referring to her clinic experience which showed that "peo-
ple can give without expecting something in return," Hannah made a
commitment to continue engaging in pro bono work on gradua-
tion. 27 2
(v) Career choice and professional identity development
Hannah also reported that her experience in the Innocence Project
showed her that "the state is gradually removing the rights of the
private individual" and that this motivated her to want to "defend the
individual against the tyrant state" rather than pursue her original
intention to be a criminal prosecutor." 2 7 3 In fact, this very same
change of intention was also experienced by Lachlan, another mem-
ber of the Innocent Project, who noted "how valuable an experience
my time to date in the Law Clinic has been ... yet another thing to
add to list of things that it has taught me." 2 7 4 On the other hand, this
experience did not have the hoped for effect on all students. Thus,
his experience on a case made Andrew realize that the "fact that I
may sympathize with a client too much and want to seek justice may
not lead me to be a good criminal lawyer...," and hence was con-
templating a career in commercial law.27 5
These changes in career intention indicate that clinical
experience can-as Tim explicitly states in an extract quoted
above 2 7 6 -have a profound impact on the development of the
student's identity as a future professional. Career choice is one of the
271 Maria, supra note 2.
272 Hannah, Diary Entry, Strathclyde (Fall 2013, Week 6) (on file with the Univer-
sity of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
2 73 Id. at Weeks 11-12.
274 Lachlan, Diary Entry, Strathclyde (Spring 2013, Week 9) (on file with the
University of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
275 Andrew, Diary Entry, Strathclyde (Spring 2014, Weeks 3-4) (on file with the
University of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
276 John, supra note 262; see also infra note 277.
94
A Tale of Two Clinics
most important ethical decisions a lawyer will make, determining
both the type of micro-, meso- and macro-ethical issues they will
face and the environmental factors that will make it easier or more
difficult to maintain a commitment to high ethical standards and a
service ideal, whether that newly-professed intention is to serve full
time in the public interest or to do pro bono work.
The Miami self-evaluations and Strathclyde diaries are also
replete with evidence of student growth as regards a much wider
range of issues relevant to professional identity development and
growth. In a sense, all learning, at least if internalized and acted
upon, involves growth. Indeed, etymologically, to educate means to
lead from one place to another. In this sense, all lessons learnt from
cases and other clinical experiences show the potential to encourage
student growth, particularly when students report, as many did,2 77
that they were now sensitized to previously overlooked ethical
issues, that they would no longer act in ways that they had in the
past, and that their attitudes to specific issues such as access to jus-
tice had changed or that they had developed or enhanced particular
attributes such as empathy. One specific attribute that could prove
particularly valuable in ensuring that students have the moral cour-
age to resist pressures antithetical to ethical and altruistic behavior
once in practice is that of self-confidence. In this regard, all the
Miami students identified confidence in their own competence and
professional identity as an area of major growth in their second
semester.
For the most part, MHRC students linked their growth in
professional identity and confidence to their ability to act as effec-
tive lawyers, though Cecelia and Tim both tied their confidence to
altru-professional goals:
277 See Cunningham, supra note 180, at 146-51; Fried, supra note 233, at 1060;
Sonunerlad & Wall, supra note 180, at 2-6; Jennifer, supra note 159; Karen, supra
note 162; Shruti, supra note 179; Jane, supra note 181; Catriona, supra note 182;
Hannah, supra note 183; Shruti, supra note 200; Anne, supra note 171; Catriona,
supra note 288; Karen, supra note 229; Hannah, infra note 296 (exploring ethical
issues through hypothesizing); infra note 279; Lachlan, infra note 280.
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The clinic has helped bolster my confidence in my
professional identity. Having had the opportunity to
represent underprivileged clients has showed me that
I have the power to use my education and skills to
help people who really need it and who would other-
- 278
wise not have access to legal assistance.
I am much more confident in communicating about
the plight of the underserved, and I more confident
that I can leverage this experience in shaping public
279policy later in my career.
Strathclyde students were less likely to refer to confidence in their
growing skills, 2 8 0 but Jill commented explicitly about how the
growth of her "self-confidence to stand firmly by my principles
could help her resist other pressures in practice." Even while the
other students' reflections on their confidence in competence is
formally only about ethics to the extent that all lawyers owe an
ethical obligation to represent their clients competently, confidence
in competence can encourage moral courage. Those who can be
made to feel inexperienced in relation to their legal skills by their
new work colleagues, especially those in authority over them, may
also be able to made to feel out of depth in terms of their moral
beliefs and hence less able to resist pressures to compromise these
moral beliefs.
By contrast to reflections on the specific attribute of confi-
dence, Lachlan reflected more widely on:
how much I had learned in the last year ... about
myself for example my strengths and weaknesses as
well as how I perform in certain situations. I now
feel that one of my strengths is in conveying sym-
pathy and empathy to clients making them feel com-
278 Cecelia, supra note 184.
279 Tim, supra note 246.
280 In all, five did so.
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fortable but this also links into what I feel is weak-
ness in that I find it very hard to accept when the law
doesn't act to redress someone that has been clearly
wronged in some way by another party which means
I have struggled when having to make this clear to
clients281
Such self-awareness of strengths and weakness has obvious value to
the formation of a professional identity in allowing one to exploit
existing strengths and work on-or at least work around-weak-
nesses. The development of a whole range of attributes which render
moral behavior more likely once in practice is even more valuable.
Thus, in his final diary submission John reported:
More than anything else I have learned tolerance,
and empathy. I have also learned that along with
empathy, detachment is an essential skill, and that
whilst sympathy may sometimes be required, if you
really feel sorry for someone, you can't focus on the
task at hand, and adequately provide assistance. I
have relearned the art of dealing with difficult
clients, and thickened my skin when clients are,
intentionally or not, derogatory and difficult.28 2
Similarly in introducing her diaries, Hannah stated:
The diaries are a reflection of my case, [Initial
Advice Clinic], training, case surgery and project
experiences over the past two years. I have discussed
how the involvement in these various activities have
[sic] altered my view on individuals, the role of law-
yers in society and the importance of performing
281 Lachlan, Diary Entry, Strathclyde (Fall 2013, Week 1) (on file with the Univer-
sity of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
282 John, Diary Entry Strathclyde (Spring 2014, Week 6) (on file with the Univer-
sity of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
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ones duties when qualifying as a solicitor. ... I feel I
have learnt many of the moral dilemmas which can
arise and the methods which should be adopted to
avoid them, such as whether I felt I could act as a
zealous advocate for a client knowing that I had
reservations of his character and guilt. 283
(vi). Sources of Learning
In the passage above summarizing her learning, Hannah
refers to learning from her cases, and it is clear that this was the
central focus of the students' learning experience, as indeed it
should be if one accepts the theoretical arguments for teaching
ethics and inculcating altruism through live-client clinics. While the
vast majority of the reflections quoted from both clinics relate to the
students' own cases, Strathclyde students also expressly reflected on
the issues raised by the cases of other students which they learnt of
284in seminars or surgeries. Jane in Miami described working with a
classmate on an ethically challenging case. "[The ethical issue in]
W's case last semester was tough. I worked with [a fellow student]
on this case a little bit and helped her navigate preparing for the
hearing. His case was challenging, but focusing on representing him
as a client and advocate helped."2 85 And although Kerry did not
mention a particular case, she summarized that she had found that:
[b]y discussing a client or an intake aloud with other
students, or listening to another student describe their
legal issue, I am able to gain the experience of work-
ing with more clients and issues than are presenting
on my personal roster. Moreover, I have learned that
many tasks are improved with group input, whether
it be solving a legal issue, revising a memo or brief,
or managing a difficult ethical issue.286
283 Hannah, supra note 183.
284 See Shruti, supra note 190; Hannah, supra note 232.
285 Jane, supra note 181.
286 Kerry, supra note 184.
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Similarly, while the vast majority of reflection related to ongoing
287
cases, occasionally-as we have seen 2 Strathclyde students were
prompted by classes to revisit earlier cases and reflect on mistakes
they had made due to a lack of awareness or more generally how
they might have dealt with things differently after learning about the
relevant ethical issue. Similarly, when students were asked to reflect
on what they would do differently in light of their experience, a
number showed awareness of the need for treating clients more
sensitively. For example, Kerry learned through an awkward
exchange with one of her first clients that a first encounter might not
be the best time to discuss the details of a client's HIV status.2 88
While this retrospective learning comes too late for the particular
client or others harmed, according to character educationalists, 2 89
lessons learnt from past mistakes go much deeper than learning in
the abstract.
In some cases, as with Jill and John's reflection on the prob-
lem of balancing empathy with detachment,2 90 learning lessons were
strengthened by particular ethical issues arising more than once.
Such repeated encounters allowed students to experiment with
different approaches in an attempt not to repeat past mistakes. We
observed this with Shruti's epiphany in relation to her possible
impinging on client autonomy. 2 9 1 This followed a class on lawyer
paternalism, but in Hannah's case, she drew on her own reflection to
act differently:
287 See Shruti, supra note 200; Catriona, supra note 288; Karen, supra note 229.
288 See Kerry, Self-Reflection Memoranda, Miami (Fall 2013) (on file with the
University of Miami Health Rights Clinic); Tim, supra note 160 ("It would have
been nice to meet with him in the clinic's private room instead of having to meet
with him in the law library where he was subjected to some stares as we walked
through"); see also Sarah, supra note 171 ("I would try to be even more trans-
parent ... and explain why I am asking the questions I am asking.")
289 See Aristotle, supra note 87, at 33 & 214; Dreyfus, supra note 87, at 237;
Kupperman, supra note 87, at 67; Peters supra note 87, at 37; Carr, supra note 88,
at 242; Condlin, supra note 89, at 323; Luban supra note 90, at 636.
290 See John, supra notes 196-197; Hannah, supra note 234; Hakeem, supra note
198.
291 See Shruti, supra notes 193, 202, 203.
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The diaries have aided the learning process, I was
able to read and ponder over issues from earlier
diaries and avoid similar problems arising in future
or dealing with them differently. This was evident as
dealing with a manipulative client in one diary
assisted in keeping my personal feelings of empathy
towards the client in another case separate from the
legal problem. Thus, I did not repeat the same mis-
take of over-empathizing with my second client.29 2
It is difficult to imagine a neater illustration of Kolb's learning
cycle 2 9 3 than that found in her discussion of a concrete experience
("dealing with a manipulative client"), followed by reflection ("I
was able to read and ponder over issues from earlier diaries") and
then active experimentation as the new theory (not over-empathizing
with clients) is applied to "the client in another case."2 94 However,
given that both she and Shruti would have approached their first
case with a theory in mind to apply to their concrete experience, it
can be argued that they actually engaged in two instances of active
experimentation or, put differently, two revolutions of the learning
cycle. The first came in the application of the initial theory to the
first case, followed by reflection and adjustment of theory, which
was then applied to the second case in the second instance of active
experimentation, leading to further reflection-in Hannah's case
that she had got things right but in Shruti's case that she had not.
While reflection on cases-usually in relation to actual
issues raised, but sometimes in relation to those suggested by hypo-
thesizing about different facts or by reflecting on the activities of
292 Hannah, supra note 183.
293 See Kolb, supra note 115.
294 See also Jane, Self Reflection Memoranda, Miami (Spring 2014) (on file with
the University of Miami Health Rights Clinic) (describing her ability to rectify her
failure to sufficiently get to the know a client so as to help them make an
appropriate decision by practicing "this skill" with her new client, thus indicating
how reflection on experience can lead to ethical development, in this case that of
empathy).
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opposing lawyers2 95 -was the main source of reflection and learn-
ing, USLC students were also prompted to reflect on ethics and
- 296--issue of justice by other clinic activities and roles within the
clinic. One source of reflection on ethics, at least for one Strathclyde
student, was negotiation training. This led Hannah to discover that
"there may be elements of deceit involved which is a slight ethical
concern since we may have to conceal information from our
opponent party in the aim of achieving the best deal for our client.
Obviously the other party will be doing the same and we will both
have a reservation price at which we will not settle."2 9 7
Strathclyde students also encountered a range of learning
experiences not open to Miami students due to the fact that the
USLC is largely student run.2 9 8 Thus, six out of nine of the Strath-
clyde cohort had a management role and four of them reflected on
relevant experience. For example, 299 Hannah commented that in her
role as fundraising officer she had made "the grim discovery that
many law firms are only interested in appearing moral and contri-
buting to society to attract clients, yet in reality it seems they are not
willing to actively contribute (financially or otherwise) in improving
access to justice, despite the cuts in legal aid weighing heavily over
society."3 00 She stated that this "certainly gives the impression that
large corporate firms are only interested in the financial gain they
can achieve" and unfavorably contrasted this attitude with the
295 See supra notes 229-30, at 310. See also Karen, Journal Entry, Strathclyde (Fall
2013, Week 5) (on file with the University of Strathclyde Law Clinic) (criticizing
an opposing lawyer for abuse of process by delaying a hearing).
296 We have also seen that Hannah's involvement in the USLC Innocence Project
prompted comments about issues of justice.
297 Hannah, Journal Entries, Strathclyde (Spring 2013, Weeks 5-6) (on file with
the University of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
298 See supra Section II (noting that while several Miami students return to the
clinic for a second year as fellows, and thus have a quasi-managerial and supervis-
ory role, their self-reflections are not at present captured and are not a subject of
this study).
299 See also infra notes 308-09 (noting the comments by Catriona and Hakeem in
their roles as training officer and Initial Advice Clinic organizer).
300 Journal Entry, Strathclyde (Fall 2013, Week 6) (on file with the University of
Strathclyde Law Clinic).
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"student advisors that volunteer their time and effort at no cost but
merely to promote access to justice." Critical comments about
access to justice were also evinced from Catriona when she attended
a pro bono award ceremony at the Houses of Parliament and
reflected on the irony that this was the very place where recent
swingeing legal aid cuts had been passed.301 She then went on to
say:
From a personal perspective, it's interesting to me to
think back and see how much my views and opinions
on this subject have grown since I started Uni two
years ago. I find myself thinking more and more
about how important it is to remember that the need
for pro bono work exists because of the lack of state-
funded resources in this area, and that pro bono
work, in the long term, is more of a stop-gap measure
against the increasingly prohibitive rules of the gov-
ernment.302
Implicit in Catriona's words are the recognition of the impact of role
models, which as we have seen are regarded as an important source
of learning and character development. In both clinics, supervisors
and academic staff involved in clinic work and teaching are likely to
constitute the most visible role models. We have already seen John's
reference to "the guidance of the [Clinic] director." 303 Jill also cited
Frances, a practicing solicitor who teaches Ethics and Justice, in this
regard:
Understanding my ethical approach will help to give
clarity to decision making, most importantly to let
me understand why I making certain decisions. As a
practitioner, Frances added context to this, and
through real life experience was able to bring much
301 Albeit in England and Wales-Scotland controls its own legal aid budget.
302 Journal Entry, Strathclyde (Spring 2014, Week 10) (on file with the University
of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
303 See supra note 286.
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of this to life. This is an affirmation of the value of
the clinical approach to learning, and has given me
the self-confidence to stand firmly by my principles
304
as my career progresses.
Another source of role models in the USLC are the volunteers who
provide training and one-off advice in the Initial Advice Clinics.
Both groups were cited as moral exemplars by Catriona and Jill
who, respectively, were responsible for these activities.
It is very heartening to see how many people are
prepared to give up their time and resources to come
in and do training events for students ... judges,
advocates, solicitors, and lecturers, among others....
In general there is quite a lot of cynicism about the
legal profession, and especially commercial firms,
but it has been nice to realize this year that there are
a lot of people who are prepared to re-invest their
own skills and experience in students, and the Law
Clinic, and that not all lawyers are bad! 30 5
Since January, I have been ... arranging and facilita-
ting fortnightly sessions where legal advice is given
by volunteer practitioners and student Advisors. I
have been heartened by the strength of their commit-
ment to the project and to the pro bono cause in
general. The practitioners are very busy individuals
who are giving of their time at the end of what I'm
sure is a long and often stressful day and gives me a
degree of comfort about the profession I am planning
to enter. I find it concerning that I may end up work-
ing in a company where the bottom line is the only
304 Jill, Journal Entry, Strathclyde (Fall 2013, Week 9) (on file with the University
of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
305 Catriona, Journal Entry, Strathclyde (Spring 2013, Week 2) (on file with the
University of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
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concern, and where client autonomy is at a level
where the practitioners are hooked on the client's
line and there they must stay until the deal is done.
This is my nightmare scenario, and one I must avoid
at all costs, for the sake of my sanity! So it is a relief
for me to see that there may be other options; that
people exist in the profession who care enough about
some of the things that are wrong in our society, and
that these people are offering a professional service
in respected legal firms.3 0 6
Jill returned again to the impact of role models, but this time to
those operating within the clinic itself
We have strong role models in the Law Clinic, and
they help to guide us. In this way, I feel that the Law
Clinic ethos may influence future generations of
solicitors, and, I hope, help to make the lawyering
profession more respected in society, rather than
lawyers being seen merely as "special purpose
friends" preferring the interests of their clients over
all else.3 07
In addition to evidencing the added value of theory to experi-
ential learning though referencing Fried's article on the lawyer as
friend,3 08 Jill also touched upon an important source of learning in
clinics, namely the informal socialization into values found in the
prevailing norms adopted by existing members and passed down
from one generation to another-what the USLC likes to calls its
"ethos" Catriona and Hakeem also noted the potential positive
impact of this ethos and sense of collegiality: the former reflecting
306 Jill, Journal Entry, Strathclyde (Spring 2013, Week 3) (on file with the Univer-
sity of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
307 Catriona, Journal Entry, Strathclyde (Fall 2013, Week 1) (on file with the
University of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
308 Hannah, supra note 234.
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on the USLC's tenth anniversary; and the latter on his two years in
the clinic:
The ten-year event was really good for morale in the
Clinic because it highlighted, and reminded us all, of
the bigger picture: where the Clinic came from, its
ethos, how many people it has helped already, and
where it is going in the future. It made me feel proud
to be part of the Clinic, and lucky to be part of such a
great team of people with the same ideas about
access to justice as I have.3 09
Something that has contributed to me enjoying the
clinic so much is the people and general ethos and
principles that underpin the clinic. There is a real
sense of purpose and enthusiasm within the Clinic
which is something to be celebrated.3 1 0
More specifically, Hakeem attributes his increased drive to promote
access to justice, which was quoted above 3 1 1 to "the attitude of the
whole Clinic which keeps advisors motivated to strive towards
assisting many people in the best way possible."3 12 On the other
hand, the more concentrated nature of the MRC experience and
the student's positive response to its emphasis on teamwork also
contain a potential for students influencing each other's moral
309 Catriona, Journal Entry, Strathclyde (Spring 2014, Week 4) (on file with the
University of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
310 Hakeem, Journal Entry, Strathclyde (Spring 2013, Week 11) (on file with the
University of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
311 Strathclyde, supra note 267.
312 Hakeem, Introduction, Strathclyde (Spring 2013) (on file with the University of
Strathclyde Law Clinic). As argued above, the effect of informal socialization of
this ethos is enhanced by the student ownership and leadership of the clinic (see
note 155), and by student mentoring (see also text accompanying notes 104-05).
However, unlike in Nicolson's previous analysis (supra note 17, at 181), there was
no mention in the diaries analyzed here of learning or teaching moral lessons in
this way.
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views, though reports of learning this way were often confined to
the practical advantages of teamwork,3 13 and in Maria's case a ques-
tioning of the (otherwise) competitive environment of law and law
school:
Before the clinic, I seldom saw people working toge-
ther or helping each other. I think the team effort
involved in the clinic is one of the most unique char-
acteristics of it. It has really taught me that lawyering
should be a team effort. Ultimately we all have the
same end goal, and that is to help our clients.31 4
This sense of common purpose-to improve the plight of the
clinic's clients-also featured in Sarah's reflection:
I am truly enjoying my time in the clinic and love
representing clients, knowing that the hard work I
put in can directly improve their quality of life.... It
has been wonderful to work in such a strong team-
oriented atmosphere. Other students have helped me
tackle challenges and I have been able to help them
in return.... On other teams, I have sometimes found
it challenging when different people have different
visions of an end goal. On this team, however, we
are all figuring out the process together, which has
been extremely helpful and rewarding.3 1 5
In this quotation, Sarah evidences another important source of
learning from experience,3 1 6 namely the feeling of satisfaction at her
313 See Daniela, Self Reflection Memoranda, Miami (Fall 2013 & Spring 2014)
(on file with the University of Miami Health Rights Clinic); Chris, Self Reflection
Memoranda, Miami (Fall 2013) (on file with the University of Miami Health
Rights Clinic).
314 Maria, Self Reflection Memoranda, Miami (Spring 2014) (on file with the
University of Miami Health Rights Clinic).
315 Sarah, Self Reflection Memoranda, Miami (Fall 2013) (on file with the
University of Miami Health Rights Clinic).
316 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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conduct. Other students also expressed satisfaction largely at helping
others, though also at some aspects of interpersonal ethics. Cecelia
noted that using her "education and skills to help people who ...
would otherwise not have access to legal assistance ... has been a
very rewarding experience that has taught me how to deal with
people on a professional level."31 7 Maria reported:
My biggest success has been getting my clients to
trust me and see me as a professional. Some of them
have thanked me, and that makes all the difference in
the world to me because it gives meaning to what I
am doing. I have not enjoyed anything in law school
as much as I am enjoying the work that I am doing in
the clinic. ... It is truly satisfying to work with
people who have nothing, and are so grateful for all
the help we offer them.318
In Nicolson's early study, some students specifically linked the
rewarding nature of helping clients to their intention to enhance
access to justice after qualification.319 Here, Cecilia hinted at such a
link by preceding the comments quoted above 3 2 0 with the acknowl-
edgement that "the clinic has helped bolster my confidence in my
professional identity.,, 3 2 1 Tim's express reference to his career plans
in relation to his positive experience in helping in a passage quoted
above 32 2 strongly suggests that he found this experience rewarding.
The converse of feelings of satisfaction are those of regret at
one's conduct and these equally can have a profound effect on learn-
ing. Here, we have already seen Hannah's expression of disappoint-
ment at her inability to put her personal moral views aside when
317 Maria, supra note 313; see also Daniela, supra note 312; Hannah, supra note
294.
318 Maria, supra note 313.
319 Nicolson, supra note 17, at 181.
320 Maria, supra note 313.
321 id.
322 Strathclyde, supra note 280.
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32faced with a client accused of abusing patients.323 In other cases,
regret was expressed at the quality of work done for clients. Thus,
having to write with bad news to a client was for Karen "one of the
hardest things I've done in [the] law clinic from an emotional stand-
point. This was partly due to the fact that mistakes were made on this
case and I had a strong feeling of having let the client down., 324
While none of these students made clear how such feelings would
impact on their future behavior, it is difficult to believe that concern
at past failings would not cause them to act differently in the future.
While the above discussion shows that students can learn
from their own feelings or thoughts or the examples provided by
others, we have also repeatedly seen how the Strathclyde students
drew explicitly or implicitly on their seminar reading and class
discussion to help then resolve or at least grapple with issues which
arose in their cases. Moreover, some325 were prompted to indepen-
dently discover relevant literature, though it is difficult to know to
what extent this was always motivated by a thirst for knowledge
rather than a desire to ensure higher marks. While in some cases the
brief introduction to ethics in the induction training was enough to
sensitize students to issues, without exposing them to the relevant
academic writing on ethics and justice and helping them to gain a
better appreciation of the ethical tools and ideas about justice their
- 326response to issues remained superficial and unsophisticated, and
sometimes unduly complacent.327 In other words, just as we noted
earlier that experiential learning "occurs not in the doing but in the
reflection and conceptualization that takes place during and after the
event," 328 it is equally true that such reflection and conceptualization
is considerably enhanced by relevant classes and reading. Indeed,
for one student at least, such class discussion and reading was what
gave reflection its value and point.
323 Fried, supra note 233; Hannah, supra note 234.
324 Karen, Journal Entries, Strathclyde (Spring 2013, Weeks 5-6) (on file with the
University of Strathclyde Law Clinic).
325 See e.g. supra notes 197-98 and 235 and accompanying text.
326 See supra notes 236-38, and accompanying text.
327 See supra notes 217, 226-27 and accompanying text.
328 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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I have always had a rather poor opinion of self-reflec-
tion and its effects upon learning. However I feel this
set of diaries have really helped me to see the benefits
of reflection when learning. ... [W]hat I found really
helped me was each week having a seminar topic to
think about as I wrote my diaries.... For me this made
the diaries more of a "real" experience because I
could almost see an automatic linking between the
seminar, reflecting in the diaries and then the learn-
ing. This meant reflective learning was no longer
easily assigned to its own neat little box which could
be completed and then entirely ignored.32 9
However, the students' reflections were not a solitary exercise, but
were considerably enhanced by the different perspectives of others
particularly those with greater experience and a deeper theoretical
knowledge. In both clinics, such processes occurred in class and in
supervision meetings, which in the case of the MRHC were held
weekly rather than sporadically as at in the USLC (except for during
Ethics and Justice), and were coupled with mid-semester oral
evaluations. However, as discussions in these fora were not captured
in writing, their impact cannot be gauged. By contrast, as we have
repeatedly seen, the provision of written responses to the Strathclyde
students played an important role in enhancing their moral sensi-
tivity and judgment. Such academic interventions:
* alerted students to potentially problematic ethical issues
which they had overlooked 3 30 or which if they noticed, had
regarded as unproblematic;
* exposed them to new issues through imagining alternative
versions of the facts of their cases or by asking whether a
329 Karen, Introduction, Strathclyde (Fall 2013) (on file with the University of
Strathclyde Law Clinic).
330 See supra note 232 and accompanying text; cf notes 212-216 and accompany-
ing discussion (showing how such an intervention would have allowed buried
ethical issues to surface).
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possibly immoral solution which they had not contemplated
might ever be justified;
* required students to clarify for themselves the exact nature of
- * *331their ethical stance on particular issues;
* referred students to relevant reading to enhance their under-
standing of issues;33 2
* encouraged students to adopt new perspectives in dealing
with dilemmas,33 3 think more deeply and in a more sophisti-
cated way about issues they had raised 3 3 4 or justify ethical
positions they had taken.3 35
IV. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the student's clinical and learning
experience had an impact on their awareness of micro- and macro-
ethical issues, and, to a lesser extent, meso-ethical issues. Moreover,
even taking into account the possibility that the views of some were
designed to garner good grades, many seem to be genuinely moti-
vated by their experiences to want to act in an ethical and altruistic
way once they graduate. Of course, at this stage there is no way of
knowing that they will go on to do so, especially given the many
powerful countervailing institutional, financial, family and personal
336pressures. However, personal contact with other students who
have gone through the clinical experience and expressed a desire to
act altruistically and ethically indicates that many are doing so. For
instance, a student in Nicolson's earlier study who stated that before
his clinic experience "I had imagined a career in a large law firm
and hadn't really considered the larger ideal of social justice" and
331 See supra note 193. See also John, supra note 268 (responding to being forced
to clarify why he entered USLC if he was not interested in social justice).
332 See supra notes 204, 242.
333 See supra note 169.
334 See supra notes 192, 197, 209, 211 & 235.
335 See supra note 237; see also Journal Entry, Strathclyde (Fall 2013, Week 5) (on
file with the University of Strathclyde Law Clinic) (discussing conunents ques-
tioning Karen's categorization of delaying tactics as an abuse of process).
336 See supra notes 75-77.
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that [n]ow I find it impossible not to" 3 3 7 has followed a career path
working for charities. Moreover, the volunteers at USLC's Initial
Advice Clinics largely comprise its alumni. Similarly, two MHRC
alumni are currently working as public interest fellows and many
have volunteered their time on pro bono matters. Clearly, there is a
need to track the careers of alumni of both clinics to determine more
systematically whether they have maintained the ethical and altruis-
tic commitments espoused in their self-evaluations and diaries, and
whether their ethical and altruistic behavior differs in any way from
law graduates who have not been taught ethics in the context of live-
client clinic experience. It would also be interesting to see whether
the professional behavior of Miami and Strathclyde graduates differ
given the difference between their clinical, educational and reflec-
tive experiences, as well as their orientation towards justice which
they brought with them when commencing their clinic involvement.
As regards differences in design and educational objectives
between the two clinics, they do not seem to have a noticeable
impact on their ability to foster awareness of social justice issues,
and inculcate or sustain a commitment to play a role in enhancing
social justice on graduation. Given that Strathclyde students are
screened according to their existing commitment to social justice,
compared to the Miami students, they might start and end up at
higher levels in terms of the strength and durability of such commit-
ment. However, contrary to the prior assumption made by Nicol-
son, 338 the mere fact that all students participate in the MRC for
academic credit does not by itself mean that its potential to inculcate
altruism is undermined. This had become apparent from his grafting
of the Clinical LLB onto the predominantly social justice-oriented
and extra-curricular USLC. But, given that the clinic remains largely
extra-curricular, it can always be said that this is the reason for the
continued dominance of the social justice ethos.
However, the Miami students' self-evaluations seem to show
that the issue is, not so much whether particular clinics do or do not
337 Nicolson, supra note 17, at 181.
338 Nicolson, supra note 11.
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provide credit for clinic activities, but whether their prevailing ethos
prioritizes serving the community over providing students with
skills and knowledge. In fact, even if clinics do teach skills and legal
knowledge directly for their own sake, rather than merely to ensure
that the community receives effective services, the Miami students
show that they will not necessarily see clinic work as merely a
means to their educational and vocational needs if they are also
taught, their tutors model, and the prevailing clinic ethos upholds the
idea that client and community needs must take precedence over
those of students. If so, while a social justice orientation may be less
prone to being undermined in extra-curricular clinics than in those
where the educational needs of students are prioritized, there is no
necessary connection between volunteerism and prioritizing com-
munity service over educational goals. Moreover, given that it is
possible to assess students on the effort and empathy with which
they serve their clients rather than their skills or knowledge gained,
it would seem that in terms of ethical development the main advan-
tage of extra-curricular over curricular clinics, is that their cost-
effectiveness enables them to expose more students over a longer
period to the potentially transformative experience of assisting vul-
nerable members of the community.
On the other hand, when it comes to using clinical experi-
ence to teach micro- and meso-ethics, and (to the extent that it
benefits from classes on access to justice and the opportunity for
reflection) macro-ethics as well, curricular programs have consider-
able advantages in exposing students to class reading and discus-
sion, and in requiring them to reflect on both theory and experience.
Yet, to the extent that clinics try to ensure that students are rendered
practice-ready, opportunities for ethical teaching and reflection are
reduced. As we saw, the type of cases undertaken also affects
learning opportunities, with the more specialist nature of the
MHRC, as well as the fact that dialogue with students about their
reflections was not confined to learning ethical lessons as at Strath-
clyde where there is a separate supervision process to address the
quality of services, appearing to result in a narrower range of (partic-
ularly meso-) ethical issues than those discussed by the Strathclyde
students. Similarly, differences in the demographic profile of the
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two clinics' clientele affected the extent of the students' exposure to
issues of social justice and access to justice, and hence the extent to
which they might be conscientized by their experience. Admittedly,
these differences owe much to the better provision of legal aid and
social welfare benefits in Scotland. Nevertheless, it remains true that
those who want to inculcate altru-ethical professionalism through
clinical experience need to think carefully about the nature of the
case-work undertaken, the profile of the clients served and what, if
any, other educational goals are pursued. Also relevant is whether
students are given a role in clinic management and mentoring.
We thus see how comparisons between the two clinics and
their educational programs provide much "food for thought" for
those seeking to enhance the apparent ethical and altruistic effect of
clinics. Similar benefit is derived from comparing the different
formats of student reflection. Indeed, both authors have re-assessed
the role that reflection plays in the ethical learning of their students.
As discussed above, 3 39 the typology of the written student reflection
varies widely between the two clinics, and can be organized along a
continuum relating to the following modalities:
* Reflection first versus theory first
* Oral versus written
* Summative versus episodic/on-going
* Brief versus extensive
* Directed versus open-ended
* Monologue versus dialogue340 (sometimes including
more than two persons).
We also saw that, prior to this study, Newman had developed a
methodology that had MHIRC students largely reflecting directly on
their experiences in advance of the introduction of formal ethical
339 See supra Section 111(a).
340 And where there is a dialogue whether it is between the student and a super-
visor concerned with ensuring quality services as well as educating students, as is
the case at the MRC, or between student and an academic only concerned with
education, as at the USLC.
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theory. Written reflection in the MHRC is also relatively brief,
summative and directed. Nicolson's methodology involved reflec-
tion following initial theoretical discussion and being captured in
lengthy and broad-ranging entries, written on a frequent basis
(episodic) and in response to very open-ended prompts. Importantly,
too, for this discussion, dialogue between professor and clinic
student is conducted orally at Miami but in writing at Strathclyde
dialogue. Clearly, these differences affected the quality of reflection
and learning in ways that are instructive for clinicians who seek to
inculcate an altru-ethical professional identity in their students.
Thus, the comparative brevity of the Miami self-evaluations
and their coverage of all course learning objectives meant not only
that students were discouraged from fully exploring ethical issues in
the written reflections undertaken, but also that we learn less about
the clinic's impact on their ethical development. By contrast, the
requirement of making both regular and lengthy entries meant that
Strathclyde students were forced to reveal their thoughts, feelings
and values in far more detail and the reader can more easily observe
that student growth without interpretation by the supervisors. On the
other hand, the fact that the Miami students reflected at set times in
the semester and were given specific prompts to which to respond
encouraged them to reflect far more in overall changes in their atti-
tudes, values and behavior. Some Strathclyde students did engage in
a similar reflection on their overall growth in the introductions to
their diaries, but these were not compulsory nor were students
specifically encouraged, let alone directed, to reflect on changes in
their ethical knowledge and values.
But perhaps the biggest difference between the two types of
reports is the opportunity offered to Strathclyde students to submit
their diaries for comments in order to deepen and broaden lessons
learnt. While it is true that face to face supervision at the MRC
might have had a similar impact, giving students a longer time to
reflect on their responses to tutor suggestions might lead to greater
thoughtfulness, and requiring students to commit their answers to
paper is likely to make the lessons more memorable. On the other
hand, face-to-face dialogue allows tutors to probe student thinking
in greater depth and correct misconceptions. This suggests to us that
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clinical teachers should make an effort to provide frequent oppor-
tunities for students to engage in written reflection on ethical issues,
and that they should strive to provide at least some written responses
that do not replace, but rather help to concretize and capture, impor-
tant elements of the oral dialogue that is so invaluable in good
clinical teaching. We also found that asking students to summarize
their development regarding issues of justice and ethics was useful
both to us in helping us understand the "clinic effect" as well as to
the students in bringing home those lessons.
Analyzing this material was valuable to us, not only in
providing further evidence of the alleged clinic effect on ethical
development and altruistic commitment, but also in allowing both
clinics to learn from each other. Thus, in the light of this analysis,
Newman has altered her learning goals and the prompts she gives
students on written reflection assignments to specifically ask them to
reflect on what they have learned about access to justice and the role
of lawyers in an effort to make the clinic's social justice mission
more transparent to students, and has also expanded the ethics
reflection prompt to include an unlimited number of examples.
Similarly, because this comparative analysis of her students' reflec-
tions revealed that MHRC students (like many American lawyers
and law students), were inclined to see "ethics" as rule-based, rather
than encompassing issues of role morality, social justice, etc.,
Newman has revised sections of her clinical seminar-including
having Nicolson guest lecture for one class-in an effort to teach
against the prevailing U.S. norms that confine law school ethical
teaching to the ethical rules. In this respect the clinic seminar also
spends more time discussing issues of detachment and empathy,
ends/means, and paternalism, as the comparison of USLC and
MRC revealed that USLC students were more sophisticated in
identifying and considering these issues.
Having not only reviewed the written reflections of both
cohorts, but having also had the opportunity to hear from and
observe the managerial work of the USLC students, Newman is con-
sidering whether, and how, to incorporate a larger role for Miami
students in the organization and operation of the clinic, both as a
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means of fostering greater student ownership and commitment and
to hopefully ensure that the clinic's ethos and social justice mission
and orientation survive beyond any single faculty member's own
vision and direction of the clinic. Some of the most obvious
limitations in the reflective writings of MHRC students as compared
to those of USLC's, however, have seemed the most vexing to
remedy. While ideally Newman would like to have her students
memorialize their reflections on some of these issues on a weekly
basis and to capture in writing some of the student reflection and
supervisor feedback at frequent intervals, the daily demands and
expectations for the volume of legal work she has placed on both
herself and her students has thus far thwarted this goal. The provi-
sion of service to (yet more) clients continues to prevail over this
worthy academic goal.
Nicolson, on the other hand, has already made compulsory
an introduction to each semester's set of diary entries as well as to
all diaries written over the course of the Clinical LLB in which
students are encouraged to consider the extent to which their clinical
and educational experience have changed their attitudes, values, and
behavior. Observing the difference between the more open-ended
nature of his students' reflection and the more constrained reflection
of the HiRC students, he has also decided to give his students even
greater autonomy by abandoning specific word limits for entries,
responses and introductions and replacing this with an overall word
length so that students can tailor their level of reflection to the issue
discussed. Finally, he is keen to try and extend his dialogue with the
students beyond the current situation where students respond to his
comments on their entries in order to responds to their responses
with the aim of deepening their reflection and knowledge and
understanding of ethics even further. However, like Newman, the
other demands on his time, flowing from the fact that he is a full-
time academic and director of a large and multi-faceted clinic which
like the NMRC emphasizes service to the community over student
education, mean that it is the latter goal which is regarded as taking
precedence over ethics teaching. Indeed, as we have repeatedly
116
A Tale of Two Clinics
stressed,341 to the extent that teaching takes precedence over com-
munity service, both clinics are likely to undermine the very ethical
message that they are trying to convey, namely that assisting those
most in need and placing client needs over those of self are the
highest moral duties that a lawyers can uphold. Fortunately, the
words of the students analyzed in this article suggest that this
message and more generally, the importance of ethics seems to be
having an effect.
341 See supra note 11 and text accompanying notes 118-119.
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